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This thesis examines the role antebellum southern cultural paradigms played in 
Confederate military operations during the American Civil War. The prewar honor 
culture of the white southern male elite was intensely focused on chivalric values of 
courage, masculinity, piety, pride, contempt for cowardice, and loyalty. When war broke 
out between the United States and Confederacy, the southern elite moved from their 
prewar position as economic, political, and social leaders to military commanders. The 
violent and militaristic culture that characterized the prewar southern elite guided their 
actions as the military leadership of the Confederacy. Using the written record of the 
Confederate elite, campaign overviews, secondary literature about the period, and 
statistical studies of the Confederate army, this thesis finds strong evidence of the impact 
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INTRODUCTION: SOUTHERNERS, SOLDIERS, AND SLAVERY 
 
 This thesis examines the role of antebellum southern culture and its place in 
Confederate military operations during the American Civil War (1861-1865). Using 
paradigms of white southern elite behavior first identified by authors such as Bertram 
Wyatt-Brown, Kenneth S. Greenberg, John Hope Franklin, and W. J. Cash, the thesis 
demonstrates the ways that violence, militarism, elitism, and masculinity affected the 
strategies, operations, and tactics of Confederate commanders. It evaluates the concept of 
southern cultural uniqueness and the ways that combat reflected cultural paradigms 
specific to the region. By concentrating on the antebellum values of elite southerners 
during the Civil War, the thesis reveals how important peacetime cultural principles 
shaped the wartime setting. In short, this thesis determines how cultural patterns of the 
antebellum southern elite affected their approach to warfare. Examining this question 
fully requires determining how Confederate military practices differed from prevailing 
military dictums of the time. To this end, the thesis examines the military context of 
Napoleonic Europe to demonstrate how Confederate operations both reflected 
contemporary military tactics and departed from them. This style of historical inquiry 
uses traditional military history techniques to assess battlefield operations, but 
concentrates on newer methods of cultural history. In addition, the thesis undertakes a 
statistical appraisal of Confederate battlefield performance. By examining the written 
record of the officers and through data-driven research, it answers the central question of 
how antebellum cultural patterns affected Confederate operations. 
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 Assessing how southern cultural values shaped the Confederate military requires 
three distinct sets of historical documents: primary literature from the officer class, 
secondary literature from southern cultural historians, and statistical data from the battles 
and campaigns of the war. The writings of Confederate commanders reveal their 
motivations and beliefs during the war. The secondary literature of the period offers 
crucial insight into the primary record. Secondary literature like Bertram Wyatt-Brown’s 
Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South, W. J. Cash’s The Mind of the 
South, Kenneth S. Greenberg’s Honor and Slavery: Lies, Duels, Noses, Mash, Dressing 
as a Woman, Gifts, Strangers, Humanitarianism, Death, Slave Rebellions, the Pro-
Slavery Arguments, Baseball, Hunting, and Gambling in the Old South, and John Hope 
Franklin’s The Militant South, 1800-1861 lays the framework for understanding the 
unique regional character of the antebellum South that defined how southerners 
approached their daily lives.
1
 
Elite white males, who belonged to the planter class of the southern slavocracy 
also dominated the officer class of the Confederacy during the war. Determining what 
they believed before the war is central to understanding how they conducted the southern 
war effort. Wyatt-Brown, Greenberg, and Franklin have argued convincingly that 
southern society was characterized by a deeply formulaic and militaristic honor code that 
governed the daily lives of whites. This honor code was a major part of the slave society 
that guided white male behavior and informed its adherents how to reinforce their status 
within the social caste. Central to this highly public form of social display was the slave 
system itself. Race-based slavery in the southern states was a brutal, violent, and endemic 
factor in the lives of every southerner. Violence between master and slave, both physical 
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and psychological, served as a major form of social control over the large black subject 
population. But despite the commonplace nature of violence between master and slave, 
white society did not limit its viciousness to white on black relationships. As Wyatt-
Brown, Greenberg, Franklin, and others have pointed out, violence took place frequently 
between members of white southern society. This violence depended on the highly 
ritualized honor code that if violated could result in duels, fighting, and personal 
vendettas. Violence informed and underlined all of the public actions of elite white 
males, and thus the slaveholding class was eminently more familiar and predisposed to 
violence than their northern counterparts. As the overarching paradigm of southern 
culture, honor remains the best way to understand Confederate military strategy. 
Determining the extent of southern honor’s influence during the war requires 
understanding what actions and beliefs allowed southerners to express their credentials as 
honorable men. Many historians argue that southern gentlemen emphasized courage, 
aggression, pride, a severe disdain for cowardice, and an exaggerated display of 
masculinity as manifestations of their honor. Impugning any of these values typically 
resulted in violence, often through brawling or dueling. This thesis argues that the values 
of aggression, courage, and Confederate commanders’ need to protect their honor and 
masculinity shaped the operations of Confederate armies. The battles and campaigns of 
the Civil War reveal the markers of honor-driven behavior. The historical record of 
Confederate leaders’ decision making reflects the ways their cultural values affected their 
battle and campaign behavior. For example, the personal aggression that shaped 
operational or tactical-level decisions produced a consistent pattern of Confederate field 
commanders initiating contact with the enemy or pursuing Union forces at a higher rate 
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than their Union counterparts. However, to separate this cultural aggression from 
Confederate commanders’ expected aggressiveness in the context of battlefield 
maneuver, the thesis also explores European tactics and more orthodox battlefield 
maneuver. While honor is the primary focus of this work, Confederate officers made 
decisions based on other factors, including military education, experience, and personal 
character. Battlefields during the nineteenth century were places of complexity and 
confusion. Fear, hunger, field conditions, personal motivations, chance, the “fog of war,” 
and technology all influenced the behavior of soldiers and their officers during battle. 
This thesis acknowledges the complexities of warfare while focusing on one specific, and 
vital, factor shaping the behavior of Confederate commanders: honor. 
To evaluate the effects of aggressive tactical, operational, and strategic decisions, 
the thesis scrutinizes the course of the Civil War’s campaigns. To that end, it divides the 
war into two distinct phases: the Confederacy ascendant (opening moves to Gettysburg 
and Vicksburg) and the tide turned (Overland Campaign to the war’s end). In each of the 
phases, the thesis provides examples of Confederate commanders whose cultural 
background influenced their conduct, and offers battlefield examples of their 
aggressiveness, courage, and masculinity. It also examines commanders’ efforts to avoid 
actions that might gain them the moniker of coward and how such concerns changed the 
way they led their men. The last of these points is particularly enlightening for 
understanding the role of southern culture in battle. For antebellum southern men, the 
social stigma associated with cowardice was a source of great shame. With the 
Confederate states at war, southern gentlemen suddenly had a national stage to prove 
their courage and masculinity in battle. As Southern aristocrat and Confederate colonel 
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James B. Griffin wrote to his wife, explaining his desire to prove his masculinity, “I have 
so far never had the fortune to be engaged with the Enemy — I hope however, if it shall 
ever be my fortune to be engaged with them, that my conduct will be such, that if I do not 
merit your praise, will not cause you to feel ashamed.”2 Such motives shaped the 
behavior of southern commanders on campaign and resulted in a demonstrable difference 
in officer casualty rates between the two armies, in deaths of high ranking commanders, 
in the tendency of officers to overexpose themselves and their men to fire, and in a 
disdain for retreat. In effect, the cultural values of the Confederate officer class reflected 
the society-wide attachment to the heroic warrior, often at the expense of military 
common sense and the lives of Confederate soldiers. 
Despite the outcome of the Civil War, Confederate commanders have a historical 
reputation for being more effective than their Union counterparts. But despite examples 
like Robert E. Lee and Thomas Jackson, were Confederate commanders more effective 
than their Union counterparts? Evaluating the South’s conduct of the war through a 
cultural lens inevitably leads to comparisons between the effectiveness of the two sides. 
The thesis will explore whether the Confederacy’s commanders’ adherence to their 
cultural norms helped or hurt their military’s chances on the battlefield. However, the 
thesis does not simply summarize the already well-worn historical debate over 
Confederate battle tactics, but locates the cultural imperatives that influenced those 
tactics. Much of the research about Confederate tactics focuses on the South’s quest for a 
“decisive battle” and argues that Confederate commanders wasted their meager resources 
on the offensive, when defensive actions and guerrilla fighting might have sustained their 
efforts longer. This thesis approaches this debate obliquely, without passing judgment on 
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either argument. Instead, it shows how southern antebellum cultural patterns shaped the 
Confederate war effort. This discussion does not seek to answer whether the Confederacy 
conducted the war in a manner that maximized its armies’ effectiveness, but instead asks 
how cultural values ultimately impacted battlefield performance. In order to understand 
how southern antebellum cultural uniqueness shaped Confederate commanders the thesis 
evaluates how southern forces performed differently than their Union opponents because 
of their cultural background. This discussion also contains a summary of the prevailing 
military patterns in the Western world, and how Napoleonic methods of warfare 
manifested themselves in both Union and Confederate armies. 
Beyond looking at the campaigns, finding evidence of how culture effected 
Confederate operations involves examining more directly the men making the decisions. 
The written record of the Confederate officer corps opens a window into their 
motivations and emotions. Many Confederate officers who survived the war, and many 
who did not, left a record of memoirs, letters, diaries, and other primary documents that 
discuss their emotions, decisions, and thought processes on the battlefield. These writings 
expose the main cultural paradigms of southern honor culture. Did officers write about 
courage? Did they talk about attacking the enemy for honor’s sake? What was the role of 
aggression on the battlefield? Was guerrilla warfare acceptable, or did it violate notions 
of gentlemanly conduct? Did fear of cowardice motivate their decision making? Was 
there a link between masculinity and battlefield performance in the minds of these men? 
These questions all speak to the motivations of the Confederate officer corps. Many more 
qualified works, especially James McPherson’s For Cause and Comrades: Why Men 
Fought in the Civil War, have examined what motived soldiers on both sides.
3
 This thesis 
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expounds upon questions of motivation by exploring how deeply ingrained cultural 
values proved a guiding force in Confederate decision making. 
Exploring the motivations and decisions of the Confederate officer class requires 
primary resources produced by men who were part of the unique culture explained by 
Wyatt-Brown and others. While the violence, racism, and brutality that characterized 
slavery in the Old South certainly affected the entire white male population, the 
slaveholding class will remain the primary focus of this work for several reasons. By and 
large, this class transitioned seamlessly from peacetime leadership roles to the wartime 
officer class. They possessed both the requisite social standing and cultural background 
to assume command and influence battlefield decisions. Officer class positions 
represented a birthright indicator of social status for these men, though many possessed 
prior military experience. Social status helped guarantee elite white men officer 
commissions and much of the junior officer corps were the sons of the elite planter class.
4
 
The thesis also explores the military school tradition and how it shaped the South’s 
militant culture, drawing on studies such as Long Gray Lines: the Southern Military 
School Tradition, 1839-1915 by Andrew Rod Jr.
5
 
Establishing the antebellum South’s unique attachment to violence naturally lends 
itself to studying the region’s antebellum relationship to America’s military and military 
schools. Elite white southerners enjoyed a strong affiliation with the United States’ 
military and attended both northern and southern military schools. Before and during the 
Civil War, military schools furnished a large percentage of the Confederate military 
leadership. Thus, the thesis primarily explores the writings of officers who obtained the 
military rank of major or higher, in order to focus on men exposed to the hazards and 
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duties of command on at least the battalion level. Such officers commanded units large 
enough to influence the course of a battle, and were usually well-schooled students of 
military theory and capable of independent decision making. Though the rank of major 
did not traditionally command a battalion (colonels, lieutenant colonels, and brigadier 
generals held that responsibility), majors could take such commands in extenuating 
circumstances. Moreover, majors represented the lowest rung of field officers and were 
valuable members of any army’s general staff. Still, the thesis focuses on the writing of 
men who made military decisions above the rank of major: colonels, generals, and other 
key decision-making officers who affected the course of battles as a result of their 
actions. Such officers exercised command roles and proved among the most prominent 
leaders of the antebellum southern elite. Their writings thus exist at the intersection 
between social and military distinction. 
Along with primary documents produced by the southern military elite and 
secondary works on southern culture, this thesis employs a third set of historical data: the 
statistics of war. Despite recent revisions to the overall number of war dead, our 
statistical knowledge of battlefield casualties has changed relatively little since the 
1860s.
6
 Examining the casualty data of the war comes with its own set of issues, 
specifically missing records from some southern states, but that does not preclude their 
effectiveness for examining military tactics. This is especially true of battle-by-battle 
casualty records and the records of specific regiments. By examining these sources and 
looking at the conduct of battles, this thesis seeks the statistical markers of southern 
antebellum honor culture. These sources answer particular questions about the nature of 
Confederate battlefield strategy: were Confederate armies more likely to attack? Did 
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Confederate units experience high casualties as a result of their cultural attachment to 
aggression? Were Confederate officers killed or wounded at a higher rate? The thesis also 
applies advanced mathematical combat calculations like force ratios to Civil War battles. 
Force ratios are derived by comparing the number of men present on the battlefield for 
each army and the relationship between army size and casualties incurred.
7
 These types 
of calculations, which have recently become more common in military histories, enable a 
reexamination of Confederate and Union performance on the battlefield. Thus, the thesis 
combines the words of the Confederate officer corps and a data-driven approach to 
understand more fully how antebellum honor culture shaped the experiences of 
Confederate armies. 
The Confederate military, led by the South’s antebellum social elite, was deeply 
influenced by the region’s heritage of honor. Living in a society culturally distinct from 
its northern counterpart, white southerners emphasized aggression, violence, masculinity, 
bravery, and a virulent disdain for cowardice. When the South transitioned from peace to 
war, the cultural paradigms of the southern elite moved seamlessly from guiding 
plantation life to running a military machine. This work determines how the culture of the 
antebellum South influenced Confederate military decisions by evaluating the voices of 
the region’s military leadership and the statistical outcomes of the war’s battles. 
Examining the cultural context and statistical consequences of Confederate commanders’ 
military decisions shines new light on the nature of the Confederate war effort. 
Combining these three methods of historical inquiry shows how the South’s antebellum 
honor culture helped shape the Confederacy’s battlefield performance. Confederate 
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officers lived and fought each day governed by a code of honor instilled in them as 
children, and their beliefs helped shape the Confederate military’s performance. 
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CHAPTER 1: MOONLIGHT, MAGNOLIAS, AND MILITARISM: THE 
ANTEBELLUM SOUTHERN HONOR CULTURE 
 
 
 In his last published novel, The Reivers, southern writer William Faulkner 
departed from many of his more complicated stylistic techniques and wrote a lighthearted 
and satirical work. Despite its often flippant tone, the novel has a moment of seriousness, 
when the main character’s grandfather lectures him for stealing his car: “A gentleman can 
live through anything. He faces anything. A gentleman accepts the responsibility of his 
actions and bears the burden of their consequences.”1 The story’s grandfather hearkens 
back to a forgotten past, reminding his young ward that southern men were once believed 
to be men of honor, bound by implied codes of conduct that regulated and governed 
social interactions. For the grandfather, this semi-legendary time, the South’s heyday, 
took place before the destruction wrought by the Civil War, when in popular southern 
memory, stately manors dotted an idyllic countryside populated by lordly Christian 
gentlemen and irreproachably pure women. The slaves adored their paternalistic masters, 
who disciplined their servants from love rather than cruelty. In this vision of the South, 
moonlit paths wound under yawning magnolia trees to beautifully palatial plantation 
homes, and noble and graceful gentlemen who recalled the great feudal barons of 
medieval England led a smiling and happy populace. Despite its quixotic nature, this 
imagining of the South remained enduring and strong. The grandfather Faulkner created 
represented southerners who longed for a return to an impossible vision of the Old South, 





The American Civil War (1861-1865) proved an unmitigated disaster for the 
Confederate States of America. As many as four hundred thousand southern men became 
war casualties, 18 percent of white males eligible for military service died, and Yankee 
armies occupied the South.
3
 Together, the Confederate states spent 2.1 billion dollars on 
the war, its enslaved black population secured freedom with the aid of Yankee bayonets, 
cotton production plummeted, income fell 40 percent per capita, and battlegrounds 
scarred once fertile lands from Virginia to Texas.
4
 But the South’s intellectual and 
cultural elite remained unbowed and defiant. Southern gentlemen across the defeated 
Confederacy took solace in a phrase they repeated over and over, “all has been lost save 
honor.” Their defiance sprang from a longstanding southern attachment to honor that 
shaped their unique regional culture. Equally important, these antebellum cultural values 
also influenced how southern gentlemen directed the Confederate war effort, military 
strategy, and tactics. Focusing on the Confederate officer corps, which constituted the 
prewar southern aristocracy, this study argues that Confederate officers’ cultural 
background helped shape their military decisions. The southern antebellum elite blended 
their prewar cultural paradigms with prevailing European military practices, which 
together governed Confederate officers’ military strategies and decisions. 
Despite four years of war, the destruction of their society, and the harsh 
realization of defeat, the southern elite remained defiant because of their antebellum 
culture of honor and conceptions of honorable defeat. Wars are not conducted in a 
vacuum; generals lead armies and make choices based on values, rationalizations, and 
paradigms arising from the cultures in which they are educated.
5
 The Confederate officer 
corps was the product of a unique plantation culture whose members viewed honor, 
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courage, justice, and masculinity as the highest ideals.
6
 George Grenfell, a Confederate 
colonel during the war, explained this cultural obsession with violence and bravery: “The 
only way in which an officer could acquire influence over the Confederate soldier was by 
his personal conduct under fire. They hold a man in great esteem who in action sets them 
an example of contempt for danger; but they think nothing of an officer who is not in the 
habit of leading them. In fact such a man could not possibly retain his position.”7 
Understanding how southern culture affected Confederate military tactics begins by 
detailing what made antebellum southern culture unique. 
 The United States, despite dynamic spatial growth, a burgeoning economy, and 
emergent international standing, was torn apart between 1861 and 1865 by internal 
divisions that arose long before the nation’s descent into war. Cultural differences lay at 
the heart of the sectional divide, with the southern states embracing unique notions of 
honor, courage, and masculinity. These components of the South’s peacetime honor 
culture shaped how the white southern elite conducted military operations during the 
Civil War. Inherent in a study examining the culture of a social group lies the dichotomy 
between how the group viewed itself and how it actually functioned. The antebellum 
southern aristocracy proved no exception to this gulf between perception and reality 
because the group invested heavily in the creation and promulgation of its own myths, 
standards, and paradigms. Examining the disconnect between what southern gentlemen 
believed themselves to be and how they actually lived offers a clearer picture of the 
southern elite before and during the war. 
 The southern aristocracy’s cultural heritage differed significantly from its 
northern counterpart for several reasons. Both northern and southern white cultures 
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shared a common British heritage, but southerners believed they descended from the 
English aristocracy.
8
 The southern elite saw their intellectual, spiritual, and ancestral 
predecessors as the Royalists who fought in the English Civil War of 1642-1651. The war 
pitted Puritan Parliamentarians, known as Roundheads, against Anglican Royalists, or 
Cavaliers, and ended in 1651 with the Royalist defeat at the Battle of Worcester. The 
Roundheads deposed the English monarch, Charles I, and established a Puritan 
government led by Oliver Cromwell. Cromwell’s short-lived reign helped shape the 
antebellum cultural divide in the future United States. Contrasting themselves to the 
Puritan descendants of Massachusetts and the North, southern aristocrats identified with 
the Cavaliers, the losing side in the English Civil War. Later historians have found deeper 
genealogical links between the southern population and Irish and Scottish immigrants, 
but the southern elite’s identification with Cavalier culture shaped their behavior.9 
 The mystique of Cavalier society occupied a significant place in the minds of 
southern gentleman, who embraced concepts of chivalry, fidelity, and honor that they 
believed the Cavaliers exemplified.
10
 Southern planters traced their ancestry to the 
Cavaliers, who in defeat and exile settled and populated the tidewater states of Virginia, 
Maryland, and the Carolinas, far removed from the Puritan colonists to the north. As the 
southern states grew in population and expanded westward, speculators, settlers, and 
surveyors took their cultural heritage with them, spreading their culture far from the 
Atlantic coast.
11
 Much like the English aristocracy, the planters’ lordly culture centered 
on the manor house and the land that furnished their wealth.
12
 By the end of the 
seventeenth century, the southern plantation culture relied on the use of slave labor and 





violence and racism intrinsic in this slave society helped reinforce southern whites’ 
cultural proclivity for vigilance and aggressiveness, a pattern of behavior justified by 
slaves’ status as property.14 This plantation culture based on collective memory and land-
based wealth, moved west with slavery, shaping southern life from Virginia to Texas. 
The cultural homogeneity of the South gave the region’s elite a cohesiveness and shared 
sense of identity, particularly after the rise of an antagonistic abolitionist movement in the 
North after 1830 that southerners attributed to that region’s Puritan origins. In the 
decades before the outbreak of the Civil War, the South reveled in its violent national 
character. Living in a culture characterized by its relationship to violence, white southern 
men, regardless of class, believed that as military men they surpassed their northern 
neighbors. White southerners reinforced this belief through their daily attitudes and 
actions, and even foreign observers commented on the “fiery blood of the south.”15  
 The South’s culture encouraged a duality in the southern elite’s behavior and 
outlook. On one hand, southern gentlemen, modeling the behavior of the Cavalier 
aristocracy, celebrated courtesy, chivalry, courage, paternalism, piety, hospitality, 
deference to authority, kindness to women, contempt for cowardice, honesty, and 
loyalty.
16
 But beneath the exaggerated attachment to genteel standards of conduct lay an 
undercurrent of violence, racism, and aggression, with southern white men prone to baser 
pursuits, such as drinking, hunting, gambling, brawling, having sexual relations with 
slave women, and lying.
17
 Violence in the pursuit or defense of honor proved a key 
marker of the planter class, and their self-image and behavior celebrated assertions of 
masculinity. At the outbreak of the Civil War, a Richmond newspaper cited these violent 
cultural paradigms to explain why the war would result in a quick southern victory: “The 
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familiarity of our people with arms and horses gives them advantages for aggression . . . .  
Ten thousand Southerners, before the Yankees learnt to load a gun, might [be] marched 
to Boston without resistance.”18 
White men who embraced the honor culture of the antebellum South depended on 
communal opinion to determine their status and were acutely aware of how their peers 
viewed them.
19
 They met perceived threats to their honor with violence, and 
disagreements frequently ended in duels, brawls, and other highly public forms of 
violence that reinforced the masculinity of the offended parties.
20
 A northerner described 
“the central trait of the ‘chivalrous Southron’” as “an intense respect for virility. If you 
will fight, if you are strong and skillful enough to kill your antagonist, [then] you can 
govern or influence the common herd.”21 Southern white men also felt the need to assert 
their credentials as honorable men in regional, state, and national contexts. The honor 
culture always informed their decisions, even when they dealt with northerners who did 
not share the South’s honor culture. Most famously, on May 22, 1856, South Carolina 
Congressman Preston Brooks brutally caned Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner on 
the floor of the United States Senate after Sumner attacked slavery and insulted Brooks’s 
uncle, Senator Andrew Butler, thereby impugning his honor.
22
 Northerners condemned 
the caning, but southerners applauded it, highlighting the violent redress that insults to 
southern honor demanded. 
 The white men who embraced the honor culture and later became the elite of the 
Confederate military represented a small fraction of the overall population of the South 
— the eleven states that formally seceded from the Union and the three additional slave 
states that did not secede. Before the war, the southern elite governed fourteen states — 
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Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, and Virginia — and played 
a central role in the governance of the country. In 1860, the population of the eleven 
future Confederate states numbered about 9.1 million, of which 3.5 million were enslaved 
blacks.
23
 The master class dominated these states economically; by 1860, slaveholders 
controlled 90-95 percent of all agricultural wealth in the South.
24
 The number of 
slaveholders in the South numbered slightly more than three hundred thousand, 85 
percent of whom owned nineteen slaves or less.
25
 This category of slave owners managed 
small to medium-size farms and often supplemented their labor force during the harvest 
season by hiring poor whites and additional slaves. Southern aristocrats who owned more 
than twenty slaves held most of the wealth of the slaveholding class. Numbering about 
forty three thousand in 1860, these men were not only the political elite but the social 
leaders of the master class.
26
 
However, using these numbers to equate slaveholders with the Confederate 
officer group is problematic. In the Civil War, officers commissioned as majors or 
colonels exercised command positions at the regimental level. They constitute a major 
part of this study because these men exercised command duty that required tactical 
knowledge and could influence the outcome of a battle. Still, the onus of command 
largely fell on generals, making them the primary focus of this work. The Army of 
Northern Virginia averaged sixty eight thousand soldiers over the course of its ten largest 
engagements, with officers constituting about 3.5 percent of the total.
27
 In contrast, the 
richest planters, those holding twenty or more slaves, represented about 15 percent of all 
slaveholders. However, this calculation assumes that all officers owned slaves, and all 
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slaveholders served in the Confederate military, neither of which was accurate. Instead, 
these numbers offer an approximation of available officer positions, and the small 
percentage of the population that could potentially attain command roles. Though 
southern slaveholders did not hold a complete monopoly of the command positions in the 
Confederate forces, these numbers demonstrate the difficulty that non-elites faced in 
moving higher in the ranks based solely on merit. In this society, wealth and social status 
served as vehicles to public office and wartime leadership. The small percentage of 
positions available to satisfy the honor of a southern gentleman made competition for 
these positions intense, and aristocrats could count on their promotion to leadership roles 
because of their place in the prewar society. 
Officers often outfitted and recruited their own regiments, especially early in the 
war. Confederate commanders held their positions because they belonged to the social 
elite, and their aristocratic status implied military competency.
28
 Since Confederate units, 
unlike Union forces, were replenished by new recruits and not phased out after costly 
battles, many of these units remained intact throughout the war. This fact, coupled with 
the Confederate practice of democratically electing officers, often meant the “best” men 
received and held important command positions throughout the war, and that the 
relatively few staff officer posts and generals’ commissions remained in the hands of elite 
southerners. Non-commissioned officers and the lower levels of the chain of command 
(lieutenants and captains) were often the younger sons of elite planters serving to prove 
their manhood, while the older generation led the armies.
29
 As one young officer wrote to 
his mother: “Tell father . . . he may flatter himself of having a son who though raised in 
the lap of luxury, has passed through the most infernal ordeal of privations . . . & of 
19 
 
misery without a murmur.”30 In short, southern antebellum elites transitioned seamlessly 
from prewar positions of social and political control to wartime positions of command, 
ensuring that the South’s antebellum honor culture influenced Confederate military 
operations. Southern peacetime leaders brought cultural values to their military service 
that shaped their behavior on the battlefield. 
This transition represented an essential component of the growth of the 
Confederate military, and can be confirmed statistically. While no records exist that offer 
firm numbers detailing slaveholder participation in Confederate forces, samples provide 
strong clues. In Soldiering in the Army of Northern Virginia, Joseph T. Glatthaar samples 
six hundred random soldiers from the Army of Northern Virginia, sorting them by age, 
state or country of origin, year of enlistment, marital status, economic class, slave 
ownership, and a host of additional criteria. Despite the problems inherent in statistical 
sampling, the incredible amount of detail Glatthaar accumulates enables him to draw 
reliable conclusions. In terms of economic class, Glatthaar finds that the upper class 
represented 35 percent of the sample, despite constituting 20 percent of the prewar 
southern white population.
31
 This upper class belonged almost entirely to the slavocracy, 
with 91 percent of the elites sampled owning slaves before the war.
32
  
These statistics offer a clear picture of the elite’s wartime participation. During 
the antebellum period, one in every four (25 percent) southern households owned slaves, 
but in Glatthaar’s sample four of every nine soldiers (44 percent) lived in slave-owning 
households before the war, a 19 percent difference.
33
 Measured both by economic class 
and slaveholding, the Confederate military was a product of the antebellum South’s 
plantation culture. In particular, slaveholders made up 37 percent of the sample, revealing 
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the willingness of the Old South’s planters to fight.34 Though both sides resorted to 
various methods of conscription, the Confederate states enjoyed a white male enlistment 
rate of 17.3 percent, nearly double the white Union enlistment rate of 9.5 percent.
35
 An 
astonishing 24 percent of Mississippians served in Confederate armies compared to 15 
percent of Illinoisans, the highest rate of participation in the North.
36
 Statistically, the 
Confederacy demonstrated a wartime zeal consistent with the cultural impetus for 
bravery and service demanded by antebellum instead of honor. White southerners 
transferred notions of personal honor, defense of the family, and assertions of manliness 
to the body politic. As General Lafayette McLaws, of Georgia, wrote, “I consider it a 
duty to my country, to my family and to humanity itself to use my utmost endeavor to 
free the South from the dominion of the North.”37 The white South — and certainly the 
southern elite — rose up as a largely unified cultural entity to defend the Confederate 
states. 
Other aspects of Glatthaar’s sample reveal the economic and cultural 
characteristics of the officer corps. For example, officers had an average personal wealth 
of $6,322 compared to just $1,299 for enlisted men.
38
 More than one officer in every five 
had a personal wealth of more than ten thousand dollars, a number that dwindled to just 
one in every twenty-five enlisted men.
39
 Nearly half of all officers (49.5 percent) owned 
slaves, and a staggering 62.9 percent of all officers came from households that owned 
slaves before the war.
40
 Glatthaar’s data shows that the officer class was a product of the 
plantation, affluence, and prewar success, and the southern military in general stood 
deeply committed to the defense of slavery and maintaining the region’s cultural heritage. 
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 More than any other aspect of southern culture, violence ruled the lives of 
southern elites. Within their honor culture, southern gentlemen had multiple ways to 
express their status as “men of honor.” However, elite men most commonly responded to 
insults to their honor through violence, which pervaded southern society, as gentlemen 
dueled, brawled, and feuded with one another, often over small slights.
41
 Moreover, the 
honor culture and the violence it engendered shaped the behavior of southern white men 
outside the upper crust. Poor whites shared in the elite’s honor culture, and responded to 
insults to their honor as brutally as wealthy planters. However, the two social groups 
differed significantly in their attitude toward the practice of dueling and brawling. Elite 
southerners, reinforcing their class hypocrisy, insisted that dueling was a barbarous and 
uncouth activity, all the while engaging in violent and often longstanding feuds.
42
 The 
southern elite publicly labeled dueling an uncivilized indulgence, but participated 
wholeheartedly nonetheless. Dueling also prevailed in the ranks of the local militias, 
which southern gentleman joined to gain military rank in a society in which titles of 
nobility did not exist. Jefferson Davis, who served in the Mexican-American War, and 
more famously became president of the Confederacy, explained that southerners had: 
[A] fondness for military titles and displays . . . . [Outsiders] have commented on 
the number of generals, and colonels, and majors all over the [southern] States. 
But the fact is, we are a military people . . . . We are not less military because we 
have had no great standing armies. But perhaps we are the only people in the 





Military rank became an important currency of honor, cementing the link between 
the violent activities of the military and social prestige. The social display of militia units, 
and their often costly uniforms and equipment, further emphasized that military rank 
belonged to those of standing who could afford to be warriors.
44 In contrast, lower class 
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white men, eminently concerned with their sense of honor, openly accepted violence as a 
common part of their discourse. Less concerned with image, they reveled in this brutality 
without pretending otherwise. Still, all southern white males shared the ethic of honor.
45
 
This widespread sense of honor became an important part of the Confederate military. 
The elites in the Confederate high command used honor to guide their military decisions 
and strategies, while the lower classes that made up the Confederacy’s enlisted elements 
fought bravely and tenaciously because of their attachment to the honor culture. 
Honor influenced the behavior that led to many violent interactions on and off the 
plantation, but the South’s elite also emphasized gentility, particularly in their 
interactions with white women. Indeed, the South’s imagined ideal of womanhood stood 
far from the carefully cultivated racist brutality of the slave-master.
46
 White women 
represented the purer ideals of the southern elite, despite the fact that both men and 
women shared genteel qualities. Southern elite women strived to be gentle, quiet, meek, 
pure, and chaste, and after marriage to be mothers, household leaders, matrons, and 
exemplars of southern virtue.
47
 The ideal of southern white womanhood, moreover, 
played an important role in the battlefield and strategic decisions of the Confederacy’s 
military leadership. Confederate commanders conceptualized the defense of the South in 
highly gendered terms. They viewed defending the honor of the South as deeply 
intertwined with the idea of defending the South’s white female population.48 Southern 
white men, both elite and poor, fought to defend their households and the virtue of the 
women within. The specter of threatened white womanhood united southern white males 
regardless of social class.
49
 As James B. Griffin wrote, “For while men can manage to 
work for themselves, and can fight the battles of their Country if necessary, Females are 
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very dependent.”50 Union invasions of southern territory demonstrated the inability of the 
Confederacy to defend itself, and by extension, threatened the masculinity of the southern 
patriarchy. Conversely, southern invasions of Union territory reinforced the notion that 
northern armies were incapable of defending their households and women. 
 The South’s unique approach to violence resulted from more than its attachment 
to honor. In part, the violent character of southern men was a product of their cultural 
memory of violence. During the long wars the United States waged with Native 
Americans, southern men served in the regular army, local militias, and defended the 
region from hostile native raiders. Though the South’s experience of Indian warfare 
paralleled that of the North, southerners never lost their sense of being an embattled 
populace.
51
 Militias and military training remained an essential aspect of local 
governance, believed necessary to defend southern settlements from Indian attack (at 
least until the 1830s) and slave unrest.
52
 To keep slaves from escaping, and to bring back 
those who attempted to flee, slave patrols ranged through the South. Locally based and 
drawn from militia units that provided the structure and resources necessary for the job, 
the patrols drew men from all classes, providing adventure and relief from the tedium of 
everyday life.
53
 The patrols were inherently violent, straddling the line between civil 
service and military operation, and kept the South in a constant state of near-military 
preparedness. 
 The racist slave system of the antebellum South brutalized African Americans, 
while normalizing and desensitizing whites to the violence they perpetrated. Race-based 
slavery rested on the assumption that the enslaved black population was racially inferior, 
and during the Civil War, Confederate soldiers used this racism to justify atrocities 
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against black soldiers in Union armies.
54
  Maintaining and protecting slavery required 
consistent and conspicuous violence.
55
 To prevent runaways, cow enslaved people, and 
reinforce their subservient status, whites turned to violence. Slave patrols, militia service, 
memory of Indian wars, and a cultural attachment to hunting together bred a violent and 
paranoid society, whose population feared the non-white elements that surrounded them. 
Southerners serving in the Confederate military believed themselves better prepared for 
war than their northern counterparts. More important, the southern elite’s sense of honor, 
inability to accept defeat, and aggressive response to provocation animated the 
Confederate command. White southern culture, hardened by the rigors of maintaining 
slavery, entered the war with a distinct advantage. A cultural attachment to violence 
permeated the Confederate military structure, while elite commanders’ aggression and 
inability to accept defeat drove decision making. 
 The ideal of the chaste, virtuous, and unblemished southern white woman 
reinforced notions of masculinity among southern white males, who considered men who 
could not protect their households weak, dishonorable, and powerless. In a society 
focused on honor and masculinity, protecting women became vitally important. As 
political tensions between the North and the South deepened before the Civil War, 
southerners increasingly portrayed the South as a female entity. By rhetorically linking 
the region and its white women, southern men reinforced their self-image as defenders of 
threatened womenfolk.
56
 This tactic garnered strong support in the South and helped 
forge a sense of unity among the white population. Describing the South in gendered 
terms also made threats by the North significantly more ominous. During the Civil War, 
southern leaders frequently employed this rhetorical trope, convincing many Confederate 
25 
 
officers to defend the South with the same energy they defended their women and 
households because their own honor was at stake. As soldier John Dale wrote to his wife: 
“You said that you didn’t want me to come home unless I came in honor. I never will 
come [back] unless I come that way.”57 Confederates, in short, equated the need to 
defend their homeland with the defense of southern white women’s honor. Allowing 
northern armies to run roughshod over southern territory constituted a violation of 
southern virtue, masculinity, and honor and thus had to be met with violent retribution. 
When Confederate commanders sensed such an insult, they often conducted rash or 
strategically unwise attacks to stop the Union forces intent on pillaging or “raping” 
southern territory. This cultural lens also sheds light on southern military leaders’ 
consistent interest in fighting set-piece battles.
58
 Their pursuit of conventional battles, 
rather than guerrilla tactics, also reflected the southern code of masculinity. Confederate 
guerrillas certainly existed, but the South’s main field armies, led by proud gentlemen, 
preferred to fight openly and “fairly.”59 Men gained honor when they defeated their equal 
on the field of battle; thus Confederate officers had strong cultural reasons to seek major 
engagements. Likewise, Confederate invasions of the North reflected southerners’ 
cultural imperatives to reciprocate the damage done to their honor by northern invasions. 
Invading and raiding northern territory represented an attempt to wage cultural warfare in 
addition to achieving more practical and traditional military objectives. 
Religion represented a central element of the antebellum South’s elite honor 
culture. The aristocracy’s relationship to Christianity and religion’s role in the mythos of 
the South helped guide the actions of the southern elite. Southern white Christians, 
despite a diversity of denominational affiliations, viewed their faith’s militaristic past as a 
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blueprint for their behavior. Southern Christian military men like the fanatical Stonewall 
Jackson loom large, but his extreme piety was neither the exception nor the rule.
60
 
Instead, Christianity’s peacetime pervasiveness often entered the military vernacular 
through the idealized “miles Christi” who drew his bravery and courage from his faith.61 
Throughout the war, this image remained popular and influential among elite and lower 
levels of white southern society. Religion proved a powerful motivator for Confederate 
armies, but it served a similar role in the North as well.
62
 Thus, though religion was 
important, more secular cultural paradigms often have greater power to explain southern 
military behavior. 
 The class divide in white antebellum southern society helps explain the 
relationship between the region’s cultural values and Confederate military tactics. 
Southern gentlemen at the uppermost portion of the antebellum slavocracy were 
extremely conscious of their social status. Poor whites, who provided the bulk of the 
enlisted men in the Confederate armies, represented the largest free social group in the 
region. To differentiate poor whites’ unique place in the southern hierarchy, their social 
betters as well as their slaves, referred to them as “crackers.”63 The elite dominated 
military command, but the lower classes carried out the culturally influenced military 
orders of their leaders.
64
 Elite and poor white males, despite significant differences in 
wealth, access to land, social position, dialect, dress, and political influence, were 
inextricably linked by the honor culture of the South. Rich and poor white males shared a 
collective need to reinforce their status as honorable men, though each group defined the 
concept differently.
65
 Among the elite, the concept of honor existed alongside genteel 
notions of refinement and dignity.
66
 Poor whites lacked this attachment to gentility, but 
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they were no less aware of their position as honorable men and responded to slights to 
their honor like their social betters. Despite the economic gulf that separated the social 
classes, antebellum southern white men showed an acute understanding of their own and 
their region’s honor. 
 Southern cultural values shaped Confederate military operations, but southerners 
also embraced prevailing European military practices.
67
 In the nineteenth century, 
military theory originated in Europe, with two primary figures, Napoleon Bonaparte and 
Antoine-Henri Jomini, shaping American military thought in 1860.
68
 Before the Civil 
War, military schools in the United States, when not teaching science, math, surveying, 
and a host of other academic subjects, taught the exploits of Napoleon, the most 
important and impressive general during the most significant set of European wars since 
the seventeenth century. Born in Corsica in 1769, Napoleon revolutionized European 
warfare during a time of great political and social instability in Europe. In the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Napoleon helped transform the French army 
from a bastion of aristocratic privilege to an organization in which professionalism and 
ability were hallmarks of success.
69
 Napoleon owed his meteoric rise from military 
schoolboy to emperor of most of Europe, to his ability to capitalize on these changes. 
After the brutally indecisive religious wars of the seventeenth century, military, political, 
and social theorists sought to restrain the violence of warfare, often by improving military 
professionalism.
70
 The age of the Enlightenment reduced military maneuvers to parade-
ground spectacles in which the belligerent powers engaged in battles that were neither 
decisive nor ruinously expensive in men or material.
71
 Despite the successes of a few 
generals who saw the value of fighting battles to decide conflicts, military and political 
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leaders showed a collective disinterest in widening the scope of war. John Churchill, the 
Duke of Marlborough, proved during the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714), as did 
Frederick the Great during the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748), that battle could 
end the fruitless sieges, marches, and maneuvers of eighteenth century warfare. Despite 
the legendary accomplishments of Marlborough and Frederick, most European generals 
eschewed “total war” for a narrower “limited war.”72 
 As a young student of military history, however, Napoleon took note of 
Marlborough and Frederick’s strategic goals. The French Revolution opened 
opportunities for promotion to the officer corps not previously available to skilled, but 
non-noble Frenchmen. The Revolution also swept away the hated conscription of the 
royalist army, and replaced it with a volunteer force motivated by patriotism.
73
 Napoleon 
used these highly motivated if poorly trained forces and unleashed them on European 
armies still chained to conscription and captained by unimaginative officers. Instead of 
limiting his objectives and preserving his armies by avoiding battle, Napoleon actively 
pursued decisive engagements to gain political goals through his campaigns.
74
 His 
impressive list of victories — at Marengo (1800), Ulm (1805), Austerlitz (1805), Jena-
Auerstedt (1806), Wagram (1809), and Borodino (1812) — established Napoleon as the 
master of the set-piece battle and a dominant strategist. Despite his disastrous invasion of 
Russia and defeat at Waterloo in 1815, Napoleon died in 1821 with his military 
reputation intact, in part because military theorists made learning about his campaigns 
required curriculum for generations of rising officers.
75
 
 The chief military theorist of the post-Napoleonic era was Antoine-Henri Jomini. 
He authored several works on strategy, tactics, and maneuver warfare, including The Art 
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of War, which examined Napoleon’s campaigns as exemplars of the decisive battle 
approach to war. Jomini, like many of the military thinkers of this era, absorbed 
Romantic Age notions of science, progress, and rationalism. He believed that battle, 
though essentially a form of art, was governed by a series of scientific principles that 
military thinkers could control and codify.
76
 He conceived of warfare as an equation that 
could be mastered and taught as long as officers accounted for unquantifiable variables, 
such as chance, uncertainty, and luck. This style of scientific warfare was epitomized by 
battlefield engagements in which the winning general applied these scientific principles 
more effectively, while avoiding bad luck or mischance.
77
 Napoleon’s genius, according 
to modern scholars, lay in his organizational skills and far-reaching strategic insights. In 
contrast, nineteenth century theorists like Jomini downplayed Napoleon’s impressive 
ability to organize, plan, and maintain campaigns, and focused instead on his ability to 
force and win battlefield engagements. Napoleon’s tactical genius cannot be denied, but 
theorists like Jomini failed to recognize that his tactical innovations had become largely 
obsolete within his own lifetime. Battles rarely had lasting political consequences despite 
theorists’ commonly held notions to the contrary. Even Napoleon’s near perfect victory 
over Austrian and Russian forces at Austerlitz in 1805 had little lasting political impact. 
His foes raised a new coalition of nations against him within months. Still, military 
theorists working in Napoleon’s shadow argued that battle could produce permanent 
political outcomes and they convinced later generations to emulate Napoleon.
78
 The 
allure of winning huge, set-piece battles convinced young military officers to engage one 
another in Napoleonic fashion, rather than looking beyond his tactics toward more 
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innovative approaches. The result was a period of stagnated military thinking that lasted 
until the trenches of Europe in 1914.
79
 
 Scholarly examinations of the evolutions in military history during the 
Napoleonic era rightly omit the United States because it was not an important military 
power.
80
 During these years, American forces battled Native American tribes, British 
incursions, and even landed forces in North Africa to combat the Barbary pirates, but the 
country remained a military backwater, albeit one determined to maintain the 
professional image, if not the size, of its military. Always afraid of a standing army, 
which they viewed as a tool of tyranny, Americans had little interest in paying for a 
military on the same scale as the European kingdoms.
81
 Instead, a nascent but minuscule 
frontier army and state militias absorbed military spending. The larger southern militias 
served a variety of purposes, not all of them military in nature. The regular frontier 
regiments combated Indian tribes, mapped and explored western territories, built forts, 
protected settlers, and performed a variety of frontier duties.
82
 Despite their utility, 
United States’ frontier units had little in common with the professional forces of Britain 
or France — or for that matter with later Civil War regiments. The change from frontier 
security to Napoleonic-style battle and maneuver occurred slowly, but southerners 
eventually adapted their culture to European strategies and tactics. 
 Between 1815 and the Mexican-American War in 1846, the United States was 
involved in no major wars. Despite incursions into Spanish Florida, constant trouble with 
Indian tribes, and naval operations in the Atlantic and beyond, American forces gained no 
practical experience against European-style field armies. Without the opportunity to gain 





 The United States Military Academy at West Point changed its 
curriculum in 1817, emphasizing tactics, engineering, and the common procedures of 
modern European armies. West Point professor Dennis Hart Mahan pushed for the 
codification and standardization of American military professionalism, promoting 
European methods of military education and Jominian tactics.
84
 Between the 1820s and 
1860 southerners founded dozens of private and public military schools, aiming to attract 
a public deeply interested in military service and the ethos of the military man.
85
 The 
perception of the South as an armed camp allowed these schools to flourish, instilling 
several generations of students with militaristic notions of duty, honor, and courage, 
along with a practical education in military theory, science, and math.
86
 The success of 
military schools in the coastal states ensured the western spread of similar schools and 
their curriculums, reinforcing the South’s broad militarism.87 
 By 1860, most American military officers were familiar with Jominian 
conceptions of battle.
88
 Almost to a man they believed that joining battle with an enemy’s 
forces after maneuver could produce politically consequential victories that would limit 
the destructive scope of warfare. Officers from the North and the South learned from the 
same military texts, often side by side in the same classrooms, and they believed that 
maneuver and battle could decide a conflict quickly. Despite their confidence, however, 
the Civil War lasted four years and cost dearly in men, material, and wealth for two 
central reasons. First, Civil War armies were roughly the same size as the armies of the 
Napoleonic Wars, but armed with significantly more deadly weaponry. By 1860 rifled 
muskets capable of delivering more accurate fire at longer distances had supplanted the 
smoothbore muskets of the early nineteenth century.
89
 American Civil War commanders 
32 
 
did not change the close-order tactics of the period to respond to the new weapons until 
late in the war, when they responded at all.
90
 
 Second, antebellum southern culture sustained the Confederacy after its military 
defeats. Measured by casualty rate, the combined Confederate losses at Gettysburg, 
Vicksburg, Atlanta, and the Wilderness rivaled the bloodiest battles of the Napoleonic 
Wars. Napoleon’s crushing victories often brought his enemies to the negotiating table, 
but southern cultural values demanded that the Confederacy carry on the war effort, long 
after the South was financially and militarily exhausted. Even as the South’s chances of a 
favorable outcome dimmed, southerners continued to believe in the Confederacy’s 
ultimate victory, reflecting their cultural disinclination to surrender, admit defeat, or 
suffer the dishonor associated with these actions.
91
 By prevailing military standards, 
Union armies decisively defeated the Confederacy’s forces at several battles, but southern 
values prevented white southerners from accepting this fact until late in the war. 
Scholars have second-guessed the Confederacy’s decision to fight a formal, 
European-style war almost since the Confederate government surrendered.
92
 In particular, 
many argue that the South should have concentrated on raising and equipping guerrilla 
units to fight, avoiding pitched battles and major confrontations until the Union 
exhausted itself.
93
 But the central role of the South’s honor culture in shaping 
Confederate military operations made these options unsuitable. Though Confederate war 
records reveals numerous instances of Confederate raiders and partisans, the amount of 
support the Confederate government gave them paled in comparison to what it spent on 
the South’s conventional armies. The Confederate War Department in theory supported 
guerilla units, but Confederate leaders believed that the best chance for victory lay with 
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the regular armies, and thus they committed the resources and manpower of the South to 
these forces. Critics of Confederate tactics believe that a guerilla war, and specifically a 
war in which the Confederate armed forces concentrated only when they had numerical 
superiority, represented the best course of action.
94
 Proponents of this theory argue that 
Confederate commanders should have fought a war in which they denied battle, and only 
attacked when they located isolated enemy units. This argument rests on the belief that 
after several years of bloody and inconclusive warfare, the Union would have ousted 
President Abraham Lincoln in the 1864 election and northern Democrats would gladly 
end the war. 
However, several factors precluded this turn of events. First, the Confederacy 
could not have fought a guerrilla war for a prolonged period of time for ideological 
reasons. One of the Confederacy’s greatest idols, George Washington, fought a war in 
which his main objective was avoiding total defeat, but the Confederacy could not have 
survived such tactics. In Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History, 
historian Alan T. Nolan argues that Lee and his fellow generals could have worn down 
the Union with Washington-like tactics and preserved their own forces until the North 
gave up.
95
 But the Confederacy wedded itself to a conventional war when it declared 
Richmond the Confederate capital, thereby institutionalizing the necessity of controlling 
geographic and ideological strongpoints unviable in guerrilla warfare.
96
  As McLaws 
explained: 
Our government has . . . committed itself to the policy of concentration . . . . This 
venture is vast and promises the most ample return, and therefore before judging 
we must await results. If our armies can be fed, there is every reason to believe 
that victory will . . . crown our efforts, and our efforts will sooner be achieved 






Conventional warfare demanded that the Confederate government hold and maintain its 
new territorial integrity. The South’s initial victory at Bull Run in 1861 confirmed this as 
a workable strategy, and from that point the Confederacy operated within the framework 
of a conventional war. 
Second, guerrilla war proponents ignore the South’s political and cultural 
realities. The separate Confederate state governments would never have agreed to let 
their territory and homes be invaded and overrun by Union armies, even in the name of a 
coherent national strategy. Historian Gary W. Gallagher argues that the southern public 
clamored for aggressive action from their great generals, not Washington-like defensive 
tactics.
98
 Indeed, Washington hoped to survive long enough to create a nation, whereas 
the Confederates believed their states already formed the basis for a nation. The 
Confederacy fought a war characteristic of a modern nation-state, and only when faced 
with the destruction of Confederacy in 1865, did Jefferson Davis release Lee and Joseph 
E. Johnston’s field armies to fight a hit and run guerrilla war, something that neither 
leader decided to follow. 
Southern cultural and social values also played a marked role in pursuing the 
decisive battle. Even though the decisive battle doctrine predated notions of honor and 
masculinity in the Old South, it shared a central component, aggression, with white 
southern notions of honor. Historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown’s Southern Honor explores 
the role of aggression in southern society during the antebellum period, frequently using 
Lee as an exemplar of southern behavior.
99
 He argues that aggression was central to 
conceptions of masculinity and honor in the Old South. Confederate generals and the 
white populace would not accept a strategy that robbed them of their honor or 
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masculinity. Widespread guerrilla war involved Union armies occupying and violating 
the South, which would have emasculated the South’s white male citizens. The decisive 
battle doctrine offered a preferable method of fighting because it allowed Confederate 
armies to defend aggressively their states and their honor. 
Revisionist historians critical of Confederate strategy also argue that the vast size 
of the South lent itself to a defensive style of war.
100
 They argue that Confederate armies 
could strike and then “disappear” into the vast southern landscape with little difficulty. In 
one respect, these scholars are correct. The combined territory of the Confederate states 
was vast, totaling 733,144 square miles, an area equal to a large swath of western Europe, 
a detail that Confederate agents at European courts consistently noted, especially when 
discussing the South’s military chances.101 But the South’s large square mileage masked 
the realities of its geography. For all its size on paper, many sections of the Confederacy 
proved inhospitable to maneuver and supply. Union gunboats dominated its coastlines 
and its great rivers.
102
 Most of Florida was too swampy and too under-populated to 
provide the South’s armies much help. The border states upon which the South counted 
were either occupied or openly divided between factions sympathetic to both sides. 
Likewise, when the Union closed the Mississippi it cut the South in half, thereby slicing 
off a large amount of maneuver room. Mountainous Tennessee, West Virginia, and a 
large portion of the eastern seaboard’s southern states were dominated by the 
Appalachians and divided between northern and southern sympathizers. In short, the 
Confederacy lacked a large enough area for guerrilla forces to operate with impunity, 
especially once Union forces divided and dominated the region after they gained control 
of the Mississippi. 
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Allowing Union troops access to the interior also exposed the Confederate 
heartland to the ravages of war, something that did not occur until Sherman’s March to 
the Sea in 1864. If Confederate generals fought a defensive war of maneuver, they would 
have found little territory in which they could safely deploy or resupply. As a result, 
Confederate generals understood the need to strike quickly and force a decisive encounter 
outside of southern territory. Disappearing into the southern landscape offered little 
protection, and posed real dangers for the Confederate armies. The North could have 
become more aggressive and brought the weight of its military to bear with less difficulty 
than it did. Fighting a guerrilla campaign also assumes that common Confederate soldiers 
could fight a war in which they abandoned their homes and families to the enemy. But 
constantly fighting in southern territory wore on Confederate officers’ psyches, leading to 




 The following chapters examine the strategies, operations, and tactics of 
Confederate forces to determine how the South’s antebellum honor culture shaped 
Confederate military operations. Honor, more than any other cultural value, drove their 
military decisions. Before the war, southern white men lived life according to a rigid 
honor code that demanded violent retribution for perceived slights. They believed that 
their personal honor and the honor of their family was deeply tied to the honor of the 
body politic. The linkage between the southern elite’s honor culture and the maintenance 
of race-based slavery ensured that they perceived assaults on the institution of slavery as 
an attack on the region’s honor. As one northerner observed about slavery’s centrality to 
the southern elite: “All of the people who had obtained any sort of success . . . had owned 
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slaves.”104 The growing sectional divide between the North and South in the 1850s 
reinforced southerners’ sense of isolation and defensiveness. With race-based slavery 
deeply embedded in the society and culture of the South, white southerners conceived the 
abolitionist movement as a threat to their way of life. A newspaper in New Orleans 
wrote: “As long as slavery is looked upon by the North with abhorrence; as long as the 
South is regarded as a mere slave-breeding and slave-driving community; as long as false 
and pernicious theories are cherished respecting inherent equality . . . there can be no 
satisfactory political union between the two sections.”105 The South’s decision to go to 
war in 1861, though certainly not assured, arose from the region’s honor-based defense of 
slavery. 
Before the Civil War, antebellum southern aristocrats approached public and 
private life understanding that their behavior affected their social status. The southern 
elite indulged in behaviors that reinforced their status as gentlemen or faced social 
disgrace and ostracism. Confederate officer Thomas R. Cobb summarized the southern 
aristocrat as someone who must “develop in our own people that highest type of man, 
which combines physical endurance with cultivated intellect, provident forethought with 
enlarged benevolence, wise statesmanship with enlightened Christianity . . . . To that 
pristine glory, let us aspire.”106 Leadership belonged to the economic, political, and 
cultural “best men” who embodied the social and cultural values of the southern 
aristocrat. When the war began, the antebellum southern elite, believing themselves 
uniquely suited to military service, became the commanders of the Confederate States of 
America’s armies. Prewar militarism and the regular violence that dominated southern 
life provided them with a distinct advantage as military leaders. As one southerner put it, 
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“To such an extent does the military fervor rage, a stranger would conclude at least every 
other male citizen to be either ‘Captain or Colonel, or Knight at arms.’ Nor would he 
greatly err . . . for . . . he would find more than every other man a military chieftain of 
some sort or other.”107 Steeped in their plantation culture and trained in the prevailing 
European military tactics of the day, the southern elite was prepared to fight a cultural 
war against their northern neighbors. Both sides read the same military literature, 
considered Napoleon the most influential commander of the previous century, and 
adapted similar battlefield strategy from their study of Napoleon and Jomini. However, 
southern honor culture distinguished the two powers from one another and led southern 
leaders to employ their own culturally based variations on prevailing military theory. 
Chapters two and three examine the Civil War’s battles and campaigns to determine 
exactly how southern culture changed Confederate behavior on the field of battle. 
                                                          
1
 William Faulkner, The Reivers: A Reminiscence (New York: Random House, 1962), 
302. 
2
 This characterization of the South was the focus of W. J. Cash’s famous work, The 
Mind of the South. In it, Cash discussed the disconnect between how southerners 
conceptualized their region and the images associated with it, and how it actually 
functioned. The idealized South that many southerners imagined differed significantly 
from the violent, brutal, and race and class obsessed culture that actually existed. 
3
 Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 257. In his article “A Census-Based Count of the 
Civil War Dead,” J. David Hacker uses census data to demonstrate the likelihood that the 
original assumptions of military casualties are lower than the true figures. Faust cites 
postwar estimates that place Confederate war dead at about two hundred fifty thousand. 
Using Hacker’s research, it is likely that total Confederate casualties, both wounded and 
dead, were three hundred fifty thousand to over five hundred thousand. 
4
 “The Civil War, Finally Passing: Assessing America’s Bloodiest War, 150 years later,” 
The Economist, March 31, 2011. 
http://www.economist.com/node/18486035?story_id=18486035 
5
 Culturally based military histories have become more common over the past several 
decades, as military historians have tried to move away from traditional “tactics and 
generals” approaches. There is a growing trend to utilize cultural paradigms in conceptual 
military histories. The most important of these works is John A. Lynn’s Battle: A History 
39 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to Modern America (New York: Basic 
Books, 2008), which discusses the militaries of specific cultures throughout history, and 
how cultural assumptions influenced battlefield strategies, tactics, and ideologies. This 
thesis applies Lynn’s reasoning to the Confederate States of America’s armies, examining 
how the antebellum South’s honor culture influenced the way its officers fought. 
6
 Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor, 25-27. 
7
 Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die: Civil War Tactics and the 
Southern Heritage (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1982), 189. 
8
 Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor, 18-19. 
9
 This is especially true of Grady McWhiney’s Confederate Crackers and Cavaliers 
(Abilene: McWhiney Foundation Press, 2002), which compares the last names on 
southern tombstones with graveyards in England, Scotland, and Ireland. Despite the fact 
that McWhiney finds a higher connection with Scotland and Ireland than England, he 
particularly focuses on lower class rather than elite graveyards. Even if McWhiney is 
correct and the southern elite were more Scot and Irish than English, the southern 
aristocracy still identified culturally with Royalists. 
10
 McWhiney, Confederate Crackers and Cavaliers, 21-23. 
11
 Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery, 246-47. 
12
 Ibid., 13. 
13
 Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor, 404-407. 
14
 Greenberg, Honor and Slavery, 34. 
15
 Franklin, The Militant South, 2. 
16
 McWhiney, Confederate Crackers and Cavaliers, 22. 
17
 Ibid., 23. 
18
 McWhiney and Jamieson, Attack and Die, 170. 
19
 Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor, 14-15. 
20
 Greenberg, Honor and Slavery, 8. 
21
 McWhiney, Confederate Crackers and Cavaliers, 24. 
22
 Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor, 34-35. 
23
 U.S. Census Office, Eighth Census [1860], Population of the United States in 1860. 
(Washington, D.C., 1864). 
24
 Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor, 176. 
25
 U.S. Census Office, Eighth Census [1860], Agriculture of the United States in 1860 




 Computing this 3.5 percent number requires an understanding of how Confederate 
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CHAPTER 2: COURAGE, CONFIDENCE, AND CAVALIERISM: 
THE CIVIL WAR FROM FORT SUMTER TO GETTYSBURG AND VICKSBURG 
 
 
On the morning of July 3, 1863, after two days of desperate fighting among the 
rocks, hills, orchards, and wheat fields surrounding the small Pennsylvania town of 
Gettysburg, armies of the United States and the Confederate States of America eyed each 
other warily. Despite a series of attacks that resulted in thousands of casualties, the 
Confederate Army of Northern Virginia had been unable to dislodge the Army of the 
Potomac from its strong defenses on the outskirts of town. However, the Confederates, 
led by their commander, Robert E. Lee, retained the battle’s tactical initiative and 
determined to continue the assaults. At two o’clock in the afternoon, Lee launched twelve 
thousand five hundred of his infantry directly against the center of the Union line. 
Buttressed by strong artillery emplacements, prepared firing positions, and a 
commanding view of the fields through which the Confederate units had to advance, the 
Union forces repulsed the doomed Confederate attack. The commander of an Alabamian 
regiment at the center of the attack observed: “My men . . . advanced about half way to 
the enemy’s position, but the fire was so destructive that my line wavered like a man 
trying to walk against a strong wind, and then slowly, doggedly, gave back . . . . My dead 
and wounded were then nearly as great in number as those still on duty. They literally 
covered the ground. The blood stood in puddles in some places . . . the ground was 
soaked with the blood of as brave men as ever fell on the red field of battle.”1 More than 
50 percent of the Confederate infantry who set out in the afternoon heat of that famous 
July day were killed, wounded, or captured within an hour.
2
 The Confederate attack 
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failed, and with it the Confederacy’s chances for a decisive victory in Union territory. In 
1948, William Faulkner summed up the South’s hope, confidence, and easy self-
assurance, soon to be broken by defeat, when he described a postwar southern boy 
imagining the battle just before 2pm on July 3, 1863: “This time. Maybe this time with all 
this much to lose than all this much to gain: Pennsylvania, Maryland, the world, the 
golden dome of Washington itself to crown with desperate and unbelievable victory the 
desperate gamble, the cast made two years ago.”3 
  The decision by Lee and his staff to attack the well-entrenched and prepared 
Union lines on the third day of the Battle of Gettysburg remains one of the most 
controversial assaults of the war. Pickett’s Charge, as the attack became known, 
illuminates how the southern military leadership viewed battlefield confrontation. 
Confederate leaders often ignored military realities, believing that the fighting 
capabilities of their men could overcome deficiencies like those at Gettysburg. Pickett’s 
Charge resulted from faulty cultural assumptions, not rational military thought. Few of 
Lee’s generals had qualms about the assault, and after the decision to attack was made 
only General James Longstreet continued to object.
4
 Despite understanding the extreme 
loss of life the attack would almost certainly cost, why then did the Confederate 
leadership willingly and confidently order it? This decision demonstrates how the South’s 
prewar culture became the guiding spirit for wartime military decisions. Lee and his 
command staff believed that Confederate forces could overcome any obstacle because 
their soldiers were better, their way of life superior, and their cause more just. As Major 
General Lafayette McLaws, one of Lee’s divisional commanders, observed of the 
northern populace three days before the battle: “[northerners] are a very different race 
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from the southern. There is a coarseness in their manners and looks and a twang in their 
voices — which grates harshly on the senses of our men [;] the distinction of class, the 
poor & sick is very marked.”5 Sandie Pendleton, one of Lee’s staff officers agreed: “[we 
must] dictate to the [local] inhabitants as masters. I do believe in it [southern superiority] 
now more than ever before. There is an innate difference between Yankee and a 
Southerner. I have ever believed, but the exalted superiority of one race has never struck 
me so forcibly.”6 McLaws and the Confederate leadership believed in the superiority of 
their men over the weak northern enemy. In this context, Confederate commanders had 
little reason to fear attacks like Pickett’s Charge would fail, because their men were 
simply superior to their enemy. 
 Chapter two examines the Civil War’s battles and campaigns between 1861 and 
1863, from Fort Sumter to Gettysburg and Vicksburg, to show how southern cultural 
beliefs influenced Confederate military decisions. The prewar elite believed that their 
personal honor and the honor of their households played vitally important roles in the 
way their community perceived them. Southern cultural paradigms demanded that men 
defend their honor and the honor of their women. When discourse in the South focused 
on national issues, especially slavery and state’s rights, southerners attached their 
personal code of honor to the body politic. Northern rhetorical attacks on the South 
required the same satisfaction that disagreements between gentlemen demanded. The 
southern honor culture predicated the maintenance of honor on aggressive and violent 
forms of display, reinforced by the violent nature of antebellum life. The violence and 
brutality of slavery, slave patrols, militia service, dueling, hunting, and brawling all 
hardened the southern elite to violent activities. When war broke out after decades of 
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animosity between the North and South, the southern aristocracy suddenly had the 
opportunity to exact violent retribution in a context eminently familiar to them. Focusing 
on how Confederate officers conceptualized the war, their enemy, their prospects for 
success, and their own involvement in military operations, this chapter explains why 
southerners believed they would win easily, why they believed their culture made them 
better soldiers, and how they relied on aggression to deliver victory. The first encounter 
between the emergent Confederate military and the Union occurred at Fort Sumter, which 
precipitated full-scale armed conflict between the two powers. 
 Twenty-nine years before Confederate shore batteries opened fire on the federal 
garrison in Charleston harbor, South Carolina stood at the center of another national 
crisis. In 1832, the state convention of South Carolina declared the contentious tariffs of 
1828 and 1832 unconstitutional and refused to enforce them in the state.
7
 Declaring their 
right to nullify federal laws that did not benefit them, South Carolina prepared to back 
their rhetoric with military force. President Andrew Jackson worried that an “attempt will 
be made to surprise the Forts and garrisons by the militia.” Such an attack, Jackson 
stated, “must be guarded against with vestal vigilance and any attempt by force repelled 
with prompt and exemplary punishment.”8 Despite violent rhetoric on both sides, 
compromises in Congress lowered the national tariffs to palatable numbers for the South. 
Believing the lower tariffs constituted a victory for their state and region, South Carolina 
proudly remembered its role as the sole aggressor against the federal government. In 
December 1860, South Carolina was the first state to secede from the Union, followed by 





 The Nullification Crisis of 1832 demonstrated several things to southern fire-
eaters who anticipated further conflict with the federal government. Most important, they 
recognized the need to seize federal batteries, forts, and arsenals before they could 
become flash-points of national contention. As the southern states seceded, they seized 
federal installations, often relying on southern sympathizers in the federal forces to 
surrender their forts peacefully.
10
 This process continued with little drama, until only two 
major forts remained in Union hands in the South, Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor and 
Fort Pickens in Florida.
11
 In April 1861, the Confederates decided to bombard Fort 
Sumter and precipitate an armed conflict to secure Confederate independence. The 
South’s prewar cultural paradigms help explain why Confederate forces fired on Fort 
Sumter instead of starving the garrison into submission. Despite all of the risks associated 
with acting as the belligerent party, southerners, guided by confrontation-based 
behaviors, chose to strike first. The Confederate officer class believed negotiation useless 
and war the only recourse. Griffin wrote, “There is a good deal of talk of peace 
movements but I don’t believe a word of it. Our only chance for peace lyes in our rifles, 
that will bring it after awhile, if we will only remain true to ourselves.”12 
 In early March, Brigadier General P. G. T. Beauregard took command of all 
Confederate military forces surrounding the beleaguered Union forces at Fort Sumter. 
Well aware of the garrison’s dwindling supplies and close friends with its commander, 
Major Robert Anderson, Beauregard initially remained content to starve the fort into 
submission if federal forces did not try to interfere.
13
 But failed Union attempts to 
resupply the position by sea heightened tensions. Despite the likely victory patience 





 The Confederate government ordered the bombardment of the fort, despite 
knowing that they would appear as the aggressive party, because of the military’s 
immersion in the South’s antebellum culture. Prewar conceptions of honor, masculinity, 
duty, and courage demanded that the southern gentlemen who led Confederate armies 
maintain the trappings of the aristocracy while on campaign. They intrinsically linked the 
honor of the individual to the honor of the Confederate states, and insults to the states 
prompted the same response as personal insults between gentlemen. The same cultural 
imperative drove many Confederate decisions during the war. 
The intrusive presence of Fort Sumter represented an insult to the military power 
of the seceded states.
15
 Its presence in the harbor of the Confederacy’s most belligerent 
state guaranteed heightened tensions. Abraham Lincoln’s repeated attempts to resupply 
and reinforce the garrison further insulted southerners who believed the federal properties 
in the South should revert to their control when they seceded. Southerners perceived 
attempts by the northern government to reinforce these installations as interference with 
their internal affairs. Even with the Confederate government in its infancy, southern 
culture helped fill the vacuum of decision-making, enabling state and local leaders to 
coordinate military actions while the Confederate government was initially located in 
Montgomery, Alabama. Despite few formal orders from the Confederate government, 
state leaders used their militia to seize federal installations and turn them over to the new 
government. At Fort Sumter, the state militias blended with newly appointed Confederate 
military commanders to seize the garrison. When Jefferson Davis and his cabinet 
authorized Beauregard to open fire they did not respond to an immediate military 
incentive. Instead, wounded honor, an effort to drag undecided state legislatures into 
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secession, and a collective interest in demonstrating the strength of the southern states led 
them to war.
16
 In keeping with this gentlemanly behavior, Beauregard notified his friend 
Major Anderson when the first shots would come, so the federal officer could prepare 
himself and his garrison.
17
 
After the fall of Fort Sumter and Lincoln’s call for seventy-five thousand soldiers 
to crush the rebellion, four more southern states joined the Confederacy.
18
 The 
bombardment of Fort Sumter and the demands of the Union government made it 
impossible for southern states like Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and North Carolina to 
remain neutral. Before the commencement of hostilities, these states hoped that war could 
be avoided through negotiation. But they viewed Lincoln’s letter demanding they send 
soldiers to put down their fellow southern states as an insult that their collective honor 
would not allow.
19
 They decided to secede when Congress demanded they attack states 
whose culture, politics, and goals reflected their own. 
The political, social, and economic leaders of the antebellum South dominated the 
Confederacy’s military leadership. When war broke out, these men entered military 
service because their place in southern society demanded it. As they transitioned from 
planters, judges, statesmen, and other peacetime occupations to military command, they 
brought their unique cultural outlook with them. Many had prior military experience or 
attended military schools during their youth, reinforcing the fusion of southern culture 
and military service. Of the original fourteen Confederate military departments, all were 
commanded by men who had either prewar military service or schooling, and all were 
either born into the planter class or joined it by marriage.
20
 Of the 425 men who achieved 





 The antebellum southern elite entered the war well versed in the military 
theory of the day, and buttressed this knowledge with their unique cultural paradigms. 
These men valued honor, courage, and aggression, believing that cowardice and retreat 
stained the dignity of a man. One officer presented his new regiment a flag to bear in 
battle that read simply, “No Retreat.”22 
However, these men infrequently expressed their cultural instincts overtly. 
Instead, the ways southern culture shaped their military decision making reveals itself in 
two ways. First, Confederate commanders’ campaign and battlefield decisions often 
reflected their cultural imperatives. Aggressive attacks, stubbornly refusing to alter their 
decisions, refusing to withdraw despite disadvantage, and fruitless but gallant assaults 
offered ways for them to demonstrate honor and bravery to their fellow officers. In 
addition, many commanders made strategic decisions based on perceived honorable 
actions such as protecting civilian populations, defending southern territorial integrity, 
and flashy displays of military prowess, such as General J. E. B. Stuart’s 1862 and 1863 
cavalry rides around the Union Army. Collectively, these actions demonstrate a military 
deeply influenced by the ideal of the dashing and courageous cavalier. Living up to the 
standards of this paragon of southern virtue proved a powerful motivator for the 
Confederacy’s officer corps.  
Second, the written record of the Confederate officer corps offers insight into 
their motivations. Officers in command positions had the ability and position to influence 
battlefield encounters. These men were literate and sought to highlight their service 
record after the war. In fact, more than 80 percent of all Confederate soldiers were 
literate.
23
 Their writing survives in several mediums: personal letters written to wives, 
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family members, and friends at home; official military correspondence; and detailed war 
memoirs written and published after the war’s conclusion. In their detailed campaign 
memoirs and military correspondences, officers often directly commented on the impetus 
behind their wartime decisions. In their letters home, officers rarely dwelled on the 
specifics of military management. However, these letters often discussed personal 
motivations about why they fought, what the Confederacy meant to them, and the ideals 
embodied in southern honor culture. In short, the primary record the Confederate officer 




After the fall of Fort Sumter both sides dramatically increased the size of their 
armed forces and the Confederate states worked feverishly to construct a regular army 
from a limited prewar infrastructure. The loose nature of the Confederate government, in 
which states held disproportionate power, made it difficult to create and sustain a unified 
army. On March 6, 1861, the Confederate Congress created a regular Confederate Army 
to operate alongside a Provisional Army, which would disband at the successful 
completion of the war.
24
 However, individual state governors and legislatures resisted 
giving control of their armed forces to the national government, and instead formed 
militia regiments based on state-wide recruiting. Only after the Confederate Congress 
created the Confederate War Department February 26, 1861 did it gain control over 
recruiting and the direction of the war effort. Chronically short of soldiers, the 
Confederate Congress passed a conscription act in early 1862 to guarantee a steady 
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stream of soldiers to the field armies instead of state militia units, further tying the 
Confederate military to the national government.
25
 
Though a numerical military inequality between the Union and the Confederacy 
existed throughout the Civil War, the South made an enormous cultural investment in the 
conflict. The eleven states that comprised the Confederacy had a military age (18-45) 
white population of 1,064,193 in 1861, while the United States had some 4,559,872 
potential soldiers.
26
 The Confederacy was at a disadvantage because of this disparity, but 
it also enjoyed a series of alleviating circumstances. Total Confederate enlistments for the 
four-year war period amounted to 1,082,119, higher than their entire white male 
population of military age in 1861.
27
 This number includes a significant number of 
reenlistments and enlistments of individuals outside military age, revealing the powerful 
cultural impetus to serve. Furthermore, with a population dependent on slaves to produce 
food for the army, fewer men needed to stay at home, freeing a higher percentage of men 
for the army than in the North. The extremely high enlistment numbers also reflect 
multiple enlistments of three types: men who intentionally enlisted, deserted, and then 
reenlisted under a different name to gain the enlistment bounty; men who reenlisted after 
discharge or injury; and men who reenlisted after their terms of service ended. Even if 
reenlistment does not explain the high enlistment numbers, many historians argue that a 
minimum of six hundred thousand southerners served in the regular armies during the 
war, with about four hundred thousand active at any one time.
28
 A southerner explained 
the impetus to serve: 
[Soldiers] defend the last refuge of civil liberty against the atrocious aggressions 
of a remorseless tyranny. I honor [them] for it; the world honors [them] . . . and 
there will be inscribed upon [their] monument the highest tribute ever paid to a 
man. He has stood bravely in the breach, and interposed the unspotted arm of 
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Ironically, this society-wide military fervor benefited only an elite few. In a war fought to 
defend slavery, the vast majority of enlisted men were poor, non-slave owning whites. 
The officer class, who stood to lose a great deal if defeated, did a tremendous job keeping 
their poor citizens in the ranks and keeping them motivated using the honor-based codes 
with which they had grown up. As slaveholder Major General John B. Gordon wrote after 
the war, “Slavery was undoubtably the immediate formenting cause of the woful [sic] 
American conflict.”30 
 Despite the aggressive announcement of Confederate military intentions at Fort 
Sumter in April 1861, Confederate forces did not follow up their victory with immediate 
offensive operations. This lack of activity occurred for several reasons, many practical 
and some cultural. Most practically, in spring 1861 the Confederate military remained a 
jumbled organization lacking in direction, supply, management, and combat experience 
among its enlisted men. However, the deficiencies of the Confederate war effort and 
strategic decision-making could be overcome through its culture. Where strong 
governmental communication and direction failed, a largely unified southern culture 
filled the void, allowing for consistent behavior in the face of bureaucratic confusion. In 
the wake of the successful bombardment of Fort Sumter, no Confederate units violated 
the territorial integrity of the United States in the East or West. From early June to late 
July, culminating at the Battle of Bull Run, Union units repeatedly invaded and 
skirmished with Confederate forces in southern territory. Confederate General William 
H. T. Walker despaired that the early skirmishing would ever evolve into the glorious 
battle he and his fellow aristocratic officers craved: “this sitting down and waiting to be 
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whipped . . . is to me the most disgusting. If it be my fate to lose my life in the cause . . . 
in Heavens name let me die like a soldier with sword in hand boldly leading my men on a 
fair and open field.”31 Griffin echoed Walker’s comments: “I am getting awfully tired of 
this defensive [posture] . . . . [The] soldiers grow extremely eager for a fight . . . I believe 
they would, almost to a man, be delighted if the Enemy would come along . . . [we] will 
now be able to give the Yanks a warm welcome.”32 
The decision of Confederate leaders not to enter northern territory at the war’s 
outset also reflected the imperatives of the South’s prewar honor culture. By starting the 
war at Fort Sumter, Confederate forces had delivered a metaphorical glove-slap to the 
North. With honor momentarily satisfied by the issue of a challenge to arms, Confederate 
leaders then waited for the North to accept the next part of the ritualistic formula. 
Invading northern territory after starting the war would have violated the southern honor 
culture. Whether Union commanders understood their reciprocal actions in this context 
was immaterial. For southerners, the North’s repeated violations of Confederate territory 
in northern Virginia served as an acceptance of the high stakes duel upon which the two 
powers were about to embark. As Nat Dawson, an officer from Alabama explained, the 
“[Union] invasion has stirred my blood and I think it will be a pleasure to meet our 
enemies in mortal combat. We will now have a bloody war, and we intend to make it as 
destructive as possible.”33 Henry Ravenel, a plantation owner from South Carolina, 
expounded upon this idea:  
I fear the northern people have an impression that we are unable to cope with 
them, from inferiority in numbers, want of necessary means, and that our slave 
population is an element of weakness. It may be necessary therefore that they 
should be disabused of such impression. If we must pass through this terrible 
ordeal of war to teach them this lesson, so be it. It may be best in the end. We put 






According to the South’s honor code, once the war had commenced on equal terms 
Confederate forces could commence aggressive military operations, with an army under 




 The first major battle of the war occurred at Bull Run on July 21, 1861, where 
despite amateurish maneuvering, Confederate forces claimed victory. P. G. T. 
Beauregard, commanding the Confederate forces, encamped at the important Manassas 
Junction, a collection of railroad hubs from which both armies could procure supplies and 
reinforcements. His Union opponent, Irvin McDowell, advanced from Washington with 
explicit orders to defeat any Confederate forces he met and end the rebellion quickly. 
Believing victory over the Confederacy would require no more than an afternoon, rich 
northern spectators came to the battlefield with picnic baskets to watch the spectacle.
36
 
For Beauregard, simply avoiding a major defeat would solidify the Confederacy’s 
military legitimacy and its strategic position. Accomplishing this required a conservative 
campaign plan, which would also not tax his poorly developed system of supply. In 
addition, Beauregard’s forces, though highly motivated, were poorly trained, and his 
subordinates had not yet adjusted to commanding large units for the first time. As 
Lincoln told McDowell, “You are green, it is true, but they are green also. You are all 
green alike.”37 Even many officers with previous command experience had not seen 
service since the Mexican-American War, more than a decade before. Confederate 
General Thomas Jackson, soon to gain fame at the Bull Run, shared how he believed 
green southern troops should be instructed, saying they must be taught to “close with the 
enemy and destroy him.”38 As southern commanders prepared for battlefield conflict, 
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they relied on their cultural aggression to guide them through their army’s inexperience 
and inefficiencies. 
Despite these factors and the benefits of fighting defensively, Beauregard and his 
subordinates decided to launch an attack on the Union left flank, in conjunction with 
Confederate forces marching from the Shenandoah Valley under General Joseph 
Johnston. McLaws noted that the army and its commanders favored initiating the battle: 
“It is the ardent desire of our men to get at the enemy. It seems as if they all wish to let 
off their pent up vengeance, which has been collecting for years past.”39 According to 
another of Beauregard’s subordinates, General Jubal Early, aggressive action was the 
only plan that Beauregard and Johnston ever considered: 
 [General Beauregard] stated that he had no doubt Johnston’s attack would be a 
surprise to the enemy, that the latter would not know what to think of it, and when 
he turned to meet that attack and found himself assailed on the other side, he 
would be still more surprised and would not know what to do, that the effect 
would be a complete rout, a perfect Waterloo, and that we would pursue, cross the 




Unbeknownst to the Confederate staff, McDowell also planned an attack on the 
Confederate left flank, which meant both armies attacked one another on opposite ends of 
the battlefield.
41
 The Union attack was larger, better coordinated, and consequently 
threatened to disrupt and rout the entire Confederate left. Several Confederate regiments 
broke under the strain, but a Virginian brigade commander, Thomas Jackson, 
distinguished himself and his men by holding the wavering Confederate battle line. 
Timely Confederate reinforcements under Johnston arrived on the battlefield by train, 
overrunning several Union artillery positions, and breaking the impetus of the Union 
advance. Union forces began an orderly withdrawal, but rumors of Confederate cavalry 
panicked the retreating columns, and the roads to Washington were soon packed with 
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fleeing soldiers and civilian spectators.
42
 Despite the rumors, the Confederate army was 
in equal disarray because of their victory and unable to pursue. A poorly planned and 
disastrously implemented attack by Beauregard led to victory, mainly because of 
Johnston’s timing and Jackson’s conduct. Still, the First Battle of Bull Run demonstrated 
the importance of aggression to Confederate commanders. Despite significant incentives 
to fight defensively, including a poorly trained army, hope of reinforcement, and the 
knowledge that only a serious defeat would crush the rebellion, Beauregard still decided 
to attack. Like most Confederate commanders, he ignored sound military reasoning in 
pursuit of aggressive action. Without the timely arrival of Johnston or Jackson’s stand, 
the Confederates would likely have lost the battle.
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Jackson soon became one of the most important representatives of the South’s 
aristocratic generals. Loyal, aggressive to the point of rashness, and deeply Christian, 
Jackson exemplified the notion of Christian gentility among the southern military gentry. 
Gordon described Jackson’s aggression glowingly: “he would formulate that judgment 
[to attack], risk his last man upon its correctness, and deliver a stunning blow, while 
others less gifted were hesitating and debating as to its wisdom and safety.”44 His later 
commander and the man who eclipsed him in the Confederate pantheon, Robert E. Lee, 
started the war poorly as a combat commander, defeated in a minor campaign in western 
Virginia. His tentative tactics earned him the nickname “Granny Lee” in the press, and 
the army reassigned him to supervise the construction of fortresses in North Carolina.
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Lee’s reassignment served as a tacit acknowledgment of the Confederate government’s 
bias against commanders who appeared unaggressive or hesitant. Though Lee later 
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reemerged as the Confederacy’s greatest commander, many southern officers and 
civilians were deeply unimpressed with his first campaigns. 
 In the West, Confederate strategists focused on the vitally important state of 
Kentucky, which a pro-Union legislature controlled, despite its southern-sympathizing 
governor.
46
 Unlike the divided Union commands in the West, Albert Sidney Johnston 
guided Confederate operations, and though outnumbered he determined to take the war to 
the North. Union General Ulysses S. Grant’s successful sieges at Forts Henry and 
Donelson revealed the Confederate weakness in the West.
47
 Union control of river forts 
meant that aggressive Confederate operations exposed the southern heartland to Union 
penetration. But these considerations ultimately did not derail the aggressive strategic 
formulations of southern generals who believed that offensive operations could bring 
military victory. To that end, Johnston and the newly transferred Beauregard contrived to 
destroy Grant’s army in a single battle. 
By early April 1862, Grant’s forces had advanced all the way into southwestern 
Tennessee, using its control of the Tennessee River to supply and shield itself from 
Confederate forces. On the night of April 5, Grant dispersed his scattered army over a 
wide area, incorrectly believing Confederate forces were not in the vicinity.
48
 However, 
Johnston and Beauregard managed to encamp just two miles from Union lines without 
detection. Beauregard hesitated to attack, believing that Union pickets must have heard 
the Confederate army marching and firing their guns to test their powder in the rainy 
dampness, meaning they had lost the element of surprise.
49
 Epitomizing the southern 
understanding of battle, Johnston told Beauregard that he would “attack them if they were 
a million.”50 He drew directly on his southern sense of honor and masculinity when he 
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told his troops, “I have put you in motion to offer battle to the invaders of your country. 
Remember the dependence of your mothers, your wives, your sisters, and your children 
on the result. Remember the fair, broad, abounding land, the happy homes, and the ties 
that would be desolated by your defeat.”51 Johnston’s circular to his troops clearly tied 
battle to southern conceptions of home and hearth, insinuating that defeat would bring 
ruin to what his soldiers valued most. Military officers repeatedly tried to motivate 
soldiers before battle, but Johnston’s circular reveals how Confederate leaders linked 
aggression and bravery to the preservation of the southern homeland and everyone in it. 
The ensuing Battle of Shiloh closely resembled the Battle of Marengo in 1800, 
during which Napoleon was caught and nearly defeated because he carelessly scattered 
his army for the night in the face of large Austrian forces.
52
 Like Napoleon, Grant 
believed his adversary unable to attack, but on the morning of April 6, Confederate forces 
crashed through Union picket lines and roared into sleepy Union camps.
53
 Grant, several 
miles downstream at the time of the attack, was caught by surprise. Despite severe losses 
and the collapse of several brigades, one of Grant’s subordinates, William T. Sherman, 
managed to rally the army long enough for reinforcements to arrive. Johnston was killed 
in the confused melee at the “Hornet’s Nest,” a Union strongpoint that Confederate 
commanders refused to bypass on their way through the broken Union lines.
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Beauregard witnessed Brigadier General John C. Breckinridge lead an attack against the 
salient: 
General Johnston was astonished at the resolute resistance encountered there. 
After causing General Breckinridge to appeal to the soldiers, and after doing so 
himself, he ordered a charge, which he led, in person, with his well-known valor, 







Confederate forces launched as many as twelve separate assaults into this salient, 
rather than going around it.
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 Again, Confederate officers subjugated military reason to a 
stubborn willingness to engage the enemy. Despite the losses incurred and Johnston’s 
death, the first day’s fighting represented a rousing success for the Confederates. Their 
actions over the next several days, however, set a deadly precedent for southern tactical 
aggression and severely damaged their army. After the first day, Grant tightened his 
defenses and prepared to fight again, this time from much stronger positions and with 
additional reinforcements. Beauregard planned to attack again, but was surprised to wake 
in the morning to an overwhelming Union attack on his line. Instead of trying to hold on, 
Beauregard launched several counterattacks that severely weakened the fighting 
capabilities of his army.
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Shiloh foreshadowed many battles the Confederates nearly won.
58
 After early 
success, Confederate leaders refused to break off the engagement when it had become 
apparent that further attacks would not bring victory. Southern leaders’ distaste for 
cowardice, a product of their honor culture, led them to make tactical discretion 
subservient to sustained aggression. Shiloh established a pattern of early tactical success, 
followed by futile bloodletting that Confederate officers followed at the Seven Days 
Battles, Stones River, Second Corinth, Antietam, Chickamauga, Gettysburg, and the 
Wilderness. These battles highlight the deadliness of the southern style of warfare. 
Notions of honor and masculine bravery, rather than tactical concerns, motivated 
southern battlefield maneuvers. Beauregard lamented the stubborn willingness of 
Confederate officers to expose themselves to fire that cost Johnston his life: 
It is but true to state here, that never from the opening of the battle up to the hour 
of his death, had General Johnston occupied on the field the position which was 
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properly his own, as Commander-in-Chief of our forces. From the place he had 
himself selected on our line, and where he remained to the last, he was but acting 




Even when retreat became necessary or advantageous, staff level Confederate 
officers hesitated to break contact. Confederates forces at Shiloh accomplished most of 
their objectives on the first day and the tactical situation did not call for further attacks, 
especially after Johnston’s death, but they did not withdraw or end their counterattacks 
against Union forces that clearly outnumbered their own. Stubbornness, protection of 
honor, and fears of being labeled a coward proved a costly pattern for the Confederate 
military. Major General Braxton Bragg described what he learned at Shiloh: “a valuable 
lesson, by which we should profit — never on a battlefield to lose a moment’s time . . . 
press on with every available man, giving a panic-stricken and retreating foe no time to 
rally, and reaping all the benefits of success never complete until every enemy is killed, 




A month before Shiloh, Stonewall Jackson set out from Richmond on one of the 
most successful Confederate campaigns of the entire war, seeking to prevent the 
reinforcement of the Army of the Potomac as it marched on the Confederate capital under 
General George McClellan.
61
 Jackson moved up and down the Shenandoah Valley, home 
to rich farmlands, pinning down Union divisions much needed by McClellan. In a war 
characterized by Confederate numerical deficiency, Jackson’s Valley Campaign stands as 
one of the South’s most lopsided successes. Jackson waged a campaign of maneuver, 
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preserving his forces in the face of significant Union pursuers. For more than a month 
Jackson moved through the Valley surprising and destroying isolated Union detachments 
without ever enjoying numerical parity. The success of the Valley Campaign became a 
symbol to the Confederate public of the possibility of offensive action. Though tasked 
with holding down the Union forces in the vicinity, Jackson managed to kill, capture, and 
drive back more than sixty thousand Union soldiers, never having more than seventeen 
thousand men himself.
62
 If Jackson’s performance at Bull Run had not already thrust him 
into the national spotlight, the Valley Campaign guaranteed his celebrity. Moreover, it 
proved for southern officers the viability of outnumbered offensive action, especially 
through operational aggression. Other Confederate commanders attempted to duplicate 
Jackson’s tactics, often by dividing their forces in the face of greater Union numbers, but 
they could not replicate his success. Jackson’s Shenandoah campaign helped cement his 
legend because it represented all that a southern gentleman of the best qualities could 
achieve. McLaws was particularly impressed: “The news that comes to us of the 
successive victories gained by Jackson over our enemies has over and over again 
electrified us and inspired new hope for our cause.”63 Though outnumbered significantly, 
Jackson’s force defeated Union armies many times its size, rallied the morale of the 
civilian population of the Shenandoah Valley, and reinforced the ideal of the cavalier 
fighting for hearth and home. As a soldier and a gentleman, Jackson became the darling 
of the southern populace, the Confederacy’s most visible officer.64 
 The success of the Valley Campaign played a significant role in the subsequent 
Union campaigns against Richmond. Union General George B. McClellan was a talented 
organizer but tentative combat commander.
65
 After the Union mistakes at First Bull Run 
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he determined to build and sustain an army capable of overrunning the outnumbered and 
undersupplied Confederate forces marshaled under the command of Confederate General 
Joseph E. Johnston. But McClellan’s timid leadership and his exaggeration of the size of 
Confederate forces delayed his planned invasion of Virginia by three months. Despite his 
own misgivings, McClellan’s overwhelming strength at the beginning of the Peninsular 
Campaign (nearly one hundred twenty thousand men compared to Johnston’s seventy 
thousand) threatened to steamroll the Confederate forces in northern Virginia.
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McClellan’s march toward Richmond gained an air of inexorability, with Johnston unable 
to engage him favorably or slow his progress. Sensing that he could not survive a siege 
en forme, Johnston decided to attack the Union Army to slow its advance and drive 
McClellan away from Richmond. 
 As a student at West Point, Johnston demonstrated an aptitude for combat 
command, and during the Mexican-American War he repeatedly led important assaults, 
resulting in multiple promotions as well as multiple wounds.
67
 Johnston’s long 
experience in the United States military made him one of the most important 
commanders in the South’s armies. He wrote to Lee and Davis to explain his campaign 
plans, “We must . . . take the offensive, collect all the troops we have in the East and 
cross the Potomac with them, while Beauregard, with all we have in the West, invades 
Ohio. Our troops have always wished for the offensive, and so does the country.”68 
Johnston’s letter illustrates the southern belief that aggressive action was the key to 
ultimate victory. As such, Johnston developed plans for an engagement and waited for 
the opportunity to strike. McClellan provided the opportunity when two of his corps 
crossed the Chickahominy River without support.
69
 Johnston immediately attacked, 
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giving his subordinates detailed plans that required precise timing and close supervision 
to work. However, unlike Napoleon who famously prepared excessively detailed 
campaign orders, Johnston did not enjoy a correspondingly skillful set of subordinate 
generals.
70
 His plans also expected too much from soldiers marching over rain-soaked 
roads, and the attacks bogged down in inconclusive fighting. The confusion produced 
frustration among the Confederate ranks, and in one instance Jackson berated a colonel 
who failed to throw his troops into action saying, “How many men did you have killed?” 
“None”; “How many wounded?” “None, sir”; “Do you call that much of a fight?” 
Jackson ordered the colonel placed under arrest.
71
 During the fighting Johnston suffered 
two wounds in quick succession; a spent musket ball hit him in the shoulder and a shell 
fragment punctured his chest, injuring him severely enough to put him out of action for 
several months.
72
 His battle plans, a blend of intense European military planning and 
headlong southern aggression, simply did not work. But McClellan’s caution led him to 
stop advancing after the engagement and afforded the Confederates time to rest and 
resupply. 
After the battle, Robert E. Lee, recently returned to Richmond after a lengthy 
assignment overseeing the construction of fortifications on the Confederate East Coast, 
assumed command of the Confederate forces in Virginia. In contrast to his first combat 
command, Lee would not again appear tentative to his superiors or fellow officers. 
Longstreet compared Lee’s aggression to his Union counterpart’s: “As a commander 
[Lee] was very much of the Wellington ‘Up-and-at-em’ style. He found it hard, the 
enemy in sight, to withhold his blows. With McClellan it was more difficult to strike than 
to march for the enemy.”73 Another staff officer who had faith in Lee said, “His name 
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might be Audacity. He will take more desperate chances, and take them quicker than any 
other general in this country, North or South. And you will live to see it, too.”74 Lee first 
released the dashing cavalier, J. E. B. Stuart and his cavalry brigade, on a one hundred 
fifty mile ride around the entire Union army.
75
 The ride proved of little strategic 
consequence, but Stuart demonstrated the dashing ideal of the southern cavalier in action. 
His ride embarrassed and frustrated McClellan and his cavalry leaders, captured several 
tons of Union supplies, and boosted southern morale. The Seven Days campaign that 
followed revealed clearly how the South’s military command believed they should 
conduct the war. 
Lee planned his own series of complicated maneuvers to strike along a wide front 
of McClellan’s line. Lee’s plan depended on surprise, coordination, and good timing, but 
he also designed the plan with his enemy in mind. Like many of his fellow gentleman, 
Lee believed the northern officer class militarily inferior to its southern rivals, and that at 
the first hint of aggressive action they would fold under pressure. As one of Lee’s 
generals, Lafayette McLaws, explained, “The Yankees themselves acknowledge our 
superiority of courage and spirit to themselves. They wonder how it is that our half clad, 
half starved soldiers can fight so well. The idea of any one fighting for principle has 
never for once entered their understanding.”76 Following this haughty line of thinking, 
Lee planned to strike the Union army knowing that Johnston’s initial offensive at Seven 
Pines had shaken the already timid McClellan. McClellan actually initiated contact, but 
quickly surrendered the initiative when his forces met determined Confederate 
resistance.
77
 But Lee did not anticipate the poor performance of his subordinates, 
including Jackson, and the poor coordination that hampered his attack’s effectiveness. 
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In the series of engagements that followed, known as the Seven Days Battles, Lee 
hoped to divide and destroy the widely spread Union Army of the Potomac.
78
 Beginning 
at Mechanicsville on June 28, Lee ordered his divisions to assault the Union right flank, 
using Jackson’s troops as the lynchpin of the attack. Just returned from the Valley 
Campaign, however, Jackson and his soldiers were sluggish, and commenced their 
portion of the attack four hours later than planned.
79
 One of Lee’s generals, John B. 
Magruder, while waiting for Jackson to arrive, asked Lee for permission to attack the 
Union lines out of sheer restlessness: “if you will allow me to do so I pledge my honor as 
a soldier that I will carry them at the point of the bayonet.”80 Union artillery pounded the 
Confederate troops waiting to attack and Longstreet struggled to rein in his impetuous 
officers, many of whom were desperate to demonstrate their bravery. Longstreet noted, “I 
sent orders for [Colonel] Jenkins to silence the battery [harassing the waiting Confederate 
lines], under the impression that our wait was understood, and that the sharp-shooters 
would be pushed forward till they could pick off the gunners, thus ridding us of that 
annoyance; but the gallant Jenkins, only too anxious for a dash at the battery, charged and 
captured it, thus precipitating battle.”81 Nothing came of Magruder and Jackson’s assaults 
but high casualties and McClellan’s panicked message to Abraham Lincoln claiming that 
he faced at least two hundred thousand enemy soldiers, rather than the something less 
than ninety thousand Confederates in the field.
82
 Lee followed the next day at Gaines’s 
Mill with the Confederacy’s largest attack of the war, nearly fifty five thousand 
soldiers.
83
 Jackson arrived late again, however, and timely Union reinforcements pushed 
back the attack. 
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Mentally beaten by the end of the second day of the battle, McClellan, despite 
controlling the field, outnumbering his enemy, possessing adequate supplies and lines of 
retreat, and enjoying a strong defensive position, began to withdraw. The Union retreat 
affirmed Lee’s initial assessment of McClellan. Lee had accomplished his objective of 
driving McClellan away from Richmond, but he launched assault after assault over the 
next several days, hoping to produce a rout of the Union army. McLaws revealed the 
Confederate hesitation to break contact during the battle, even in victory: 
Yesterday our troops were engaged all day, with brilliant results, having driven 
the enemy in all directions, from his strongest fortifications. But the battle is not 
yet won, as our enemies are powerful and well provided. It is however the opinion 
that if we would now allow them to run they would run, but we are surrounding 




 After a failure by Magruder to follow up a successful attack, Lee sent him a 
dispatch reminding him how southern generals were expected to fight: “I regret much 
that you have made so little progress to-day in pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap the 
fruits of our victory the pursuit should be most vigorous. I must urge you, then, again to 
press on his rear rapidly and steadily. We must lose no time, or he will escape entirely.”85 
But the defensive positioning and numerical superiority of McClellan’s force made Lee’s 
strategy unlikely to succeed and Confederate casualties ballooned, especially at the final 
fight at Malvern Hill, where Lee gave up any pretense of nuance and tried to overrun the 
Union positions by sheer force. His pre-battle artillery bombardment did little damage to 
the Union defenders, and more than five thousand six hundred Confederates were killed 
or wounded.
86
 In one instance, Confederate officers were so desperate to get at their 
Union enemy that they advanced without orders. Longstreet reported: “It seems that just 
as the troops marched to the left under the last order, information was received by some 
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of the officers at the front that the enemy was getting away from us . . . . Anxious to atone 
for lost opportunities of the day before, part of the troops near our right moved forward, 
and soon encountered the enemy’s infantry.”87 After Malvern Hill, Lee’s battered and 
exhausted army could not contest McClellan’s retreat, which did not stop until it reached 
the safety of northern Virginia. 
The Seven Days campaign against McClellan produced a strategic victory but 
Lee’s continued assaults, well after he had any hope of decisive victory, also made it a 
symbol of the waste incurred by aggressive Confederate generals. D. H. Hill, one of 
Lee’s generals, summarized this belief after the war: 
We were very lavish of blood in those days and it was thought to be a great thing 
to charge a battery of artillery or an earth-work lined with infantry . . . . The 
attacks on the Beaver Dam intrenchments, on the heights of Malvern Hill, at 
Gettysburg, etc., were all grand, but of exactly the kind of grandeur which the 




While Seven Days restored Lee’s favor among the Confederate high command 
and lifted civilian morale, it also produced acute bloodletting in the Army of Northern 
Virginia. Sustaining the image of the aggressive southern officer led to casualty rates that 
the relatively limited Confederate manpower reserves could not accommodate. Still, the 
Confederate populace reacted positively to Lee’s aggressive operations, regardless of 
cost. Officers already predisposed to aggressive action by upbringing and training 
recognized that command opportunities rested on their ability to produce via aggressive 
action. The Confederate officer corps was deeply impressed with Lee after the battle, and 
McLaws praised the man once called “Granny Lee” by noting, “The criterion in military 
matters is success and up to this hour the combinations of General Lee have been of the 
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most marked, decided, and successful. You cannot imagine how gratifying is the feeling 
to soldiers, to know that their chief is competent to all positions.”89 
 A month after McClellan withdrew up the peninsula, a second Union force, the 
Army of Virginia under John Pope, marched to the aide of the Army of the Potomac, 
forcing Lee to make a difficult choice. If he waited for the Army of Virginia to join with 
McClellan he risked being crushed between the two. But if he moved against Pope, Lee 
knew McClellan would be free to attack Richmond. Alternatively, if Lee attacked 
McClellan’s fortifications, he could gain little by it and suffer more casualties. Believing 
that waiting profited little and goaded by a staff confident in his abilities, Lee committed 
a small number of troops to hold McClellan in place and marched north to confront Pope. 
Confederate spirits, rising after their strategic victory at Seven Days, soared when they 
learned they were attacking again. Brigadier Isaac Trimble believed another battle would 
allow him to demonstrate his bravery and thereby gain promotion: “Before this war is 
over I intend to be a major general or a corpse.”90 Lee’s maneuver, by which he 
confronted one side of the pincer movement while occupying the other’s attention, was 
perfected by Napoleon nearly half a century before.
91
 Lee sent Jackson on a flanking 
march, with orders to seize Manassas Junction, currently employed as Pope’s central 
supply and communications hub.
92
 Once Jackson seized the junction, Pope would have 
no choice but to offer battle or withdraw. Jackson, recovered from the weariness that 
plagued him and his division after the Valley Campaign, moved around Pope’s flank and 
expertly planted himself astride the Union line of communications. James Longstreet, one 
of Lee’s divisional commanders, followed the sounds of the guns and arrived quickly, 
while Pope threw his army against Jackson’s isolated division. Serious casualties piled up 
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on both sides, but Longstreet’s arrival on the battlefield, right behind the attacking Union 
army, went unnoticed. His subsequent attack crushed the Union army between his army’s 
hammer and Jackson’s unmoving anvil.93 Pope’s forces fled the battle, leaving the Army 
of Northern Virginia its clearest victory of the war. 
 Lee’s success at the Second Battle of Bull Run rested largely on his ability to 
seize the operational and tactical initiative from his Union enemies. Once Jackson 
captured the Manassas rail-hub, victory was largely assured if Pope did not withdraw and 
Longstreet continued aggressively maneuvering, which Lee could count on because of 
the southern cultural attachment to aggression. The southern use of aggressive tactics — 
both Jackson’s capture of Manassas rail-hub and Longstreet’s maneuvering — led 
directly to a victory, and one attained at significantly less cost than Seven Days. 
Emboldened by the success aggression brought, Lee and his lieutenants looked to exploit 
the victory by invading Maryland. Longstreet wrote, “the situation called for action, and 
there was but one opening, — across the Potomac.”94 Southern leaders hoped to relieve 
Virginian farms from supplying the Confederate army by obtaining much needed 
supplies from enemy territory.
95
 Confederate military and political leaders also hoped that 
a victory on northern soil would gain formal French and British political recognition and 
bring Maryland slaveholders to the Confederate colors.
96
 Lee believed his invasion would 
influence the North’s upcoming elections, leading to a more antiwar House of 
Representatives. Above all, however, Lee recognized the South’s strategic and military 
vulnerability. No matter how many battles he won in Virginia, only the destruction of the 
Union’s principal field armies or the capture of its capital would compel the North to sign 
a peace treaty. Lee’s aggressive invasion of Maryland followed the Confederate 
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understanding of the strategic situation, and the region’s cultural values. Lee and 
Longstreet believed they would succeed. According to Longstreet, Lee offered Jefferson 
Davis, “deliberate and urgent advice to . . . join him and be prepared to make a proposal 
for peace and independence from the head of a conquering army.”97 
 Beyond the practical reasons for invading Maryland, Lee’s decision to march 
north lay deeply rooted in southern understandings of honor and masculinity and 
reflected the heavy toll that defensive fighting in the South took on his men. Confederate 
soldiers eagerly sought to visit some of the devastation and violence on northern towns 
that Union armies had visited upon Virginia’s countryside. Southern soldiers adopted 
characteristically enthusiastic rhetoric about the venture and expressed deep virulence 
toward the enemy territory they would soon pass through. Griffin discussed the mood of 
the army when he wrote: “I heard several [soldiers] to day . . . hope that Jeff Davis would 
not stop until he overran all the North and burned the principal cities, including 
Boston.”98 McLaws echoed the sentiments of his fellow officers when he wrote before 
the campaign, “If we are striking for Pennsylvania we are actuated by a desire to visit 
upon the enemy some of the horrors of war, to give the northern people some idea of the 
excesses committed by their troops upon our houses and inhabitants.”99 The wish to harm 
defenseless civilians may seem uncharacteristic for men who believed themselves models 
of gentility and moral uprightness, but their experiences in the war’s first year brought 
another aspect of their honor culture to the fore. Constant exposure to Confederate 
refugees, burned-out farms, and razed villages insulted the masculinity of these men, who 
seemed powerless to stop the Yankee invaders. By attacking and ravaging northern 
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territory, southern soldiers sought to prove that they could defend their home while 
demonstrating northerners’ inability to defend their land. 
Despite southerners’ desire to burn and lay waste northern farmland, Lee forbade 
Confederate soldiers from plundering the northern countryside, an order to which they 
adhered, despite the obvious needs and interest of the army.
100
 McLaws wrote unhappily, 
“It is reported that our army will not be allowed to plunder or rob in Pennsylvania, which 
is all very well; but it would be better not to publish it. As we have received provocations 
enough to burn and take or destroy, property of all kinds and even the men, women & 
children along our whole border.”101 Gentility and honor won out over rage and violence, 
reflecting Confederates’ belief that the war with the Yankees represented a clash of two 
different cultures and they would not compromise their values in the pursuit of victory. 
McLaws eventually concluded that sparing northern territory was a good idea: “We knew 
too well the treacherous, fiendish, Yankee character to give them any such excuse for the 
exercise of their natural brutality.”102 The Confederates would fight as gentlemen and not 
succumb to the baser actions instincts they believed were common among their northern 
opponent. As the war progressed and the Confederate cause became more desperate, 
however, southern gentility took a backseat to more cruel behaviors, especially regarding 
the treatment of northern property and black Union troops. 
 Lee and his army slipped by McClellan’s forces, and moved north in several wide 
ranging columns. A young northern boy wrote in his diary about the Confederate soldiers 
as they marched past:  
They were the dirtiest men I ever saw, a most ragged, lean, and hungry set of 
wolves. Yet there was a dash about them that the northern men lacked. They rode 
like circus riders. Many of them were from the far South and spoke a dialect I 
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Military strategy usually counseled against splitting an army, but Lee concluded 
that the careful McClellan would not pursue him quickly, and his army could be supplied 
more easily in separate columns. However, ill-luck plagued Lee’s operation, including a 
careless officer who left a complete copy of Lee’s campaign orders at an abandoned 
campsite.
104
 Union pickets discovered and delivered the orders to an exultant McClellan 
who declared, “Here is a paper with which if I cannot whip ‘Bobby Lee,’ I will be willing 
to go home.”105 For all his bluster, however, McClellan could not completely shed his 
cautious nature and waited a full eighteen hours before pursuing Lee.
106
 Confederates 
discovered that McClellan had obtained a copy of their plans, but Lee refused to abandon 
his invasion. Perhaps he wanted to ensure the safety of some of his exposed divisions or 
perhaps he believed he could win a defensive battle. Lee recognized his extreme 
vulnerability and realized that McClellan had the opportunity to destroy his army 
piecemeal. But rather than withdraw to Virginia, declare the campaign a failure, and start 
over again at a later date, Lee decided to fight, issuing orders to his far-flung 
commanders to assemble at Antietam Creek, Maryland. 
 Lee had nearly fifty five thousand men during the campaign, but he could only 
gather thirty nine thousand soldiers near Antietam before McClellan attacked.
107
 Though 
Lee’s decision to remain in Maryland was fundamentally flawed, his tactical conduct at 
Antietam was notable. McClellan’s numerically superior force attacked throughout the 
day in wave after wave against the thin Confederate lines, but Lee managed to repulse 





 Lee launched aggressive attacks whenever he could, even against 
overwhelming enemy forces, as Brigadier General John Bell Hood observed: 
Not far distant in our front were drawn up, in close array, heavy columns of 
Federal infantry; not less than two corps were in sight to oppose my small 
command, numbering, approximately, two thousand effectives. Notwithstanding 
the overwhelming odds of over ten to one against us, we drove the enemy from 
the wood and corn field back upon his reserves, and forced him to abandon his 
guns on our left. This most deadly combat raged till our last round of ammunition 
was expended. [We] had lost, in the corn field, fully two-thirds of [our] number; 
and whole ranks of brave men, whose deeds were unrecorded save in the hearts of 




This episode demonstrates the unwillingness to disengage, common among the 
Confederate leaders even in the face of overwhelming numbers, that cost them dearly. 
McClellan, for his part, never achieved a force concentration large enough to drive home 
any of his attacks, in large part because he refused to commit several divisions that could 
have turned the Confederate defeat into the complete destruction of Lee’s army.110 For 
his part, Lee demonstrated an understanding of European tactics unmatched by other 
American commanders, but his cultural affinities proved costly. The southern belief that 
retreat meant cowardice or dishonor chained Lee to a decision — remaining in Maryland 
— that ignored sound military judgment. At one point, the fighting became so closely 
contested that D. H. Hill, one of Lee’s generals, “seized a musket and by example 
speedily collected a number of men, who joined him in reinforcing the line threatened by 
this heavy display.”111 Lee’s decision resulted in the bloodiest day in American military 
history, as Confederate and Union forces shredded one another for nearly twelve hours. 
The battle almost crippled the Army of Northern Virginia, with Lee losing 11,724 men, 
or 22.6 percent of his entire force.
112
 Narrowly avoiding complete destruction, Lee 
limped back into friendly territory without having gained the desperately needed decisive 
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engagement. The Confederates gained no strategic advantage from his decision to fight, 
despite the severe losses incurred at Antietam.
113
 
Antietam represented a defining battle of the Civil War and offered a clear 
demonstration of southern battle culture. Retreat would have saved Lee’s army, but it 
would have required abandoning Maryland allies and southern conquests. Equally 
important, retreat entailed a public loss of face. The Maryland Campaign and its bloody 
conclusion highlight how the South’s honor culture could lead to disastrous decisions. 
Lee, and to a lesser extent, Longstreet and Jackson, decided to hold the line at Antietam 
because they viewed retreat without battle as tantamount to failure. Even though Lee 
conducted a defensive battle, tactics aggressive southern commanders did not favor, 
simply deciding to fight was aggressive. Besides strategic concerns, the South’s 
willingness to fight in northern territory also demonstrated the region’s honor culture. 
Without a contest of arms to confirm or deny the legitimacy of their invasion, retreat 
represented cowardice. Instead of withdrawing to the safety of northern Virginia the 
Confederate high command decided to fight. In short, the Confederate army conducted 
the battle defensively, but by refusing to withdraw from Union territory without a fight, 




While the Confederates in the East pressed their advantage after Second Bull Run, 
the Confederate armies in the West contemplated their own offensive maneuvers into 
Union territory. Much like Lee, the commanders in the West sought decisive 
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engagements against the Federal armies opposing them. After replacing P. G. T. 
Beauregard as the commander of the Army of Tennessee, Braxton Bragg reworked 
Confederate strategy and determined to strike north. Bragg redeployed several 
subordinate armies in a shield stretching from Arkansas through Mississippi, in an effort 
to slow Ulysses Grant, currently maneuvering against the vital Confederate city of 
Vicksburg. He ordered General Edmund Kirby Smith to join him in the North, and each 
slipped past their Union pursuers into Kentucky. Bragg and Smith believed, like Lee, that 
an invasion would benefit larger Confederate strategic goals, encouraging sympathetic 
Kentuckians to rally to the Confederate colors while eliminating the need to supply 
themselves from southern farms.
114
 After an easy entry into Kentucky, Bragg confidently 
told his soldiers: “Comrades, our campaign opens most auspiciously and promises 
complete success . . . . The enemy is in full retreat, with consternation and demoralization 
devastating his ranks. To secure the full fruits of this condition we must press on 
vigorously and unceasingly.”115 Bragg and Smith faced the cautious and southern-
sympathizing Don Carlos Buell, but they failed to combine their forces during the 
ensuing battle for the state. Despite seizing the Kentucky capital of Frankfort, their 
campaign failed, partially because they wasted time and effort interfering in Kentucky’s 
state politics.
116
 Confederate forces facing numerical deficiencies could ill-afford to split 
their strength in the face of larger Union armies, especially in enemy territory. While this 
practice worked at Second Bull Run, it significantly undermined the Confederate 
invasion of Kentucky. 
Buell, disinclined to force a battle with the invading Confederate armies, pursued 
Bragg slowly through Kentucky, until Union forces stumbled into Confederate forces 
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outside the town of Perryville. Bragg opted to attack the larger Union army and sent notes 
to Smith to join him when he realized the potential to defeat Buell, who had divided his 
command in an effort to locate the Confederates.
117
 Bragg told his officers, “A powerful 
foe is assembling in our front and we must prepare to strike him a sudden and decisive 
blow.”118 With Buell several miles behind the main army when the battle began, Bragg’s 
aggression created confusion among the Union command staff. Bragg attacked along the 
Union left, driving Union forces before him, but the attack sputtered as reinforcements 
reached Federal lines. The Confederates continued to launch halfhearted attacks, but 
slowed by the heat and a lack of water, failed to capitalize on earlier breakthroughs.
119
 As 
Union reinforcements arrived, Bragg withdrew, hoping to join with the tardy Smith and 
renew his advance. However, Bragg soon learned of the Confederate defeat at Antietam 
in the East and further Union advances in the West and decided to abandon Kentucky. 
Bragg won a tactical victory, but the battle cost him nearly 20 percent of his force killed 
or wounded.
120
 Bragg and Smith withdrew from Kentucky, with nothing to show for their 
aggressive invasion. The twin Confederate thrusts north ended in failure, with combined 
casualties of nearly twenty thousand men, irreplaceable losses for a military desperate to 
preserve its manpower. 
Lee and Bragg’s invasions of the North provide excellent case studies for 
understanding southern aggression. Each campaign reflected applications of military 
thought by attempting to put pressure on presumed weak points in the enemy’s 
defenses.
121
 Lee and Bragg both believed that the border states represented the North’s 
weak link, and cultural inclinations to take the war to the North supplemented good 
military and strategic sense. Neither campaign proved successful, though not because of 
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flaws in the strategic thinking. Lee’s Maryland campaign failed because of mischance 
and an unwillingness to withdraw, while Bragg’s failed because he did not have enough 
men on hand to exploit his success at Perryville, especially because of Smith’s dallying 
and Lee’s defeat at Antietam. Failures in application rather than flaws in planning foiled 
southern expansion. Lee’s stubbornness cost the South dearly at Antietam, and Bragg’s 
inability to link with Smith made it impossible to sustain his invasion of Kentucky. 
Strategic aggression might have succeeded if not for operational and tactical failures. 
Equally important, both commanders showed a similar cultural imperative that led them 
to invade northern territory. Separated by hundreds of miles and never in direct 
communication, Lee and Bragg acted aggressively because their cultural background 
reinforced what they believed the correct military decision. In effect, strategic 
formulations did not necessarily require direct oversight by the Confederate War 
Department because individual army commanders shared the belief that successful 
prosecution of the war required aggressive action. Their invasions fused military 
rationality with the seeming irrationality of southern aggression. In Lee’s case, his 
continued attachment to aggression led to defeat, showing how southern culture could 
negatively impact military judgment. 
Both Confederate armies withdrew to safe territory and began to rebuild. 
Fortunately for the Army of Northern Virginia, new Union General Ambrose Burnside 
launched a piecemeal and weak attack in December 1862 against Lee’s strong winter 
positions around the town of Fredericksburg. Despite the Confederate preference to 
attack, Lee and his commanders could not believe their good fortune when Burnside 
decided to offer battle. Begun at the height of the inactive season for most armies of the 
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era, Burnside’s attack gave Lee and his army the opportunity to inflict a large number of 
casualties with relatively little risk to their position.
122
 After the bloodletting of the 
Maryland campaign, even the most hotheaded southern commanders could not pass up 
the opportunity to fight defensively from their prepared positions at Fredericksburg. At 
the cost of only five thousand men, Lee’s army killed or captured more than twelve 
thousand Union soldiers who marched straight toward the well supported defensive lines 
of Lee’s men, much to the horror of the northern public.123 
Lee’s success in the defensive battle at Fredericksburg has prompted scholars to 
wonder why he did not attempt to fight more of these types of battles, especially 
considering his overwhelming success. Defensive battles certainly benefited a manpower-
strapped Confederacy, but Lee rarely found such fights operationally possible. A string of 
careful Union commanders often surrendered the initiative to Lee, who was both 
militarily and culturally inclined to pursue an aggressive policy. Military conditions made 
continuous defensive posture unlikely, while cultural influences made it odious. Lee and 
other military leaders well remembered his derisive title “Granny Lee” and the southern 
public’s love for dashing figures like Jackson and Stuart. As long as gallantry, 
masculinity, and courage endured as important regional cultural paradigms, southern 
military leaders remained chained to the offensive. Only crippling manpower shortages 
curbed this tendency much later in the war. Fredericksburg thus represents an anomaly in 
1862, a tactical choice that reflected the exhaustion of the Confederate army after 
Antietam and the poor decision-making of Burnside, who lost thousands of soldiers 
without damaging Lee’s position.124 
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In the West, Bragg and his fellow generals suffered through an abysmal few 
months in the fall of 1862, first defeated at Iuka and then thoroughly repulsed during an 
offensive at Second Corinth. The latter battle is especially revealing, as the Confederates 
won the first day’s fighting, overcoming prepared Union rifle pits with determined 
bayonet charges.
125
 On the second day, however, the Confederate commanders, Earl Van 
Dorn and Sterling Price, hurled their divisions against a second set of carefully organized 
entrenchments, this time backed by Union artillery and gun emplacements, and turned an 
initial Confederate success into an overwhelming Union victory.
126
 The defeats at Iuka 
and Corinth, though smaller in scale than Bragg’s or Lee’s campaigns, demonstrated that 
regardless of force size, Confederate commanders believed attack the foremost way to 
fight with honor. Even when sound military thought demonstrated otherwise, Confederate 
commanders could not detach themselves from the southern culture that guided their 
actions. 
In response to the losses at Iuka and Second Corinth, Bragg felt compelled to 
accomplish at least one successful campaign before the end of the year. At the Battle of 
Stones River in the first days of 1863, Bragg contrived to surprise the Union Army of the 
Cumberland, in the same way that Albert Sidney Johnston and P. G. T. Beauregard 
surprised Grant at Shiloh earlier in the war. The commander of the Army of the 
Cumberland, William Rosecrans, knew of Bragg’s forces operating in his vicinity, and 
planned for battle when he felt ready. However, Bragg seized the initiative, and two 
divisions crashed into the Union right early on the morning of December 31.
127
 Sweeping 
aside several Union brigades in the middle of finishing breakfast, Confederate forces 
ruptured large portions of the Union line, forcing Rosecrans to tighten and reform his 
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line. Despite the casualties incurred on the first day, Bragg resolved to attack again if 
Rosecrans did not retreat. While raiding Union supply lines, Confederate cavalry 
discovered large numbers of Union troops escorting wounded soldiers north, which they 
interpreted as Rosecrans’s withdrawal.128 Rather than wait for the Union departure and 
therefore the completion of his campaign’s objectives, Bragg launched more assaults. 
Well entrenched and supported by strong artillery emplacements, Union defenders 
blasted away at the Confederate lines, turning what at first appeared to be a victory into a 
decisive defeat.
129
 Bragg withdrew to Tullahoma, leaving Murfreesboro to the now 
unopposed Rosecrans. 
Stones River demonstrated again that Confederate commanders could not 
abandon their aggressive style of fighting, even when they had little reason to continue to 
fight that way. As at Shiloh, attacks on the second day of Stones River could not 
accomplish more than the surprise attacks on the first. Confederate commanders again 
salvaged defeat from the jaws of victory by refusing to relinquish the tactical initiative. 
Bragg’s failure at Stones River proved especially glaring. Repeated Confederate attacks 
concentrated the Union defense, and when Bragg fed southern reinforcements into battle 
too slowly Rosecrans met each attack individually. In many ways, the battle resembled a 
reversal of Antietam, as the defending Union army survived poorly coordinated 
Confederate attacks by manipulating their interior lines. After Stones River, the 




Following the defensive victory at Fredericksburg, Lee and Jackson decided to 
resume their aggressiveness by attacking Joseph Hooker’s Army of the Potomac as it 
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marched parallel to Lee’s previous entrenchments. Hooker believed that he could simply 
overwhelm Lee’s army, which was half the size of his one hundred thirty thousand man 
force. He reportedly boasted, “May God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have 
none.”131 To accomplish what he assumed would be an easy victory, Hooker planned to 
swing his army’s corps along a wide frontage, making it impossible for Lee to escape his 
net. Though a complicated and difficult plan to carry out in the heavily wooded areas 
through which the armies maneuvered, Hooker’s superior numbers gave him a distinct 
advantage. Despite a smooth start, Hooker soon lost confidence, fearing that his plans 
were too complicated and the initiative once again devolved to the Confederates.
132
 
In early May 1863, Lee and Jackson seized the initiative, but then violated the 
same important military axiom Bragg and Smith disregarded at Perryville, by dividing 
their forces in front of larger Union armies. Marching across Hooker’s front at 
Chancellorsville to attack the Federal flank and rear, which was “in the air,” Lee’s 
gamble depended on the suddenly hesitant Hooker to remain in place, and the Union 
general obliged.
133
 Through the early afternoon Jackson led his corps around the Union 
flank, careful to screen his movements with Confederate cavalry. Hooker assumed 
reports of marching Confederate forces were Lee beginning a retreat, and relieved that he 
needed to take no immediate action stood his ground. Once in position, Jackson’s 
Confederate units crashed through Union army encampments, where most of the Army of 
the Potomac was sitting down for dinner.
134
 Jackson routed the entire XI Corps, 
shattering it in just two hours. But friendly fire in the dim light of early evening left 
Jackson mortally wounded, and Lee’s subsequent attacks lacked the momentum of the 
earlier charges and could not dislodge entrenched Union reinforcements.
135
 For his part, 
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Hooker was a beaten man and began a steady withdrawal north as soon as he had the 
opportunity, awaiting further orders from President Lincoln. 
After the failures at Iuka, Second Corinth, and Stones River, Confederate forces 
in the West faced a difficult proposition. Union forces, advancing south from their bases 
in western Tennessee, resumed their campaign against the vital city of Vicksburg, 
Mississippi. By the spring of 1863, despite setbacks, Grant advanced toward Vicksburg 
with armies totaling nearly seventy five thousand men.
136
 Confederate forces numbered 
roughly half that number, dispersed between the Vicksburg garrison under John C. 
Pemberton and Joseph E. Johnston’s independent command.137 Despite holding such an 
important post, Pemberton was not actually a southerner. Born and raised in 
Pennsylvania, he joined the Confederate Army due largely to the influence of his 
Virginian wife, and during the campaign his reluctance to attack angered his aggressive 
southern subordinates.
138
 Grant’s initial movements appeared to the Confederates as the 
beginning of a conservative campaign in which he would use his numerical superiority to 
wear down their forces. In response, Pemberton believed he could harass Grant’s supply 
lines that stretched all the way back to Tennessee and force him to withdraw.
139
 
Pemberton told Johnston he preferred to outlast Grant instead of attacking aggressively, 
noting, “I am a northern man; I know my people.”140 Pemberton believed that his plan, 
rooted in understanding that a hot and sickly summer climate in Mississippi would affect 
Grant’s men more than his southerners, would enable the Confederates to conserve their 
outnumbered forces. 
Pemberton’s poor generalship, partially a product of his background, produced 
one of the feeblest Confederate operations of the war. During Grant’s advance Pemberton 
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launched a few halfhearted attacks before Grant disposed of his supply lines and slipped 
by his confused Confederate pursuers. Exploiting local farms and towns, Grant supplied 
his army independently of his overstretched supply lines and with no fixed objective to 
attack, Pemberton withdrew.
141
 Johnston, maneuvering near Pemberton’s forces, urged 
the Vicksburg garrison commander to find and immediately attack Grant: 
I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow 
upon the enemy . . . . If prisoners tell the truth, the force at Jackson must be half 
of Grant’s army. It would decide the campaign to beat it, which can only be done 
by concentrating, especially when the remainder of the eastern troops arrive . . . . 
Can [Grant] supply himself from the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off from it, 





Meanwhile, Grant’s chief subordinate, Sherman, captured Jackson, Mississippi, 
giving Grant a base from which to lay siege to Vicksburg.
143
 Pemberton drew up his army 
at Champion Hill twenty miles east of Vicksburg to make a stand. But strong Union 
attacks drove back his forces and compelled him to withdraw into the city. Once Grant 
surrounded Vicksburg the city would inevitably fall unless reinforcements came. 
Johnston and other military leaders urged Pemberton to break out, but he refused.
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Lacking enough soldiers to attack Grant’s siege lines and relieve the city, Johnston 
withdrew and left Vicksburg to its fate. The surrender of nearly thirty thousand soldiers 
and the Confederacy’s most important western city proved a decisive blow to the 
Confederate cause. As Grant observed, “The fall of the Confederacy was settled when 
Vicksburg fell.”145 In a campaign in which the Confederacy desperately needed to act 
aggressively it lacked leaders capable of making those decisions. Entrusting Vicksburg to 
Pemberton, a man with strong prewar military experience, but without southern 
aggressiveness, resulted in Confederate encirclement and defeat. William Chambers, a 
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junior officer in Pemberton’s force, wrote, “Some of us wept . . . for we realized that this 
was the end of all our sacrifices. For this ignoble ending we had fought . . . had hungered, 
had shed our blood.”146 He accused Pemberton of selling out the southern army to his 
northern brethren: “[Pemberton] had been false to the flag under which he fought.”147 In 
this instance, the cultural aggressiveness that cost Confederate armies dearly at Shiloh 
and Antietam might have saved Vicksburg, but was never applied. The fall of Vicksburg 
crushed the likelihood of a significant Confederate victory in the West.
148
 After the Battle 
of Chancellorsville, it fell to Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia to take the 




The Army of Northern Virginia won its most impressive victory at 
Chancellorsville, but it cost the life of its best divisional commander, as well as more 
than thirteen thousand casualties.
149
 Other tactically similar battles like Shiloh, Second 
Corinth, Stones River, Chickamauga, and the Wilderness proved too costly for 
Confederates forces to follow up. But Chancellorsville, like Second Bull Run, afforded 
Lee an opportunity to revive his plans for an invasion of Pennsylvania. Slipping past the 
cowed Hooker, Lee divided his poorly supplied army and advanced north, assuming 
correctly that his adversary would be doubly cautious after his defeat at Chancellorsville. 
Hooker’s tentativeness prompted President Lincoln to replace him with George Gordon 
Meade, who set off in quick pursuit.
150
 Meade wanted to bring Lee to battle, especially 
once he realized that Lee had dispersed his army to search for supplies. Lee also suffered 
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from a lack of information, as J. E. B. Stuart foolishly rode around the entire Union army 
again, capturing supplies, destroying railroads, and cutting telegraph wires.
151
 Though an 
impressive feat, Stuart’s ride cost his commander vital information about Meade’s 
movements upon which the campaign hinged. In early July 1863, Lee’s army made 
contact with the Union army accidentally outside the town of Gettysburg, and Lee 
quickly called his scattered divisions to assemble. 
After conferring with his generals, Lee decided his best plan of action would be to 
attempt to repeat his actions at Second Bull Run. Though his inability to discover the 
whereabouts of the Army of the Potomac before stumbling into it meant he could not 
choose a battlefield to his liking, Lee remained confident of victory. He and his 
lieutenants hoped to invite a Union attack if possible, and smash the Army of the 
Potomac against their forces lying in wait.
152
 However, the Battle of Gettysburg 
developed significantly differently, largely because Lee and some of his generals changed 
their minds before the battle. Longstreet remembered the moment Lee altered his battle 
plans: 
[Lee] had announced beforehand that he would not make aggressive battle in the 
enemy’s country. After the [field] survey and in consideration of his plans, — 
noting movements of detachments of the enemy on the Emmitsburg road, the 
relative positions of manoeuvre, the lofty perch of the enemy, the rocky slopes 
from it, all marking the position clearly defensive, — I said, “We could not call 
the enemy to position better suited to our plans. All that we have to do is to file 
around his left and secure good ground between him and his capital.” This, when 
said, was thought to be the opinion of my commander as much as my own. I was 
not a little surprised, therefore, at his impatience, as, striking the air with his 
closed hand, he said, “If he is there to-morrow I will attack him.”153 
 
Longstreet inadvertently revealed the two sides of Confederate military thinking. 
First, Lee and his officers developed a solid plan that involved slipping by Meade, 
dictating a place of battle suitable to their plans, and then baiting the enemy into attacking 
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them. That plan, reminiscent of the famous French victory at Austerlitz that generals of 
the era thought the perfect battle, made sound operational sense. Napoleon baited a trap 
into which the Austrian and Russian enemies fell, allowing him to counterattack so 
forcefully that he destroyed both of their armies as effective fighting forces for several 
years.
154
 Southern commanders believed that replicating Napoleon’s plan was militarily 
feasible and prudent, if ambitious. However, southern cultural impulses often preempted 
good military planning. As Longstreet noted, upon seeing the enemy, Lee changed the 
plans and decided to attack. Lee’s decision reveals Confederate commanders’ deeply 
rooted need to strike first, rather than waiting passively. And that the entirety of Lee's 
command staff, with the exception of Longstreet, agreed to the change, points to the 
shared cultural imperatives of the commander and his officers.
155
 
Over the first two days of the battle, Lee hammered the Union line, which held on 
despite severe losses. Confederate losses were grave as well, especially among the officer 
corps. Longstreet, upon discovering one of his colonels mortally wounded on the field, 
agreed to take a note written in blood to the dying man’s father, which read, “I died with 
my face to the enemy.”156 On the third day, nearly twelve thousand five hundred 
Confederate soldiers charged the heart of Union artillery and infantry entrenchments.
157
 
During Pickett’s Charge, as the attack became known, a now familiar Confederate 
tactical pattern played itself out on a massive scale, and withered under Union guns. A 
Confederate officer recalled, “[We] pressed on to within about twenty or thirty paces of 
the [enemy’s] works — a small but gallant band of heroes daring to attempt what could 
not be done by flesh and blood. The end soon came. We were beaten back to the line 
from which we had advanced with terrible loss, and in much confusion.”158 
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Lee’s decision to attack on the third day at Gettysburg represents one of the 
clearest instances of how southern battle culture shaped Confederate tactical decisions. A 
skillful commander in the European military tradition, Lee’s decision to attack straight 
into the toughest part of the Union line assumed his soldiers could overcome their 
numerical deficiencies, the strength of the Union lines, and the distance they had to cross 
to reach the Union defenders. Lee’s confidence came from something other than military 
reason. At Gettysburg, Lee and his generals attacked because they believed in the 
superiority of their men, the concept of aggression, and that military sacrifice was a 
component of success. Before Lee ordered the attack he remarked, “There never were 
such men in an army before . . . . They will go anywhere and do anything if properly led. 
The enemy is there, and I’m going to strike him.”159 Pickett’s reckless charge, led from 
the front by southern officers determined to gain military glory, proved a brutal failure. 
The honor culture that drove officers’ actions prompted their enlisted men to follow them 
into the teeth of the Union line. The decision to launch an attack on such well-prepared 
Union lines could only have come from a commander and a society sure of its military 
superiority. Lee wrote after the battle: 
The conduct of the troops was all that I could desire or expect, and they deserve 
success so far as it can be deserved by heroic valor and fortitude. More may have 
been required of them than they were able to perform, but my admiration of their 
noble qualities and confidence in their ability to cope successfully with the enemy 




 The defeat at Gettysburg marked the turning point in the eastern theatre, just as 
surely as the fall of Vicksburg did in the West.
161
 During the first years of the war the 
Confederacy enjoyed significant advantages in confidence and military preparedness. 
However, they largely squandered these advantages by 1863. The decline of Confederate 
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military fortunes was directly linked to prewar notions of military participation and 
behavior. Confederate commanders time and again launched tactically unwise assaults 
that represented a poor fusion of military education and cultural inclinations to fight 
aggressively. Southern notions of bravery, aggression, and honor helped supplement a 
broad base of military knowledge among the Confederate military command. However, 
instead of creating a military structure that benefited from its martial education and 
honor-based upbringing, it created a system in which aggression dominated military 
affairs. During the first years of the war Confederate commanders planned and fought 
battles that reflected what they understood as good military decision-making. Guided by 
an overweening belief that the war could be won by instigating major battles instead of 
fighting defensively or relying on guerrilla operations placed a significant strain on the 
resources of the South. In a society in which bravery represented a vitally important 
component of manhood these attacks guaranteed that officers and men alike would put 
themselves in harm’s way at an alarming rate. 
Culturally inclined to attack and carry out their orders, the Confederate military 
bloodied itself thoroughly during the first years of the war. By the conclusion of the 
Battle of Gettysburg and Siege of Vicksburg, the Confederacy had largely crippled itself 
through its own actions. Nonetheless, the South fought on for two more years, continuing 
to express the same assurance of victory that characterized its first years. As the end of 
the war approached, however, their rhetoric changed. As chapter three explores, the belief 
that defeat approached never quite took hold among the South’s military leaders. Only 
when Lee surrendered at Appomattox and other generals began to surrender their 
commands did the Confederacy understand that the end was at hand. Narratives began to 
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change from defiance, pride, and belief in ultimate success to a desire to fight honorably 
until the bitter end, or die trying. If chapter two is the story of the Confederacy at the 
height of its aggressiveness, chapter three explores the stubbornness of the Confederacy 
as it came to grips with its collapse and notions of “defeat with honor.” 
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CHAPTER 3: DEFIANCE, DECLINE, AND DOWNFALL: 




In one of his most widely known and important works, The Sound and the Fury, 
William Faulkner wrote, “I give you the mausoleum of all hope and desire; I give it to 
you not that you may remember time, but that you might forget it now and then for a 
moment and not spend all your breath trying to conquer it. Because no battle is ever won 
he said. They are not even fought. The field only reveals to man his own folly and 
despair, and victory is an illusion of philosophers and fools.”1 After the Battle of 
Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg, the possibility of southern victory eroded, even 
though the Confederacy continued to fight. However, the poor prospects of the 
Confederate armies had little impact on the attitude of the military elite who led them on 
battlefields from Texas to Virginia. Despite suffering two devastating defeats and 
surrendering nearly thirty thousand men at Vicksburg, little changed in their rhetoric or 
actions. Contrary to good military sense, the Confederate military leadership made little 
substantive change in their aggression or intention to conduct the war as men of honor. 
Their predilection to continue fighting the war aggressively never wavered, though acute 
losses increasingly hampered them. However, as men of honor, they remained defiant, 
even in the face of the catastrophic losses they suffered. As an officer from Georgia put 
it, “We who fight for our wives and children, our homes, and property cannot be 
whipped, to conquer us is to kill us.”2 
99 
 
Chapter three examines how Confederate generals conducted their campaigns as 
the possibility of victory steadily diminished after Vicksburg and Gettysburg through the 
end of the war. During the first years of the war Confederate generals and the white 
populace remained confident that victory would result from a war conducted by 
honorable gentlemen, according to southern cultural imperatives. They believed that the 
South, long known as the more militaristic, brave, and honorable part of the United 
States, could not be defeated by a nation far less motivated and valiant. But even after 
victory became less certain, the Confederacy continued to wage what they believed to be 
an “honorable war.” Their commitment to this cultural imperative also enabled them to 
surrender peacefully, without turning the major southern armies into guerrilla forces to 
continue the fighting. Cultural commitments made it difficult for Confederate generals to 
change their tactics when the war turned against them. Ultimately, they ended the war 
according to their understanding of honor, or only when the Union army forcibly battered 
down their military resistance. 
The Confederate generals’ conceptions of “honorable warfare” had its roots in 
Western military history. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, warfare 
developed organically from the ideals of the Enlightenment, Scientific Revolution, and 
Romantic Era.
3
 Western Europe’s aristocracy, long influenced by chivalric notions of 
military service, played a pivotal role in the development and maintenance of European 
armies during the dynastic wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
4
 As a German 
military theorist explained, “The nobility derives its origins, and most of its privileges, 
from the military establishment of our ancestors.”5 Even when non-noblemen and 
professionals became part of the military command structure during and after the French 
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Revolution, the belief that command belonged to the “best-men” never wavered.  
Southern aristocrats in 1861 embraced the message of a European military memorandum 
written in 1781, “[the nobility] knows no other condition of life, no profession other than 
that of arms.”6 European military officers believed that war, despite its horrors, could be 
fought honorably and they consequently accorded even their enemies certain favors and 
respect.
7
 Officers who fought gallantly could expect good treatment, but cowards and 
fools could not. During the eighteenth century these practices became informally codified 
so that generals under siege knew how many days of bombardment they must endure, 
how many sorties to launch, and how close the enemy’s artillery had to come to the walls 
before it became acceptable to open surrender negotiations.
8
 The French Revolution 
certainly changed the professional attitude of Europe’s officer corps, but the idea that 
gentlemen could conduct warfare honorably remained extremely important. 
Confederate generals, who believed themselves the inheritors of Europe’s nobility 
and military doctrine, adapted these concepts to the Civil War. Though they believed 
their enemy did not come from the same noble stock bequeathed to southerners by their 
cavalier ancestors, Confederate officers thought that they should conduct the war 
honorably. Men of higher social stature had to lead armies because they were the South’s 
natural leaders who understood the finer points of military tactics and civil governance. A 
war conducted by their social inferiors, they assumed, would devolve into brutality.
9
 The 
prevailing trends of warfare that influenced both Confederate and Union generals had 
changed little since the late 1700s, but southern generals, unlike their northern 
counterparts, attached cultural dimensions to their military service.
10
 While the North 
certainly had a class of individuals who qualified as an economic elite, its members did 
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not see military service as a necessary component of their cultural identity like the 
southern aristocracy.
11
 Northern officers studied prevailing military standards and 
practices, but were less immersed in the “gentlemanly” aspects of war than their southern 
counterparts. Though northern men remained keenly aware of their honor and 
masculinity, military service was not required to attain or reinforce their status as 
honorable men. Northern honor derived from upright moral character and economic 
success, making physical violence and aggression less important.
12
 The absence of 
slavery in the North, and the correspondingly strict social hierarchy that flowed from its 
racial stratification, meant that northern conceptions of honor were less communally 
dependent than in the South.
13
 Conversely, Confederate officers went to great lengths to 
aggressively demonstrate their honor in battle, creating a series of unspoken protocols 
that formed the basis of southern battlefield conduct. 
Confederate generals proved they were honorable men by behaving courageously 
on the field, aggressively pursuing action, shunning cowardice, and acting in accordance 
with other masculine paradigms of antebellum southern elite culture. However, as the war 
turned against the Confederacy, and especially after Vicksburg and Gettysburg, many 
officers began to question how best to salvage a victory. Instead of changing tactics and 
becoming more conservative during campaigns, the major Confederate armies continued 
to fight aggressive actions and as late as fall of 1864 still planned to invade northern 
territory.
14
 During the latter half of the war the behavior of Confederate generals followed 
two crucial patterns. First, Confederate officers did not change their tactics in the face of 
overwhelming losses. Indeed, an obsession with dying in battle or destroying the 
invading Union forces became the primary objectives for many Confederate officers. 
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Second, once the hopelessness of the Confederate position became apparent to the 
military elite, they began conceptualizing their objectives as less strategic and more 
honor-based. Multiple Confederate generals concluded that surrender might be an option, 
but only if they believed they had satisfied their honor and the honor of their army, 




The Confederacy’s last year and a half of the Civil War were substantially 
different from the first two years of the conflict. After the defeats at Vicksburg and 
Gettysburg the South lacked the population resources to undertake offensive campaigns 
into Union territory. This situation, coupled with the inexorable push of Ulysses S. Grant 
in the East and William T. Sherman in the West, transformed the war. Seizing the 
strategic initiative enabled Union forces to open several major campaigns against 
Confederate cities and strongpoints. Even when Robert E. Lee or John Bell Hood, who 
replaced Braxton Bragg and Joseph E. Johnston, led attacks against Union armies, they 
could do no serious damage to the Union war effort. Lee inflicted heavy casualties on 
Union forces at Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg, but 
Grant could afford his climbing casualty rates more than the Confederacy. Grant’s style 
of campaigning, which often appeared overly costly to contemporaries, looks impressive 
in hindsight. He watched for years the effect of Confederate aggression in both theatres, 
and understood that only the application of overwhelming force and the continuous 
concentration of armies in the South’s territory could overthrow the Confederate military. 
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His strategy required the application of the North’s prodigious population, industrial, and 
material resources and it worked perfectly. Grant’s continued hammering of Lee’s army, 
though bloody, prevented Lee from regaining the aggressive initiative that fueled the 
early successes of the Confederacy’s military. However, Grant’s victories came at a cost, 
and his decision to launch attack after attack against Confederate field trenches and 
fortifications presaged the waste of later World War I battles.
15
 
The defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg snapped the defensive lines of the 
Confederates in the West, and permanently wrecked the offensive capabilities of the 
Army of Northern Virginia. More than sixty-four thousand Confederate soldiers were 
killed, wounded, or captured during the two campaigns.
16
 Hindsight makes the South’s 
defeat seem inevitable, but the southern population and military did not believe defeat 
was certain after 1863. Newspapers, private diaries, and a host of other material attest to 
the fervent belief of Confederate soldiers and private citizens that the war could still 
reach a favorable conclusion, despite the demoralization that accompanied the 1863 
defeats.
17
 As Fred Fleet, a soldier in the Army of Northern Virginia explained in 1864, “If 
you could only see the Army, you would never feel any anxiety about Richmond. Lee is 
stronger than when the fighting commenced & his men, as well as those of the gallant  
Beauregard are in the best possible trim.”18 Even in the waning days of the war, white 
southerners hoped that foreign recognition would arrive along with troops from France 
and Britain.
19
 In this fantasy, Lee would defeat Grant and march north, and the Union 
advance in the West would bog down in the innumerable waterways and tributaries of the 
Mississippi River. Major Thomas Elder remarked in 1864, “I think the Yankees and the 
rest of mankind must soon come to the conclusion that the South cannot be subjugated.”20 
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Though fervently believed, these pipe-dreams did not reflect the reality of the war. The 
Confederacy’s prospect of winning declined sharply after it lost the capacity to take the 
war into northern territory. Lincoln’s 1864 reelection and Grant’s unrelenting campaign 
in the South meant that the war’s end was only a matter of time. Despite their 
diminishing offensive capabilities, Confederate armies continued to attack when tactical 
and operational opportunities made it possible. But these offensive operations only 
prolonged a war the South was increasingly unlikely to win. Lee’s surrender at 
Appomattox and his decision not to use his army in a guerrilla war amounted to 
formalities, despite their symbolic and cultural importance. Confederate forces spent four 
years aggressively seeking a decisive battle, but did not gain it, and in the last years of the 
war southern officers made futile attempts to give a losing defensive war some sort of 
positive momentum. 
After their successes in the Gettysburg and Vicksburg campaigns, Union forces 
gained the strategic initiative and began a multi-pronged offensive in September 1863, 
aimed at wresting control of Tennessee and Virginia from the Confederacy. As a first 
step, Union army forces applied pressure to Braxton Bragg’s forces defending 
Chattanooga. Well aware of the danger of such a loss, Confederate leaders had discussed 
releasing units from the Army of Northern Virginia to help in the West, even before the 
Gettysburg campaign. James Longstreet, anticipating a western command before 
Vicksburg fell, said that, “honor, interest, duty, and humanity called us to that service,” 
and asked the War Department to send reinforcements from Lee’s army to the West.21 
Longstreet and many of his fellow generals believed that military good sense, as well as 
honor, required propping up failing generals like Bragg in the western theatre. After 
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Vicksburg fell, Longstreet was sent to the West, and assigned to Bragg’s endangered 
command. As the more senior commander, Longstreet bristled at being placed under 
Bragg, thinking it an insult to his honor: 
A soldier’s honor is his all, and of that they would rob him and degrade him in the 
eyes of his troops. The occasion seemed to demand resignation, but that would 
have been unsoldierly conduct. Dispassionate judgment suggested, as the proper 





Longstreet’s complaints certainly suggest that the same honor culture that 
buttressed the South’s social hierarchy before the war shaped the command structure of 
the Confederate military. Longstreet soon became the leader of a group of officers 
determined to push Bragg out of his command.
23
 Unlike Lee, Bragg had chosen not to 
launch an aggressive campaign after his defeats at Perryville and Stones River. These 
disasters and his timidity alienated him from the generals on his staff, who repeatedly 
wrote to Confederate President Jefferson Davis asking that Bragg be stripped of his 
command. Though initially opposed to removing Brag, Davis became convinced of the 
need to act after the fall of Vicksburg and Bragg’s inability to come to the city’s aide. 
Accordingly, Davis sent the partially recuperated Joseph E. Johnston to Bragg’s Army of 
Tennessee with the stated purpose of making sure the army was ready for battle. Secretly, 
Johnston sought to ascertain whether he should assume command and take the war north 
again by attacking William Rosecrans’s Army of the Cumberland, then threatening 
Chattanooga. While Johnston decided not take command because of the lasting effect of 
his wound at Seven Pines and the exhausting Vicksburg campaign, his visit stiffened 
Bragg’s resolve to resume the offensive. Despite the Confederacy’s recent military 
losses, southerners expected their generals to take aggressive action or step down from 
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military command. One Confederate explained that after the fall of Vicksburg: “war 
policy . . . must be no dilly-dallying, no tardiness, no timidity in our counsels. We must 
fight ever, fight bravely, and contend for every inch of ground, falling back only when 
our warm and patriotic blood shall have watered & dyed the soil of the sunny South.”24 
Bragg’s new campaign started poorly, when Rosecrans launched his own 
offensive to sever Bragg’s hold on Chattanooga. Meanwhile, Longstreet and his corps 
from the Army of Northern Virginia commenced its three-week journey to reinforce 
Bragg. Before Longstreet arrived, however, Rosecrans outmaneuvered Bragg, smoothly 
and nearly bloodlessly slipped past the Army of Tennessee, and seized the city.
25
 Unable 
to counter Rosecrans’s position effectively, Bragg withdrew from the city’s environs into 
the hills outside of town. By the time Longstreet and his reinforcements arrived, Bragg 
had decided to attack Rosecrans, who had seriously overstretched his supply lines to take 
Chattanooga. Bragg notified his officers: “I shall promptly assail him in the open field 
with my whole available force, if he does not exceed me more than four to one.”26 
Bragg’s force numbered sixty-five thousand men, meaning he was willing to attack the 
Union army if it did not exceed two hundred and sixty thousand soldiers, a staggering 
differential. Bragg’s willingness to attack exemplified the southern understanding of 
battle — attack at all costs, regardless of military reason. 
The battle began on September 19, when Confederate forces ran into Union 
pickets encamped perilously close to southern lines. Once the general engagement began, 
Bragg committed heavy reinforcements to each of his successive attacks across the wide 
Federal front. Though unable to break through the Union lines at any point over several 
hours of fighting, Bragg resolved to continue the Confederate assaults the next day, 
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despite suffering as many as eight thousand casualties. Bragg’s reckless determination to 
maintain his aggressive position paid off on the second day, when a mistaken 
communication among Rosecrans’s lieutenants caused a gap to open in the center of the 
Federal lines.
27
 Meanwhile, Bragg, impatient that attacks on the Union left had 
floundered, ordered Longstreet’s corps to advance, into what should have been the center 
of the Union defenses. Instead of significant resistance, Longstreet’s forces overwhelmed 
the few defenders and began to roll up the Union right. Union forces, thrown into a panic 
by the sudden collapse of their lines, tried to reform along a series of ridges astride the 
Union left. 
Confederate forces, thanks to good fortune, and in spite of serious mishandling by 
Bragg, had completed their objectives beyond their highest expectations. The defeated 
Union forces, their supply lines cut off, had to withdraw to Chattanooga, where Bragg 
could open a siege at his convenience. Instead of waiting for the Union’s certain 
withdrawal, however, Bragg continued to attack. But by this point, Union forces had dug 
in to their positions and clung to their only route of escape. Bragg’s continued attacks 
made little military sense, and severely weakened his army by wasting men in fruitless 
attacks.
28
 Indeed, Longstreet estimated that he ordered as many as twenty five separate 
assaults against the heavily defended Horseshoe Ridge on the last day of the battle.
29
 
Bragg’s attack highlights the subjugation of military good sense to the South’s cultural 
and social impetus to demonstrate aggression and bravery. Even though he secured a 
victory, Bragg’s conduct at Chickamauga resulted in more than eighteen thousand 
Confederate casualties, including nine ranking generals.
30
 On the third day of the battle, 
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an exhausted and battered Union Army of the Cumberland withdrew into Chattanooga, to 
await Bragg’s encirclement of the city.31 
After Bragg commenced the siege of Chattanooga, he quarreled with his chief 
generals, accusing them of failing to bring him an absolute victory. His subordinates, 
including Longstreet, mutinied, and only the intervention of the War Department and the 
suspension of several officers alleviated the problem.
32
 Longstreet was dispatched to 
counter a Union thrust by Ambrose Burnside to seize Knoxville. Longstreet waged a 
strong campaign, but in the climatic engagement at Fort Sanders, his force incurred 
nearly nine hundred casualties trying to break strongly fortified Union lines, while only 
thirteen Union soldiers were killed or wounded in the assault.
33
 Longstreet argued that 
attack was the only way to victory at Knoxville, writing, “I am entirely convinced that 
our only safety [was] in making the assault upon the enemy’s position.”34 Longstreet 
failed to prevent the fall of Knoxville, and was crucially absent when Grant began his 
campaign to relieve the Army of the Cumberland, now commanded by George H. 
Thomas, at Chattanooga. 
Armed with reinforcements from successful campaigns elsewhere, Grant defeated 
Bragg’s halfhearted attempts to destroy his supply lines at Wauhatchie. After he entered 
Chattanooga, Grant ordered Thomas to attack Bragg’s forces on the high ground outside 
of the city. At Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, Union forces advanced uphill 
against entrenched Confederate forces and thoroughly defeated them. Bragg was forced 
to withdraw in shame, and the Confederate defeat opened the Deep South to penetration 
by Union forces for the first time in the war.
35
 After the battle, a colonel from Alabama 
expressed the mood of the army thusly: “Everybody, both officers and men, seems to be 
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ashamed of our defeat. I honestly believe that it will have a good effect upon the troops. 
When they get a chance to meet the enemy again they will pay him back with interest.”36 
A Georgia artillerist offered: “We have been overpowered in numbers and met with 
serious reverses. I hope that out of this disaster some good may yet come . . . . I never 
want to leave this army till we have punished the Yankees who drove us from Missionary 
Ridge.”37 Bragg offered his resignation, believing that President Davis would reject it. 
But Davis could not overlook Bragg’s meandering prosecution of the siege of 
Chattanooga and embarrassments at Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Davis 
accepted the resignation because of the Confederate defeat at Chattanooga, and because 
he found Bragg’s timid behavior, which enabled Grant to relieve the city, intolerable.38 
Many Confederate soldiers in the Army of Tennessee rejoiced at Davis’s decision. As an 
officer from Georgia explained, “We want now at the head of this army some general 
who will act with boldness and follow up every advantage he may gain. This army will 
fight with all the desperation and valor displayed at Chickamauga, for they are heartily 
ashamed of their conduct at Missionary Ridge.”39 
Joseph E. Johnston, tasked with preventing William T. Sherman from seizing 
Atlanta, replaced Bragg. The ensuing Atlanta Campaign highlights the consequences for 
Confederate generals unwilling or unable to pursue vigorous action. Beginning with a 
timid Johnston in command and ending with the much more aggressive John Bell Hood 
leading the Confederate army, the Confederates hoped to prevent Union capture of one of 
the South’s largest cities. Sherman’s objective was twofold: attack and destroy Johnston’s 
army, or outmaneuver him and seize Atlanta. Taking Atlanta would capture one of the 
last major railroad hubs in the South and severely curtail distribution of crucial food and 
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military supplies within the Confederacy.
40
 In response, Johnston planned a delaying 
campaign, aiming to extend Sherman’s line of supply and strike only when he could gain 
a significant advantage. Johnston earned a reputation as an aggressive commander during 
his time commanding the Army of Northern Virginia, but since his wounding at Seven 
Pines in 1862 he had become cautious and his campaign against Sherman consisted far 
more of parrying Sherman’s repeated attacks than landing any of his own. In the ten 
principal engagements between the two, Sherman initiated nine.
41
 The one outlier 
occurred when a brash Hood decided to attack Sherman without orders from Johnston. 
By early July, many of Johnston’s subordinate generals had become disgruntled 
with Johnston’s unwillingness to give battle. Corps commander William Hardee 
despaired: “If the present system continues we may find ourselves at Atlanta before a 
serious battle is fought.”42 Led by the well liked and dashing, if physically disabled, 
Hood, the officers petitioned Davis to change command.
43
 Johnston felt his honor was 
threatened, and wrote to one of his friends to explain his behavior: “I learn that it is given 
out that it has been proposed to me to take the offensive with a large army, & that I 
refused. Don’t believe any such story. I have been anxious to take the offensive.”44 
Braxton Bragg, acting as Davis’s advisor in Richmond after his resignation, headed to 
Georgia to determine who was at fault for the timid campaign. Hood told Bragg, “I have, 
General, so often urged that we should force the enemy to give us battle as to almost be 
regarded reckless by the officers high in rank in this army [Johnston], since their views 
have been so directly opposite."
45
 
Davis, convinced that Johnston was the problem, asked Robert E. Lee what he 
thought of the young Hood, who had been one of Lee’s division commanders. Lee’s 
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affirmative response, though brief, spoke volumes about what he considered important in 
a field commander: “[Hood is] a bold fighter, very industrious on the battlefield, careless 
off.”46 Major Charles S. Venable described Hood’s love for battle to famous Virginian 
diarist, Mary Boykin Chesnut, who noted: “[Venable] had often heard of the light of 
battle shining in a man's eyes. He had seen it once — when he carried to Hood orders 
from Lee, and found in the hottest of the fight that the man was transfigured.”47 Before 
appointing Hood, Davis hoped to induce Johnston to attack Sherman’s army, telling him 
that he would receive no reinforcements unless he started an offensive.
48
 When Johnston 
refused, Davis decided to replace the older, tentative commander. The allure of 
appointing the brave and aggressive Hood, despite his inexperience, reflected southern 
cultural imperatives. Despite Hood’s track record of personal audacity, he was largely 
unfit to command a full field army, and soon led his army to aggressive battle regardless 
of the costs. Hood’s promotion was Davis’s last desperate gamble to rekindle some of the 
offensive spirit that made Bragg’s Kentucky campaign of 1862 so inspiring to the 
southern populace.
49
 Hood’s command of the Army of Tennessee proved a disaster for 




Several months after Rosecrans seized Chattanooga, Union forces began 
preparations for a much larger campaign in the East. Ulysses Grant, newly appointed 
commander-in-chief of all Federal forces, ordered George Meade, the victor at 
Gettysburg, to gather forces for a renewed invasion of Virginia.
50
 Lincoln hoped his 
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appointment of Grant would address the problems that consistently vexed Union 
leadership in the years preceding Gettysburg. Grant’s predecessors in command of the 
Army of the Potomac — George B. McClellan, John Pope, Ambrose Burnside, and 
Joseph Hooker were substantially less skilled than Grant, but they also proved less 
willing to deploy Union forces aggressively and risk battle. After each defeat they 
suffered at the hands of southern commanders, previous Union generals had retreated, 
giving the Confederacy the opportunity to resupply, gather more soldiers, and regain the 
strategic initiative.
51
 Their actions reflected the era’s style of warfare, in which defeated 
generals typically retreated and gave control of the field to the victor. Grant believed this 
pattern of warfare prolonged the war, and provided Lee with the time he needed to 
resume serious offensive action. In contrast, Grant planned to follow Lee and force him 
to fight a continuous string of battles. Even when beaten, Grant remained in the field, so 
that Lee could not regain the initiative.
52
 
Grant’s style of warfare promised significantly more casualties because 
campaigns did not end in a single battle. Instead, contact became unrelenting, and 
attrition replaced maneuver, making it impossible for the Confederacy to replace its 
losses. Grant’s attritional war relied on Union logistical, manpower, and economic 
strengths, while highlighting the same Confederate weaknesses. Longstreet, for one, 
dismissed Grant’s astute strategy as dishonorable: “the policy of attrition which became a 
prominent feature during [the Overland] campaign . . . showed that the enemy put his 
faith in numbers more than in superior skill and generalship.”53 Lee adopted a simple 
response to Grant: break the inexorable push by destroying the Union army. He told his 
officers, “As far as I can judge there is nothing to be gained by this army remaining 
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quietly on the defensive.”54 Within weeks of his defeat at Gettysburg, he was ready to 
take offensive action again, writing to Longstreet, “I hope you will use every exertion to 
prepare the army for offensive operations, and improve the condition of our men and 
animals. I can see nothing better to be done than to endeavor to bring General Meade out 
and use our efforts to crush his army while in its present condition.”55 To succeed, he 
needed to fight decisively and aggressively before Grant and Meade could overwhelm 
him. 
In early May 1864, Grant’s forces crossed the Rapidan River and moved south. 
Grant knew Lee’s forces were shadowing him near the old Chancellorsville battlefield, 
but believed Lee would not force a fight so soon after his river crossing. Lee’s plan 
remained consistent with southern battle strategy: find the enemy and fight them. He 
wrote to Davis, “[M]y object has been to engage him [Grant] when [his army is] in 
motion and . . . I shall continue to strike him whenever opportunity presents itself.”56 Lee 
capitalized on the fact that Grant did not believe Confederate forces ready to give battle. 
He also realized the terrain would negate the Union Army’s considerable advantage in 
artillery. Lee waited to attack until Grant’s army became entangled in the dense 
collection of woodlands and shrubs known as the Wilderness. The thick woods precluded 
artillery support and made the Union’s considerable numerical discrepancy — Grant had 
more than one hundred twenty thousand soldiers to Lee’s sixty thousand — less glaring.57 
The battle soon devolved into a brutally confused mix of attack and counterattack that 
ultimately hinged on Grant’s ability to recognize where Confederate attacks would occur. 
One of Lee’s corps commanders, Richard Ewell, led the first surprise assault of the day, 
concentrating on the extreme right of the Union line, anchored along the Orange Court 
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Turnpike, one of the area’s largest roads. Control of these roads proved vitally important 
because of the difficulties in maneuvering large forces through the dense wilderness, 
which caught fire several times during the battle, and burned hundreds of wounded 
soldiers to death.
58
 Lee’s engineers found an abandoned train track to the left of the 
Union line, and began another assault along this relatively clear avenue. 
Despite the element of surprise, the Confederate attacks bogged down as Union 
forces raced reinforcements to threatened areas and countered both thrusts. Committing 
Longstreet’s units along the abandoned railroad on the second day of the fighting 
produced little change, but by that point Lee’s attacks largely accomplished their 
objectives. The Confederate forces severely mauled the Union army, which suffered 
more than seventeen thousand killed, wounded, or captured, compared to about eleven 
thousand Confederates.
59
 However, the aggression of the Confederate high command 
produced little change in the strategic outlook of the campaign, because Grant would not 
concede defeat. Instead, he readjusted his frontage and planned to move around Lee. 
Grant wanted to interpose himself between Lee and Richmond, forcing Lee into another 
series of attacks, this time at a place of Grant’s choosing. The Battle of the Wilderness 
had little impact on the campaign, save for its severe bloodletting, but it demonstrated 
clearly the strategic imperatives of Lee and his commanders. Despite their bloody repulse 
at Gettysburg, and the overwhelming numbers brought to bear against them in the 
campaign, they still opted for aggressive action. During the first week of fighting Lee lost 
twenty of his fifty-seven infantry brigade, division, and corps commanders.
60
 Even with 
the war turning against them, the South would not alter its conduct because the region’s 
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notions of honor would not allow its commanders to shrink from an aggressive style of 
warfare. 
Confederate scouts reported to Lee that the pontoons Grant used to cross the 
Rapidan River were gone, indicating the Grant did not plan to withdraw like so many 
defeated Union commanders before him.
61
 When Lee realized that Grant would not 
retreat, he shifted units south, hoping to seize the crucial crossroads at Spotsylvania Court 
House to deprive Union forces of a convenient way through the Wilderness. Grant, well 
aware of the road’s usefulness, also shifted his forces south in a race against Lee. 
Confederate cavalry detachments under Lee’s nephew, Fitzhugh Lee, reached the 
crossroads first, and despite Union advances into the town, J. E. B. Stuart’s cavalry drove 
them out. The exhausted Confederates, suddenly in possession of a fixed point of 
defense, did something relatively alien, and began to dig in, expecting a major attack. 
While earthworks had become a staple of sieges and fortifications, especially in the 
Confederate West, the Overland Campaign represented the beginning of widespread 
entrenchments for Confederate forces in the East, specifically in preparation for battle.
62
 
The concept of entrenching on campaign, though increasingly common for Union 
soldiers as the war progressed, remained anathema to Confederate forces because it 
assumed they would fight a defensive battle, contrary to the demands of the southern 
honor code. Lieutenant General Stephen D. Lee was appalled: “A general who resorts to 
entrenchments, when there is any chance of success in engaging in the open field, 
commits a great error.”63 Earlier in the war, Longstreet wrote that, “[Digging in] seemed 
strange [to Brigadier] General [Robert] Toombs, however, as he was known to have 
frequent talks with his troops, complaining of [Union commanders] holding the army 
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from battle, digging and throwing up lines of sand instead of showing lines of battle, 
where all could have fair fight.”64 Bragg remarked that rather than providing strong 
physical and mental reassurances they negatively impacted his units: “[Fighting from] 
heavy entrenchments demoralizes our troops.”65 Though present in the operations before 
Seven Days, Confederate forces in the East did not begin to utilize field fortifications 
systematically until later in the war. However, by mid-1864, even the most ardent of 
aggressive Confederate military leaders began to recognize the usefulness of field 
entrenchments to shield the desperately shrinking pool of available soldiers.
66
 
The entrenchments at Spotsylvania proved valuable almost immediately, enabling 
Confederate forces to repulse Union forces racing to the area and inflict heavy casualties. 
Realizing the value in holding his position rather than launching another bloody assault 
so soon after the Battle of the Wilderness, Lee brought up his entire army and wrapped 
them around the major roads, daring Grant to drive him from his strong defensive 
positions. In response, Grant launched a fact-finding assault along much of the 
Confederate line, hoping to find a weakness to exploit. After several bloody failures, 
Grant managed to penetrate parts of the Confederate line, before being driven off. Next 
he launched large numbers of men along narrow fronts, hoping to overrun the 
outnumbered Confederate defenders. The attack had some initial success, but again 
Confederate forces, employing especially well-placed artillery, drove Union troops back. 
Grant launched more men at the Confederate line’s major salient, known as the “Bloody 
Angle,” and casualties began to mount on both sides.67 Confederate engineers hastily 
built a secondary line behind the first, and after hours of intense fighting southern forces 
limped back to the safety of the new line, essentially negating the hard-won Union gains. 
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Over the next several days, Grant continued to try to march around the flanks of the 
fortifications, rather than launch another frontal attack. Lee realized that Grant’s constant 
reorientation of his lines left the Union northern flank exposed or “in the air” and he 
summarily sent Ewell on a reckless attack to turn Grant’s flank. But Ewell’s aggressive 
attack failed, adding hundreds of Confederate casualties to the ledger. By the end of the 
fighting at Spotsylvania, Confederate forces had suffered another twelve thousand 
casualties to Grant’s losses of about eighteen thousand.68 Despite again doing more 
damage to Federal forces than they suffered, Confederate fortunes continued to diminish. 
Lee simply could not replace his losses and Grant would not concede the field after 
defeat. 
In fact, Grant immediately tried to turn Lee’s flank again, this time by racing him 
to the crossing of the North Anna River. Lee’s forces again arrived first, but this time 
Grant hesitated to cross the river in range of Confederate entrenchments, and contented 
himself with a series of bloody skirmishes across the water. Unable to turn Lee’s flank at 
North Anna, he moved south again, aiming for the important crossroads at Cold Harbor.
69
 
This time Union cavalry won the race, but Lee’s forces managed to construct a series of 
intricate field fortifications that Grant would have to attack head-on if he wanted to move 
any further. Grant obliged, precipitating one of the most lopsided battles of the war. 
Union forces attacked the Confederate earthworks over the course of several days, 
sometimes marching straight into Confederate forces so well entrenched behind 
earthwork parapets, that many Union soldiers could not see their targets.
70
 At the cost of 
roughly five thousand casualties, Lee’s entrenchments helped him inflict more than 
twelve thousand casualties on Grant’s forces, essentially replicating his defensive victory 
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at Fredericksburg in 1862.
71
 Cognizant of the climbing casualty figures and cries of 
“butcher” from the northern public, Grant still tried to turn Lee’s flank for the third time, 
finally succeeding. Lee was forced to withdraw south, before digging in for a siege 
outside the important rail hub of Petersburg, which protected the outskirts of the 
Confederate capital at Richmond. Despite some brief attacks on Lee’s position, Grant 
contented himself with starving the Confederate forces in the city, while Union armies 
operating in other parts of Virginia further reduced Lee’s ability to break out. 
Confederate forces did not despair however, and as an officer from North Carolina wrote, 
their resolve continued to strengthen: “I will fight them [the enemy] as long as I can 
crawl . . . . They may take every seaport town around the whole Southern Confederacy; 
they may overrun Virginia, [but] then we are not half whipped. We will fight them as 
long as there is a man [remaining] . . . . For I had [rather] die as become a subject.”72 
In July, Union engineers detonated a mine under part of the Confederate siege 
lines, opening up a giant crater into which Union forces, including black soldiers, poured. 
Despite the initial shock of the explosion, Confederate forces reacted quickly and drove 
back the assaults, inflicting heavy casualties. Confederate forces also massacred black 
soldiers they found in the crater, helping to stain their combat record against troops their 
racist society believed unworthy to fight against white men of honor.
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 The Overland 
Campaign represented a costly failure for the Army of Northern Virginia. At the outset of 
the campaign, Lee and his generals hoped to destroy Grant’s army, or failing that, bleed it 
so badly that Grant had to withdraw. But Grant refused to let his climbing casualty rates 
dissuade him from his objective: the complete destruction of Lee’s army as fighting 
force. Lee’s aggressive attacks at the Wilderness could not break the Army of the 
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Potomac, and his defensive victories at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor did not slow the 
Union invasion. During the Overland Campaign, the Army of Northern Virginia could 
not achieve decisive results through aggression, but that did not stop its senior 
commanders from trying. Only the relentless aggression of Grant after the Battle of the 
Wilderness prevented Lee and his commanders from seizing the operational initiative that 






A month and a half before Lee entered his siege lines at Petersburg, Confederate 
forces in the West began an offensive they hoped would lead to glory. Hood believed that 
tentative officers had no place in the Confederate high command. His service in the Army 
of Northern Virginia from 1861-1863 exposed him to the aggressive styles of Lee and 
Jackson, and he was determined to emulate their decisiveness. After the war, Hood laid 
out his beliefs on Johnston’s failures, and on the benefits of aggressive action: 
The troops of the Army of Tennessee had for such length of time been subjected 
to the ruinous policy pursued from Dalton to Atlanta . . . that they were unfitted 
for united action in pitched battle. They had, in other words, been so long 
habituated to security behind breastworks that they had become wedded to the 
‘timid defensive’ policy, and naturally regarded with distrust a commander likely 
to initiate offensive operations . . . . [Lee’s troops] were always taught to work out 
the best means to get at the enemy, in order to cripple or destroy him, in lieu of 
ever seeking the best means to get away from him. Therefore the Lee and Jackson 
school is the opposite of the Joe Johnston school, and will always elevate and 




After assuming command of the Confederacy’s largest army in the West, Hood 
attacked Sherman’s forces at Peachtree Creek, and after finding no opening, withdrew 
and tried again against other Union forces outside Atlanta. Failing there, he recklessly 
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attacked again at Ezra Church and Jonesborough. During the first phase of the Atlanta 
campaign, Johnston’s forces lost roughly ten thousand soldiers, killed, wounded, or 
captured, trying to fend off Sherman over a two month period. Hood’s recklessness cost 
the Army of Tennessee nearly fourteen thousand men in half that time.
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 His aggression 
so drained his army that he had to abandon Atlanta to Sherman. Davis and the War 
Department had replaced a cautious commander with an aggressive commander, but the 
change did little to alter the result of the campaign. Unlike Johnston or even Bragg, 
however, Hood’s actions earned him no censure because he followed the South’s 
culturally accepted aggressive style of warfare. In fact, his soldiers gained confidence, 
and William Nugent from Mississippi wrote to his wife in 1864, “You may tell your 
friends that I say we are not near whipped; and the Yankees will find it out this spring . . . 
one more grand fight in Georgia, after that we may expect nothing more than raids.”77 
Davis warned Hood in a meeting that he had considered replacing him, but ultimately 
Davis preferred that his generals fight aggressively rather than be defeated as the result of 
timid action. After the war, Davis continued to blame Johnston, wishing that he had acted 
sooner in replacing him with Hood: 
[Johnston] failed to obey the positive orders to attack General Grant . . . [if he] 
had vigorously attacked Sherman at Atlanta when directed, the fortunes of war 
would have been changed, and Sherman hurled back to Nashville, over a sterile 
and wasted country — his retreat little less disastrous than Napoleon’s from 
Moscow. He did not do so, and was relieved — General Hood, a true and spirited 
soldier, taking his place — but the opportunity was then gone; and to this delay, 
more than any other cause, the Southern people will attribute their overthrow, 




The Confederate concern for honor and aggression shaped their war effort. 
Disgrace only came to those not courageous enough to seize honor; those that tried, but 
failed still earned respect as gentlemen. So long as Confederate generals like Hood 
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conducted battle along the lines demanded by southern honor, they retained command. 
After his meeting with Hood in September 1864, Davis affirmed his belief that 
Confederate armies would soon return to the North in a widely distributed propaganda 
message: 
General Hood's strategy has been good and his conduct has been gallant. His eye 
is now fixed upon a point far beyond that where he was assailed by the enemy. He 
hopes soon to have his hand upon Sherman's line of communications, and to fix it 
where he can hold it . . . . I believe it is in the power of the men of the 
Confederacy to plant our banners on the banks of the Ohio, where we shall say to 
the Yankee, ‘be quiet or we shall teach you another lesson.’79 
 
 After conferring with Davis, Hood planned to move north into Tennessee, giving 
Sherman the slip and concentrating his forces against the suddenly isolated George H. 
Thomas at Nashville. Hood reasoned that by moving north, he could tempt Sherman 
away from the unprotected heartland of the Confederacy in Alabama and Georgia.
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Hood had believed that he could carry out his campaign in secret because he had a strong 
numerical superiority in cavalry, including some of the best riders available to the 
Confederacy in September 1864. Outnumbering the Union cavalry by as much as two-to-
one, Hood’s troopers were also significantly more experienced riders and fighters. 
However, Hood overestimated the importance of Sherman’s supply lines. Believing that 
moving north would force Sherman to shadow him and protect his critically overstretched 
supply trains, Hood took with him almost the entire available pool of Confederate 
soldiers in the area. Instead of following, however, Sherman dispatched Thomas to deal 
with Hood, while Sherman gathered more than sixty thousand soldiers to march to the 
Atlantic seaboard, supplying his army from the previously untouched Confederate 
heartland.
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 Hood’s aggressive operation was seriously flawed in conception. Sherman 
now stood almost completely unopposed in his devastating campaign through the 
122 
 
Confederate’s unprotected southernmost states. The Confederate War Department could 
barely muster seven thousand soldiers to oppose Sherman, mostly poorly equipped militia 
too young or old to serve in the regular armies.
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 Despite these obstacles, Hood set off toward Tennessee, from Palmetto, Georgia, 
with a force numbering close to forty thousand, almost the entire available operating 
force in the Confederate West. Using his experienced cavalry under Joseph Wheeler and 
Nathan Bedford Forrest to screen his movements while raiding Union supply wagons, 
tearing up railroad, and disrupting rearward positions, Hood maneuvered north. During 
the advance, Hood’s forces captured a detachment of uniformed black Union soldiers, but 
rather than treat them as prisoners of war, the Confederates forced them to provide 
manual labor, tearing up Federal railroad tracks. Confederate officers like Hood, raised to 
see blacks as slaves, could not treat them in any other way. The racist antebellum 
plantation culture made it impossible for Confederate officers to accord the honors of war 
to men they believed property. Indeed, Hood sent most of the captured black soldiers 
back south to be returned to their former masters.
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 Hood continued north, hoping to draw Sherman into Kentucky, or at the very least 
move east and help Robert E. Lee, pinned down at Petersburg by Grant. Meanwhile, 
Sherman simply ignored Hood, ordered Thomas to come south and engage Hood, and 
returned to Atlanta and his campaign against Savannah. P. G. T. Beauregard, advising 
Hood at Jefferson Davis’s request, suggested that Hood abandon his movement north and 
strike Sherman before he could leave Atlanta. Though Beauregard’s plan made military 
sense, Hood quickly abandoned it, believing that he could destroy Thomas’s force 
quickly. Hood continued north, skirmishing with Union garrisons and Thomas’s brigades 
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that shadowed his march. By late November, Hood arrived outside the city of Franklin, 
Tennessee, but had been out-marched by Union forces under John M. Schofield in late 
November 1864. Schofield, commander of the Army of the Ohio, and responsible for 
pursuing Hood before linking with Thomas, used his time in Franklin wisely. Schofield 
ordered his army to create a series of redoubts, entrenchments, and defensive works to 




Hood was aware of the strong Union defenses, but he nonetheless rushed most of 
his army at them.
85
 Hood’s 
assault lacked tactical finesse, 
relying instead on courage and 
brute force.
86
 His failure to 
catch Schofield earlier in the 
campaign likely played a role 
in his decision to launch an 
all-out assault against heavily 
fortified lines. The result was a predictable bloodbath. The Army of Tennessee reported 
more than six thousand casualties, including a stunning fourteen generals and fifty five 
regimental commanders, while Union forces barely lost a sixth of that number.
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 Once 
again, the southern obsession with courage, aggression, and headlong attack decimated an 
army. Most striking, Hood’s senior staff, whose aristocratic background and embrace of 
the South’s militaristic honor culture encouraged their risky assaults, suffered an 
enormously high casualty rate. During the height of the attack, one of Hood’s divisional 
Illustration 3.1: Battle of Franklin 
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commanders, William W. Loring, sensing his men’s hesitation, shamed them forward, 
yelling, “Great Gods! Do I command cowards?” He proceeded to show himself to the 
Union lines, daring them to shoot him, while his soldiers rallied.
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 Somehow avoiding 
injury, Loring moved the faltering brigade back into position, but they could not make 
any more headway. With the fighting concluded, and Hood unable to continue attacks 
because of darkness, Schofield withdrew in good order and linked with Thomas. Another 
aggressive Confederate assault failed, not because southern soldiers were unwilling to 
fight bravely, but because their commanders placed aggressive action above military 
reason. 
 Despite the terrible casualties his force suffered at Franklin, Hood continued to 
push north, hoping to bait Thomas into leaving Nashville. Knowing that their losses at 
Franklin had tempered his army’s considerable enthusiasm to fight another offensive 
battle, Hood hoped he could tempt Thomas into attacking, and then follow with a 
counterattack strong enough to destroy Thomas and Schofield’s forces. However, 
Thomas would not attack until he was certain he could destroy Hood’s army. After a 
severe winter storm and written admonishments from Lincoln and Grant urging Thomas 
to attack, the Union general finally began the attack that Hood sought.
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 However, 
Thomas’s assault proved far more spirited than Hood believed possible. Over the course 
of the first day, Thomas gradually hammered Hood’s lines inward, forcing the 
Confederates to create a more compact defensive line. On the second day, Union forces 
caved in Hood’s sagging left flank, forcing the Confederates to retreat in the night. 
During the Battle of Nashville, Hood fought defensively, but his unwillingness to 
withdraw south after the disaster at Franklin sparked the battle. Hood believed his army 
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could continue offensive operations, even though there was little they could do to damage 
the Union’s position in Tennessee after the Battle of Franklin. That they even continued 
to campaign reveals the unwillingness of Confederate commanders to admit defeat when 
they still controlled armies in the field. Hood’s inability to identify attainable military 
goals and pursue them instead of unrealistic dreams of northern conquest doomed his 
campaign from the start. Hood began the campaign with almost forty thousand men, but 
fewer than twenty thousand limped back to Confederate lines after the battles of Franklin 
and Nashville.
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 Even by the sanguine standards of southern aggression, Hood’s failures 
were too costly to ignore. Davis therefore stripped Hood of his command and gave what 
was left of his army to Johnston’s forces, desperately trying to defend the Carolinas from 
Sherman’s fast-moving invasion.91  
 The Franklin and Nashville campaigns largely ended coherent Confederate 
military operations in the western theatre because they destroyed the last major 
Confederate army operating in the area. More important, these operations highlight what 
could go wrong when commanders allowed cultural imperatives to outweigh military 
maxims. Commanders in the European tradition of warfare understood military truisms 
and followed them to the letter. Southern men like Hood, though well versed in the 
prevailing military wisdom of the time, could not temper their enthusiasm for battle with 
sound military decision making. During his time at West Point, Hood read the standard 
military texts of the time, including Antoine Henri-Jomini’s The Art of War and his 
assertion that fortified lines should never be attacked frontally:  
[To] return to the explanation of the measures most suitable for adoption in an 
attack on lines. If they have a sufficient relief to make it difficult to carry them by 
assault, and if on the other hand they may be outflanked or turned by strategic 
maneuvers, it is far better to pursue the course last indicated than to attempt a 
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hazardous assault. If, however, there is any reason for preferring the attack by 





Like Lee’s decision on the third day of Gettysburg, Hood’s actions at Franklin stand in 
stark contrast to Jomini’s advice. Moreover, Hood did not represent an isolated case of 
poor generalship because Confederates made the same tactical mistakes across multiple 
campaigns. The battles of Shiloh, Seven Days, Stones River, Second Corinth, Antietam, 
Chancellorsville, Chickamauga, Gettysburg, and the Wilderness all fit the same tactical 
pattern, with the commanders at these battles constituting a who’s who of important 
Confederate leaders. Despite the wealth of military training Confederate commanders 
brought to battle, they often ignored military dictums in their blind fervor to attack. 
 After Grant trapped Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia in the siege 
lines of Petersburg, the Confederates had little chance to escape. With no help 
forthcoming from Confederate forces in the West and Grant continuing to tighten the 
Union grip around the city, Lee launched several breakout attempts. Following a Union 
attempt to storm the city in early April 1865, Lee finally abandoned his siege lines. 
Marching west to meet Johnston in the Carolinas, Lee was followed doggedly by Grant. 
McLaws noted the devastation of the countryside as they marched, but was impressed by 
the resolve of the population: 
The South Carolinians have suffered very much . . . the rice planters who had 
surrounded themselves with every luxury and lived in lordly magnificence, upon 
their princely estates, have been left without lands or houses, or negroes and are 
wanderers. But they do not but in a few instances, appear to be downcast or repine 
over their fallen fortunes, but on the contrary are in high spirits and appear 




Desperately outnumbered and with many of his men falling out of their marching 
columns for want of food and clothing, Lee still managed to attack Union forces at 
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Amelia Springs before Union forces cut off portions of his army and forced them to 
surrender.
94
 Ever mindful of the deeply shameful consequences of surrendering without 
first exhausting all other options, Confederate forces continued to fight, hoping to stave 
off the inevitable. Even in the waning days of the war, Confederate forces continued to 
attack against impossible odds, motivated by a culture that would not allow them to 
surrender. One soldier in the Army of Northern Virginia wrote, “[soldiers] who suffer 
and have often suffered in this war are the last ones to say surrender.”95 Indeed, 
Confederate forces rebuffed Union surrender overtures because Lee and his generals still 
hoped to escape to Johnston’s forces and continue the war.96 Longstreet summarized the 
attitude of many of his fellow officers, who despite knowing they fought a lost cause, 
preferred to continue until they could fight no longer: “The cause was lost, but the end 
was not yet. The noble Army of Northern Virginia, once, twice conqueror of empire, 
must bite the dust before its formidable adversary.”97 For southern men of honor, fighting 
to the death was preferable to surrender. A soldier named Fitzpatrick wrote that he had, 
“no distant dream of ever giving up . . . . Yankees may kill me but will never subjugate 
me.” Fitzpatrick was mortally wounded on April 3, 1865, six days before the collapse of 
Lee’s army.98 Grant finally caught up with Lee at Appomattox Court House and 
surrounded the tattered Confederate army. According to a staff officer, Lee’s approach to 
the surrender negotiations was characteristically bleak: “When I bore the message back to 
General Lee, he said, ‘Then there is nothing left me but to go and see General Grant, and 
I would rather die a thousand deaths.’”99 Surrender, long anathema to Confederate forces, 
finally became a reality for the Army of Northern Virginia. With breakout impossible, 
Lee surrendered the Confederacy’s most important army. 
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 After years of unrelenting warfare, crowned by the casualties of hundreds of 
thousands of Confederate soldiers, what cultural impetus allowed Lee and his generals to 
surrender? They believed they could surrender honorably because they had exhausted all 
military recourses. The link between military action and honor meant that southern 
soldiers could face surrender only if convinced they could no longer forestall defeat 
through further force of arms. As Lee noted: 
It is impossible to describe the anguish of the troops when it was known that the 
surrender of the army was inevitable. Of all their trials, this was the greatest and 
hardest to endure. There was no consciousness of shame; each heart could boast 





Despite their surrender, southern soldiers could take solace in their defeat because 
they believed their honor remained intact, made so by their courage in battle and their 
sacrifices over the preceding years. During the war, the same honor culture that enabled 
them to attack repeatedly against overwhelming odds without demurring, now allowed 
them to surrender without losing face. The South’s honor culture created a generation of 
Confederate officers dedicated to the attack, aggressive behavior, and feats of masculine 
bravery. Conversely, in the face of defeat and after years of combat, that same honor 
culture allowed the Confederate military to lay down its arms without the shame reserved 
for cowards. Under the South’s honor code, surrender became an option once 
Confederate forces could no longer fight in an honorable fashion. The chance of victory 
realistically disappeared in 1863, but Confederate forces continued the war for two more 
years because of the imperatives of the southern honor culture. As Lee said to General 
William Pendleton before the surrender, “We had, I was satisfied, sacred principles to 
maintain, and rights to defend, for which we were in duty bound to do our best, even if 
129 
 
we perished in the endeavor.”101 The antebellum culture that drove them to fight so 





Over the past several decades, many military historians have turned to social 
science tools to examine their subjects.
102
 Traditional military history concentrated on 
generals, their campaigns, and the politics behind their actions, often ignoring cultural 
and social factors. This style of historical evaluation also dismissed the plight of the 
common soldier, essentially dismissing their impact in combat, and concentrating on 
campaign and battle summaries. In recent years, however, cultural history approaches 
have gained popularity and are often supplemented by quantitative analyses.
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 Likewise, 
the battlefield influence of the South’s honor culture can be discussed statistically, by 
examining casualty numbers, contemporary ratio calculations, and other numerical 
measures. Taken together, these numbers further illuminate the impact of southern honor 
on the Confederate military and its officer corps. 
 Determining how to evaluate honor, courage, and aggression statistically presents 
some challenges. The Union enjoyed significant manpower and economic advantages 
throughout the war. Confederate soldiers were often poorly equipped, outnumbered, and 
hungry, but they still performed well in battle. James B. Griffin wrote: “Our men don’t 
complain — although they are without tents, and living pretty hard — and all they ask is 
to be in the fight.”104 At the same time, Union soldiers compiled an impressive combat 
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record, though often led by ineffective or cautious commanders. Over the course of the 
war the military competency of the North improved, rivaling that of the Confederacy’s 
infantry and cavalry. Still, a statistical evaluation of the influence of southern honor 
culture produced on the battlefield is revealing. 
 After the Civil War, private citizens and public officials, hoping to determine the 
number of soldiers and casualties on each side, collected data from battle reports, hospital 
registers, and enlistment reports and produced several major works, often spanning 
thousands of pages. Confederate records remained notoriously incomplete, however, 
because of a paucity of recordkeeping during the war and the widespread destruction of 
the records during the chaotic final months of the war.
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 Nevertheless, the compiled 
estimates of the United States War Department, based on southern muster rolls, indicate 
that about six hundred thousand soldiers served in the regular Confederate armies during 
the war. Of this estimate, 274,955 left the rolls through death, disease, desertion, or 
discharge, while 74,524 were killed in action or mortally wounded, a rate of 12.3 percent 
death in battle.
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 In contrast, the Union casualty rate was 10.9 percent.
107
 Compared to 
battle deaths in the other nineteenth century western wars, these death rates were 
shockingly high. For example, in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, in which a 
coalition of German states led by Prussia soundly defeated France, the French suffered a 
battle casualty rate of less than 1 percent of their entire force.
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 The hierarchical nature of southern society makes the war experiences of the 
officer class particularly revealing. Unfortunately, no unified count of the officer class for 
both armies exists. Instead, surveys often use samples of officers and extrapolate their 
experiences as exemplars of the whole. For example, Peter S. Carmichael’s The Last 
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Generation studies 121 elite young Virginian men who served as junior officers in the 
Confederacy’s armies. But larger counts are available. By the end of the Civil War, 425 
men had reached the rank of general in the Confederate Army, seventy three of whom 
were killed or mortally wounded in battle.
109
 In contrast, only forty five Union generals 
out of 583 suffered the same fate.
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 A stunning 55 percent (235 of 425) of Confederate 
generals were killed or wounded at least once, while sixty four generals were wounded 
more than once, including three generals wounded at least five times.
111
 The higher 
Confederate death rates and raw numbers reveal the personal bravery and recklessness of 
southern officers on the battlefield, especially considering the far larger number of Union 
generals. In particular, Confederate officers placed themselves at the fore of most of their 
army’s attacks, as witnessed by the fact that 70 percent of Confederate generals killed in 
action fell in offensive operations.
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 Personal bravery, an important component of 
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Equally revealing as the number of deaths among the Confederate generals is the 
question of when they died. Of the seventy three Confederate generals killed or mortally 
wounded in battle, thirty two were fatally wounded between the war’s beginning and the 
battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg; from July 3, 1863 to the end of the war, forty one 
lost their lives.
114
 More specifically, during the first thirty six months of the war thirty 
seven Confederate generals were killed or mortally wounded in battle, while during the 
last thirteen months thirty six Confederate generals were killed or fatally wounded.
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Why did the killed in action rate of Confederate generals spike in the last thirteen months 
of the war? While the pattern of Confederate generals’ deaths in battle may be 
coincidental, a comparison to the number of Union generals killed in battle makes this 
conclusion unlikely. The Confederacy commissioned 425 generals compared to the 583 
the Union appointed. Of these, at least seventy three Confederate generals were killed or 
mortally wounded in battle (17 percent) compared to only forty four Union generals (7.5 
percent).
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 Moreover, unlike the growth in the numbers of Confederates killed over this 
time, Union generals’ battle deaths remained more evenly distributed. By year, the Union 
lost one, fifteen, thirteen, thirteen, and three generals in battle.
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 These numbers point to 
a cultural explanation for Confederate deaths and highlight the high rate of mortality 
among the South’s officer corps, especially among its most elite members. 
As the prospects for Confederate victory diminished, and the losses piled up, 
Confederate generals sought a conclusion to the war that ended either with a miraculous 
victory or at least guaranteed an honorable defeat. Southerners’ belief that defeat was 
acceptable only when the South could no longer go on fighting emanated from the 
region’s conceptions of personal honor. The prospects of defeat shamed Lee and his 
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fellow generals, but once they began to accept it as a likely outcome, they looked for 
terms that would not impugn their personal honor or the honor of their armies. The data 
suggests that southern gentlemen often concluded that death in battle represented the 
most honorable way out of the war. As Confederate war hero Thomas “Stonewall” 
Jackson wrote: “What is life without honor? Degradation is worse than death.”118 Griffin 
echoed Jackson’s words in a letter to his family: “And if it is God’s will that I shall fall, I 
hope to fall at the head of my men and leave the Legacy, to my Dear Dear very Dear 
family, that I died the most glorious and honorable death known to man — That of 
fighting for Liberty.”119 
Personal sacrifice, so important in the southern elite’s chivalric codes, placed a 
great deal of emphasis on fighting heroically in defense of one’s family.120 As the war 
demanded a growing commitment to realize an ever-diminishing chance of success, the 
number of officer casualties climbed. In short, the number of Confederate generals killed 
in the last thirteen months of the war grew because of officers’ willingness to sacrifice for 
the cause and reverse the downward spiral of the Confederate military fortunes. Whether 
they deliberately put themselves in harm’s way is difficult to determine, but considering 
the South’s cultural attachment to bravery, its marked distaste for surrender, fatalistic 
Christian notions of the virtuous warrior, and the dire straits of a failing Confederate war 
effort, the growth in the number of dead Confederate generals as the war came to a close 
seems unsurprising. Still, southern cultural paradigms differed from other fatalistic 
military ethoses, like the bushido code of Japanese forces in World War II, which made 
death in battle the price of defeat.
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 Instead, Confederate officers, desperately trying to 
stave off defeat, led their armies from increasingly vulnerable positions and suffered 
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devastating casualties because their society praised their sacrificial heroism. Hood noted 
a conversation between himself and Jackson, which highlights how Confederate officers 
conceptualized the inevitability of their death or maiming in battle: 
We were riding together in the direction of General Lee’s headquarters, [and] the 
conversation turned upon the future, and [Jackson] asked me if I expected to live 
to see the end of the war. I replied that I did not know, but was inclined to think I 
would survive; at the same time, I considered it most likely I would be badly 
shattered before the termination of the struggle. I naturally addressed him the 
same question, and, without hesitation, he answered that he did not expect to live 





Confederate officers as a group, and not simply the men of the high command, 
paid a high price for their society’s attachment to honor. Leading from the front lines, 
expected from men who placed a high premium on personal courage, inevitably led to 
high casualty rates among the officer corps. Over the course of the war, the Army of 
Northern Virginia suffered an astonishingly high casualty rate among its officer corps, 
with four of every five either killed outright or wounded at least once.
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 A quarter of all 
southern officers fell in battle, and officers were twice as likely to be killed in action as 
the enlisted men who served under them.
124
 In his seminal work on the Army of Northern 
Virginia, historian Joseph Glatthaar examines Confederate officer casualty rates during 
Seven Pines, Seven Days, Second Bull Run, Antietam, the Valley Campaign, Cedar 
Mountain, and South Mountain. He finds the killed in action rates of Union officers 20 
percent lower and their wounded rates 10 percent lower than their Confederate 
counterparts.
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 Glatthaar’s sample of six hundred Confederate officers and enlisted men 
returns even more shocking numbers. Roughly one in every four officers was killed in 
battle, and half of all officers were killed or wounded at least once.
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 In a larger sample, 
Bruce S. Allardice examines the lives of 1,583 Confederate colonels, and found that 16 
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percent were killed in battle, comparable to the sample of 425 Confederate generals, 
further confirming the sample’s statistical weight.127 Furthermore, the sample of colonels’ 






 Did the casualty rate of Confederate enlisted men look similar to their officers? 
The table above further dispels the notion that Confederate commanders changed their 
tactics as the number of men they had available shrunk.
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 In the same way that 
Confederate generals continued to hazard their lives, if not purposefully put themselves at 
greater risk, casualties among Confederate enlisted men suffered through the same spike 
in numbers. This indicates one of two things: that Confederate commanders, seeking 
death or glory, exposed their armies to even greater perils as the war went on, or that 
Confederate enlisted soldiers shared the same feelings about their ever decreasing 
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war that made death in battle a preferable outcome. As one Confederate soldier wrote in 
1865:  
“I am in favor of prosecuting [this war] to the last extremity. For if we do not gain 
our independence, I cannot see anything but [my own] slavery staring me in the 
face, and . . . I would rather die . . . . I am not willing to be driven back [—] until 
the last man of us has perished.”130 
 
Both explanations also point to a demonstrable rise in Confederate forces 
exposing themselves to sustained combat in an effort to gain victories. The data supports 
this assertion, especially when compared to Union casualties, which did not rise 
consistently throughout the war. However, the raw casualty data reveals a fascinating 
dichotomy when viewed alongside the numbers of Confederate soldiers captured during 
the war. While it seems logical to expect Confederate battle deaths to mirror the number 
of soldiers captured, the data instead suggests success in battle correlated significantly 
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battles. The battles represent fifteen Confederate tactical victories, ten tactical Union 
victories, and two inconclusive engagements.
132
 Immediately noticeable is the 
discrepancy between the numbers of soldiers captured in victories rather than defeats. 
Military theory would argue that soldiers are more likely to be captured in defeat than in 
victory, and this dictum lines up perfectly with the data on Union soldiers captured in 
these battles; nearly 70 percent of Union soldiers captured surrendered in battles in which 
they were tactically defeated. However, the opposite is true of Confederate soldiers, 
where the number of their soldiers captured in defeat is only slightly more than half. 
Confederate soldiers captured in battle were 15 percent more likely to be taken during a 
victory than their Union adversaries.
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Why did the rate of Confederate soldiers captured climb in victories in 
comparison to Union soldiers? Confederate generals were often disinclined to call off 
attacks that had already met objectives or carried the field. At Seven Days, 
Chancellorsville, Chickamauga, and the Wilderness, Confederate officers continued to 
lead attacks even after securing the field, routing portions of Union lines, or meeting 
objectives. Their behavior follows the southern cultural paradigm that praised courage 
and aggressive behavior. Commanders found it difficult to rein in troops who moved too 
far ahead and hesitated to stop attacks that were succeeding. Withdrawal or hesitation 
result in public accusations of cowardice. With their masculinity and bravery at stake, 
Confederate commanders and soldiers kept attacking beyond what made military sense to 
gain a decisive victory. They more often initiated battles, continued to attack once battle 
was joined, and lost far more men in victory their Union foes. For example, in the 
thirteen battles in which Confederate forces lost at least one thousand men captured 
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included in the table above, they were the aggressors in ten of the battles. In short, the 
southern honor culture increased the likelihood that Confederate soldiers would continue 
to attack beyond military necessity, thereby increasing the likelihood they would advance 
too far and fall into Union hands. The data suggests this was particularly true in 
Confederate triumphs, where victorious southern soldiers pursued defeated Union forces 
too quickly and became victims of their own success. 
Officer resignation rates offer another marker of a commander’s personal 
investment and perhaps sense of duty, by showing the likelihood officers would resign 
their commission and return to civilian life or non-combat duty. Here, the difference 
between Union and Confederate generals is even more pronounced. One hundred ten 
Union generals resigned their commands during the war, compared to only nineteen of 
their Confederate counterparts.
134
 Only one Confederate general was cashiered out of the 
service during the war, while three Union generals faced dismissal.
135
 Union generals 
who failed spectacularly faced significant inquiry from the Federal War Department, 
which weeded out insubordinate or incompetent commanders. Conversely, the 
Confederates considered defeat an honorable outcome of battle as long as they conducted 
themselves bravely. Consequently, officers resigned at far lower rates, despite failure in 
battle. This may have enabled incompetent commanders who should have been cashiered 
to keep their jobs. John Bell Hood’s performance at Franklin should have cost him his 
command, but his superiors allowed him retain it, resulting in the crushing defeat at 
Nashville. Even with the relative paucity of experienced commanders late in the war, 
Davis passed over several generals more qualified to lead the Army of Tennessee than 
Hood, including James Longstreet. 
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Confederate commanders who displayed personal bravery demanded the same 
from their units, resulting in high casualty rates. However, dividing casualties by 
enlistment totals paints an incomplete picture, and does not reflect the character of the 
individual southern soldier. In Attack and Die, historians Grady McWhiney and Perry D. 
Jamieson use the war’s raw casualty data to argue that Confederate aggression severely 
damaged fighting capabilities and wasted manpower reserves.
136
 Using mathematical 
equations to examine variables such as topography, chance of success, combat 
experience, and other battle-specific data help paint a fuller picture. Exchange ratios, for 
example, depict the losses sustained by a military suffering an attritional war, as the 
Confederacy did in its final months. Civil War force ratio equations, in contrast, identify 
an army’s ability to inflict casualties, by dividing an opponent’s casualties by the size of 
the enemy’s army.137 The higher the force ratio achieved, the more successful an army 
was at inflicting casualties on its opponent. Scholar Herbert K. Weiss examines force 
ratios and concludes that Confederate forces were more effective at inflicting casualties 
than their Union opponents.
138
 Employing three principal sources — Frederick Phisterer, 
Statistical Record, Thomas L. Livermore, Numbers and Losses in the Civil War, and 
Gaston Bodart, Kriegs-Lexikon — Weiss demonstrates the consistent ability of 
Confederate forces to perform effectively in battle despite their numerical deficiencies.
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Phisterer details 2,261 separate engagements in the war, while Livermore describes sixty-
four battles resulting in at least one thousand Union casualties.  
Weiss rejects McWhiney and Jamieson’s blanket descriptions of southern military 
wastefulness. Based on force ratio analysis, Weiss examines the entire Civil War and 
concludes that Confederate forces, with a 15.5 percent force ratio, inflicted casualties 
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more effectively than the Union, whose force ratio was 11.5 percent.
140
 The numbers 
suggest southerners were better able to inflict casualties and therefore more effective in 
battle than their Union opponents. More important, Confederates performed well in 
offensive battles and attacking fortified lines. Southern cultural values often prevented 
Confederate armies from disengaging or hesitating before attacking entrenched lines that 
might have slowed or stopped less aggressive commanders. Weiss’s calculations also 
show that defenders clearly had an advantage in attacking fortified lines. An examination 
of Union and Confederate attacks on fortified lines reveals how each side fared as 
offensive and defensive entities. Table 3.5, focusing on battles with the highest losses per 
one thousand and at least five thousand soldiers on both sides, reveals that Confederates 
consistently achieved higher force ratios. 
Table of select battles and force ratios 
Union losses per 1000 (Force ratio %) Confederate losses per 1000 (Force ratio %) 
Victories Defeats/Failures Victories Defeats/Failures 
Stones River 223 (24) Port Hudson, June 14 267 
(1) 
Chickamauga 259 (24) Gettysburg 301 (35) 
Gettysburg 212 (33) Olustee 265 (17) Chancellorsville 187 (28) Stones River 266 (37%) 
Shiloh 162 (17) Cedar Mountain 219 (17) Bull Run/Chantilly 187 
(36) 
Shiloh 241 (33) 
Antietam 155 (18) Fort Wagner 214 (11) Olustee 180 (37) Atlanta, July 28 222 (4) 
Cedar Creek 132 (9) Chickamauga 196 (31) Drewry’s Bluff 158 (23) Franklin 206 (12) 
Winchester 124 (10) Wilson’s Creek 175 (22) Gaines’s Mill 153 (12) Tulepo 201 (7) 
Fair Oaks 105 (14) Drewry’s Bluff 175 (8) Wilson’s Creek 100 (12) Perryville 196 (26) 
Pea Ridge 105 (8) Port Hudson, May 27 141 
(2) 
Fort Wagner 95(84) Atlanta, July 22 190 (9) 
Corinth 104 (18) The Mine 138 (10) Cedar Mountain 79 (14) Fair Oaks 137 (12) 
Perryville 100 (6) Bull Run/Chantilly 132 
(13) 
Pleasant Hill 70 (11) Peachtree Creek 133 (9) 
Non-weighted average: 
142 
Non-weighted average: 192 Non-weighted average: 146 Non-weighted average: 
209 
Average force ratio: 
15.7% 
Average force ratio: 13.2% Average force ratio: 28.1% Average force ratio: 18.4% 








 Table 3.5 reveals the high Confederate casualty rates in failed assaults, but it also 
demonstrates high Confederate force ratios. Confederate armies achieved higher total 
force ratios and higher average force ratios than their Union counterparts, often gaining 
battlefield successes independent of force size. Despite being outnumbered, Confederate 
forces were often more potent statistically on the attack than their Union opponents. In 
victory, the average Confederate soldier inflicted 12.4 percent more casualties than Union 
soldiers, and in defeat, 5.2 percent.
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This data can also be used to examine battle success by battle size. The 
highlighted battles represent engagements that included at least forty thousand men on 
the battlefield. The two columns with the most highlighted battles are Union victories and 
Confederate defeats, demonstrating that despite impressive individual per-man 
performances, Confederate defeats in major battles doomed their long term goals. Of the 
sixteen individual battles highlighted, Confederate forces were the primary aggressors in 
twelve. Confederate forces also took the offensive in seven of the war’s nine costliest 
battles. Fox’s Regimental Losses records seventy Confederate regiments that suffered at 
least 50 percent casualties in a single engagement.
143
 In contrast, during the entire 
Franco-Prussian War, only two regiments suffered a single battle casualty rate above 46 
percent.
144
 Military historians often conclude that high casualty rates in single battles 
indicates defeat, an incompetent general, or a reckless assault. But thirty three (47 
percent) of the regimental losses listed by Fox occurred in Confederate tactical victories. 
These numbers indicate the Confederate proclivity to over-expose units to prolonged 
action, a disregard for individual losses, and collective bravery among the rank and file. 
The highest single battle percentage loss of the war belonged to Hood’s 1st Texas 
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regiment at Antietam at 82.3 percent.
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 Without an incredibly strong social stigma 
denigrating cowardice and promoting bravery, Confederate soldiers would not have made 
these sorts of sacrifices. The southern honor culture pervaded Confederate units and 
enabled them to sustain incredibly high unit losses in pursuit of victory. The honor 
culture influenced both the officer corps and the enlisted men. Even though the South’s 
lower class conceptualized honor differently than their social betters, it still pushed them 
to attack and die with little hesitation. The incredible casualty rate of the Confederacy’s 
enlisted men testifies to their bravery as well as the aggression of their commanders. 
Taken together, they help explain the incredibly high losses the Confederacy both 
suffered and inflicted. 
 The end of the Civil War represented a cataclysmic humbling of the South’s 
people and the culture that guided their actions. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and 
civilians died or were wounded, the region’s slave population gained its freedom, and the 
South’s economy collapsed. A war to protect slavery and the right of states to secede to 
protect that institution began with a confidence endemic to the South’s prewar elite. 
Southern men, believing in their superiority as soldiers, statesmen, and warriors, thought 
their defeat impossible. During the war, the Confederate military conducted itself as an 
extension of the culture that created it. Confederate commanders recognized their place in 
the European military tradition, but they remained more concerned with their role as 
southern men of honor. From the first shot at Fort Sumter, Confederate commanders 
carried out the war without compromising the values of the plantation society from which 
they sprang. The white South’s emphasis on aggression, courage, masculinity, disdain for 
cowardice, and the protection of the community propelled Confederate battlefield 
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strategy. The South’s planter class, the region’s antebellum political, social, and 
economic elite, took up arms to defend what they perceived as the North’s attack on their 
culture. The relative homogeneity of the Confederate officer corps ensured that the values 
they lived by before the war helped guide them on the battlefield. As a result, they 
adopted aggressive tactics throughout the war, only partially abandoning them when the 
losses became too great to bear. Only when the Confederate military lost the ability to 
conduct the war aggressively, did southern men believe they could surrender honorably. 
The South’s honor culture guided the Confederate populace both in its fight for 
independence and in its decision to put down arms and return to the Union. 
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EPILOGUE: RECONSTRUCTION, RADICALS, AND RECIDIVISM 
 
 
The collapse of the Confederate States of America’s military in 1865 broke the 
will of the South’s populace to continue serious organized resistance. After four long and 
bloody years of war, the Confederacy was trampled under the victorious advance of 
Union armies. In terms of material damage to the South and its white population, the 
Civil War represented a complete upheaval. Hundreds of thousands of Confederate 
soldiers were battle casualties and more than a quarter of southern white men of military 
age died during the war from battle, disease, and in Union prisons.
1
 Some 57 percent of 
the Confederacy’s counties witnessed enemy action, a number that accounted for 63 
percent of the Confederacy’s free population.2 A war to protect slavery, preserve honor, 
and secede from the Union failed, and a majority of the white population felt that defeat 
personally, whether they witnessed it scar their land or lost loved ones in the fighting. As 
William Faulkner wrote in 1951, “the past is never dead. It’s not even past.”3 Despite 
their defeat in the Civil War and the changes that loss meant for the region, white 
southerners determined to retain the racial, economic, and social hegemony they enjoyed 
before the war. In the wake of their military defeat, white southerners turned to new 
mediums of discourse for southern honor, southern militarism, and southern identity. 
Even after the humbling of their armies during the Civil War, the South’s white elite 
believed in their superiority and looked for ways to vindicate their honor. Prominent 
southern publisher H. Rives Pollard wrote in 1866: “The South can yet preserve its moral 
and intellectual distinctiveness as a people, and continue to assert its well-known 
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superiority over the North in civilization, and political scholarship, in its schools of 
refinement and in all standards of individual character. This superiority the war has not 
conquered or lowered, and the South will do right to claim and cherish it.”4 Far from 
stamping out the honor culture of the South, the Civil War helped infuse new life into it, 
albeit in ways different from the violence of the battlefield. 
 The South’s white populace felt deep shame as a result of their wartime failures. 
In the minds of militant southerners, the Civil War should have vindicated long held 
beliefs about their military and cultural superiority over their northern neighbors. For 
several decades before the outbreak of hostilities, many white southerners viewed civil 
conflict as an eventuality that if not welcome, would be easily won. The possibility of 
defeat did not enter their deepest nightmares. At the end of the Civil War, white 
southerners once so sure of their superiority had to face a new era publicly humbled and 
with the very foundations of their society shaken. The South’s slaveocracy, which had 
long dictated the region’s national posture felt particularly humiliated. The Emancipation 
Proclamation, announced during the war, and the Thirteenth Amendment, adopted in 
1865, forever outlawed slavery and destroyed the foundations of prewar southern 
society.
5
 Ratified by most of the southern states after the war in order to gain readmission 
to the Union, the Thirteenth Amendment represented the end of the South’s slave society. 
 Yet during the postwar process of rebuilding the South known as Reconstruction, 
the white elite stubbornly refused to recognize their defeat. Rejecting the calls of northern 
Republicans to enforce severe penalties on their defeated region, southern Democrats 
fought back. Even though the federal government barred many former Confederates from 
public office and thousands of senior Confederate soldiers and public servants had to take 
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loyalty oaths because of their role in the rebellion, they still vehemently opposed 
Reconstruction, often through illegal means.
6
 Some former Confederate leaders found 
remaining in the conquered South too humiliating and chose exile in foreign nations 
instead.
7
 Though never numbering more than a few thousand, the exodus of ex-




Alongside President Abraham Lincoln’s stated purpose of returning the southern 
states to the Union, northern Republicans demanded a change in black-white relations in 
the South. But racist white southerners refused to relinquish their place in the social 
hierarchy of the South. They viewed recognizing their former slaves as social equals as 
tantamount to a complete destruction of the southern way of life. Instead, white 
southerners fought back in several ways. Legally, southern legislatures worked to gut 
measures to enfranchise blacks, help provide former slaves with the means to leave their 
plantations, and begin the process of introducing widespread literacy to the southern 
black community. In addition, southern whites resisted what they saw as intrusions by 
northern whites, whom they derisively labeled carpetbaggers, and federal agencies, 




 White southerners also believed that northerners economically exploited the 
extreme poverty of the South. The legal end of slavery crippled the southern plantation 
system. Widespread war devastation and rampant inflation left many southern 
landowners destitute and the value of southern property fell to less than half of its pre-
1860 worth.
10
 Pervasive poverty among the former white southern elite created 
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opportunities for northerners with liquid assets who came to the region, acquired 
plantations at low prices, purchased control of business interests, and inserted themselves 
into the local political structure through money and alliances with the partially mobilized 
southern blacks.
11
 As a result, both groups earned the enmity of the southern white elite, 
now pushed from their former place of economic and social preeminence in the South. 
The end of slavery automatically forced a partial collapse of the South’s plantation 
system, fundamentally changing the nature of the region’s agrarian economy. The 
average size of plantations fell by half between 1860 and 1880, but the devastation 
wrought to southern farmland during the war opened new avenues of economic growth, 
especially smaller sharecropping farms.
12
 Northern businessmen used the opportunity to 
open the region to new industry, especially railroads, and helped finance the construction 
of thousands of miles of track.
13
 Northerners and northern capital dominated the shift to a 
more modern and diverse economy, further alienating southerners from a rebuilding 
process that despite its benefits they did not initially control. Even though these northern 
efforts benefited the region, southern whites refused to cooperate with northerners or the 
newly enfranchised African American population. To combat these groups, southern 
whites turned to an illegal means of redress with which they had great familiarity before 
and during the war: violence. 
 On April 14, 1865, five days after the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
John Wilkes Booth stepped into the President Lincoln’s box at Ford’s Theatre and shot 
him. By some accounts, Booth yelled either, “The South is avenged,” or “Sic semper 
tyrannus,” meaning “Thus always to tyrants,” in Latin.14 The Lincoln assassination sent 
shockwaves through the North and South, and raised new questions about how Congress 
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would approach Reconstruction. Before his death, Lincoln’s policy had embraced a 
consistently moderate approach to readmitting the defeated South to the Union.
15
 He 
understood the anger the war’s bloodletting had caused in the North, but sought to 
balance the desire for vengeance against the need to reform the nation peacefully and 
quickly. His magnanimity and willingness to include the South in the process of reunion 
was correspondingly diminished in Republican leadership in the years that followed his 
assassination. Without his steadying hand, the less moderate elements of the Republican 
Party had a stronger platform to challenge the tone of Reconstruction.
16
 President 
Andrew Johnson, a southern sympathizer, clashed with the Republican majority, 
essentially supporting the elements of southern society determined to erase their defeat. 
Republicans seized control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate 
and enacted legislation, often over the veto of Johnson.
17
 They sought to lengthen 
Reconstruction and make the South pay for the war, force changes in the treatment of 
southern blacks, and stamp out the racist southern culture that had caused the war in the 
first place.
18
 In the words of Pennsylvania Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, 
Reconstruction must “revolutionize Southern institutions, habits, and manners . . . . The 
foundations of their institutions . . . must be broken up and relaid, or all our blood and 
treasure have been spent in vain.”19 The southern elite instead sought immediate 
admittance to the Union, a quick return of their voting privileges, and a restoration of 
their political equality. A speedy Reconstruction would have rewarded the South for 
seceding because the slave population, which previously counted as three-fifths of the 
total population for the purpose of congressional representation, would now as freemen 
be counted as equals. The southern states stood to gain congressional representation and 
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political power through their defeat.
20
 Republicans rightly opposed such an outcome and 
before readmitting the former rebel states, sought serious concessions and changes. But 
the southern states were unwilling to make changes to their society, even in the face of a 
northern military occupation. 
The assassination of Lincoln, though certainly the most well-known act of 
southern postwar violence, was hardly the last.
21
 Many southern whites, regardless of 
social and economic class, rejected the policies of Republicans and mounted resistance, 
often violent, against the party’s perceived proxies — northerners in the South, free 
blacks, and southern whites sympathetic to the Republican cause, known as scalawags.
22
 
As publisher H. Rives Pollard explained, “We shall strike hard blows for the people and 
against their oppressors, whether they be native enemies or imported tyrants.”23 The 
presence of a sizable number of discharged Confederate veterans helped spawn dozens of 
paramilitary groups that terrorized the perceived “enemies” of the southern Democratic 
cause. They murdered and terrorized African Americans, engaged in widespread voter 
suppression, and intimidated northern businessmen and their allies whenever they 
could.
24
 The largest of these paramilitary organizations, the Klu Klux Klan, counted 
many high ranking ex-Confederate generals such as George Gordon and Nathan Bedford 
Forrest as early members.
25
 Even Federal forces occupying the South struggled to protect 
populations targeted by the Klan, though Ulysses Grant managed to suppress it in some 
states during his presidency. As the South’s violent resistance stiffened, many southern 
whites looked increasingly at the Civil War as a shameful blot on their regional memory. 
Determined to erase their failure, white southerners began a highly successful effort to 
distort the realities of the war and restore their honor. 
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 To explain their military defeat and rationalize the end of their slavery-based 
culture, the white southern elite turned to mythmaking. The myths, collectively known as 
“the Lost Cause of the Confederacy,” involved two separate accounts of the Civil War. 
The first, fact-based account of the war, described what actually happened. In contrast, 
the southern interpretation of events, people, and battles willfully distorted the memory of 
the Civil War during the postwar era. This misrepresentation reflected several flawed 
assumptions about the South’s participation in the war and the region’s ability to conduct 
it successfully. The Lost Cause represented a deliberate attempt to explain away the 
defeat of the Confederacy by shifting the blame from the military competency of the 
officer corps as a group toward other factors.
26
 The Lost Cause myth originated in the 
postwar writings of Confederate officers, helping to explain its militaristic focus. In short, 
the Lost Cause was a cultural and literary movement through which the southern elite 
attempted to escape culpability for the war, vindicate their behavior, keep their honor 
intact, and explain their military failures by blaming factors beyond their control. 
The Lost Cause movement originated with a series of articles written by one of 
Robert E. Lee’s former lieutenant generals, Jubal Early. Like many of his fellow Lost 
Cause writers, Early argued that the Confederacy had not lost because of the military skill 
of the United States but as a result of its overwhelming numbers.
27
 In their view, the 
Confederacy lasted for four years only because of the military abilities of its generals, 
specifically Lee and Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson. In the highly Christian South, the two 
titans of the Army of Northern Virginia acquired saintly qualities, transforming their 
military exploits into extended hagiographies.
28
 The work of Early and his fellow Lost 
Cause writers deeply influenced southern opinion after the Confederacy’s defeat, their 
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authority arising from their positions during the war. Men like Early, who served in the 
Army of Northern Virginia, played an instrumental role in creating the cult of Lee and 
Jackson. The primacy of the eastern theatre, which quickly became a central tenet of Lost 
Cause writers, developed because of men like Early who served there and believed that 
front the most important of the war. As their writing gained increasing credence, the 
importance of the western theatre correspondingly diminished. As a result, mainstream 
American culture began to accept the primacy of the eastern theatre, and gradually myth 
passed into fact.
29
 The acceptance of the Lost Cause by much of the white South 
eventually grew beyond simple arguments about the relative importance of Confederate 
armies. A series of ideologically driven dogmas began to develop as southern memory. 
Most important, the Confederate elite argued that defeat was both simultaneously 
inevitable because of Union advantages and somehow also winnable due to the skill of 
Confederate generals.
30
 The fact that these two arguments were mutually exclusive 
proved immaterial to Confederate mythmakers. On one hand, they argued that Union 
armies, much larger, better supplied, and more numerous, made southern resistance noble 
but ultimately futile.
31
 However, they also argued that the exploits of Confederate 
generals like Lee and Jackson nearly won the war. In their opinion, the Battle of 
Gettysburg, and Pickett’s Charge in particular, represented the “high tide” of the 
Confederacy geographically into Union territory and in terms of its chances of victory. 
The triumph slipped from their grasp, not because Lee destroyed part of his force in an 
unsuccessful attack into the teeth of the Union army, but because they had been betrayed 
from within, by too cautious or incompetent elements of the military. 
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The enshrining of Lee and Jackson required that their battle records be scrubbed 
clean of defeat. Southern writers simply ignored Lee’s initial failures in 1861 and his 
subsequent demotion.
32
 Likewise, they downplayed Jackson’s poor showing during the 
Seven Days campaign, and instead both men’s other victories became evidence of their 
impressive combat records.
33
 According to Lost Cause proponents, Jackson’s death at 
Chancellorsville robbed the Confederacy of one of its greatest defenders, and had he 
lived the outcome of the war would have somehow changed. The whitewashing of 
specific beloved commanders’ military records also required identifying a group of 
officers to blame for defeat. Chief among them was one of Lee’s corps commanders, 
James Longstreet. Despite Lee’s affection for Longstreet, and Longstreet’s own strong 
combat record, many Lost Cause writers vilified Lee’s “Old Warhorse.”34 In particular, 
they pointed to his failures on the second day of Gettysburg as evidence of his ineptitude. 
However, Lost Cause writers more likely targeted Longstreet because of his close 
relationship after the war with Republican President Ulysses Grant and his support for 
Republican Reconstruction in the South.
35
 Another focus of contention centered on the 
lost orders during the Maryland campaign, and recriminations swirled for years after the 
war as generals blamed one another in an effort to escape culpability.
36
 
Elite southerners also looked to the prewar period as part of the reimagining of 
their role in the Civil War. Antebellum whites embraced the concept of paternalism, 
which argued that African Americans benefited from their enslavement because they 
were a backward, less evolved people.
37
 As Confederate Senator Benjamin Hill wrote in 
1865, “Slavery is the only civilizer of the negro.”38 Southern slaveholders believed they 
brought the light of Christian humanitarianism to their enslaved people, and this 
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understanding helped them justify race-based slavery. By arguing for paternalism, 
antebellum slaveholders painted a fictitious portrait of happy slaves basking in their 
master’s strong but ultimately beneficial control. This southern white memory of slavery 
ignored the endemic and frighteningly casual brutality, frequent escape attempts, and 
unrelenting fear of slave revolt that characterized the antebellum period.
39
 After the war, 
former slaveholders and southern apologists continued to argue that their slaveocracy 
benefited African Americans, and that the institution of slavery would have died out 
naturally without northern hostility.
40
 Unsurprisingly, the fact that hundreds of thousands 
of former slaves bore arms or assisted Union armies in the fight against the Confederate 
escaped mention by southern writers.
41
 Their argument that slavery would die naturally 
contrasted sharply with prewar southern efforts to further entrench slavery where it 
already existed and spread it to new territory in the American West. In short, after the war 
white southerners continued to misrepresent the conditions and goals of slavery. They 
persisted in creating myths about the origin and nature of the war, but the foundations of 
their arguments rested on outright falsifications. 
Alongside their paternalistic arguments, postwar southerners explicitly stated that 
the hostility of northern abolitionists caused the war.
42
 According to white southerners, 
their region’s cultural aggression had nothing to do with the increasingly hostile 
antebellum sectional rhetoric. A significant feature of the Lost Cause consisted of white-
washing the South’s culpability in starting the war or even laying the groundwork for its 
outbreak. Southern writers argued that the North forced the war upon them, and that they 
would have happily left the Union without fighting. Their argument implied that all states 
possessed the legal right to secede and that leaving the Union did not constitute grounds 
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for the use of force by Federal troops. Even ignoring the constitutional and legal 
ramifications of this argument, southerners essentially discounted their role in igniting the 
war at Fort Sumter. They even attempted to change public perceptions of the war through 
its name. Referring to it variously as the War Between the States, the War of the 
Rebellion, the War of Northern Aggression, the War for Southern Independence, or the 
Freedom War absolved the South of culpability or explicitly blamed the North.
43
 
Despite the political and economic undertones of the southern propaganda 
campaign, the central goal of the Lost Cause writers remained the restoration of southern 
honor, something that required white-washing the Confederacy’s military performance. 
The failure of the Confederacy to achieve its independence through war, despite their 
belief in their military superiority, represented a blow to the region’s pride and distinct 
culture. Rooted in confrontation, the honor culture of the South demanded that gentleman 
who sought honor be victorious in any contest. The South’s decision to go to war 
represented a region-wide acceptance of confrontation with the North. Defeat, especially 
when southerners believed they would enjoy an easy victory, crushed the region’s self-
important conceptions.
44
 An honorable fight made defeat acceptable, but it remained a 
blemish on the reputation of the southern white elite. To erase this stain southern writers 
essentially rewrote the history of the war. In an era when the white elite was losing 
control of the South’s economy, politics, and society, the assault on history offered them 
a comfortable refuge. They could still satisfy their honor by reimagining the war. In 
particular, they found the assertion that northern resources made the war unwinnable 
extremely reassuring. Believing that their resistance was noble, but doomed from the 
outset, made southern whites better able to rationalize defeat. In their mind, they were not 
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beaten, but simply overwhelmed by the sheer numbers, money, and military resources of 
the North. 
Such beliefs also allowed white southerners to continue to discuss their military 
superiority and the stellar combat records of their leading generals, while dismissing 
Union generals, even successful ones, as products of the North’s industrial might. For 
example, southerners pointed to Grant’s bloody Overland Campaign as evidence that he 
was a butcher rather than a general, while ignoring his campaign against Vicksburg 
which represented some of the most skilled maneuvering of the war by either side.
45
 But 
Lost Cause proponents never concerned themselves with facts. The southern writers who 
created the myth believed in the justness of their cause and the truth of their assertions, 
but doing so required distorting the history of the war. The Lost Cause ignored historical 
facts because white southerners found such memories easier to accept than the 
alternative. Such myths absolved white southerners of culpability and allowed them to 
regain the honor they had lost in defeat. 
Several major tenets of the Lost Cause continue to echo in modern America.
46
 
Historians have argued that even though the North won the Civil War, the South won the 
fight for the war’s memory by convincing themselves that they had not been defeated.47 
After the war, northerners struggled to reconcile themselves to the great losses they 
suffered in pursuit of holding the Union together. With abolition complete, the North lost 
one of its greatest cultural unifiers in the decade before the Civil War. Westward 
expansion and significant economic opportunities also facilitated a redistribution of the 
North’s populace. While the white South found vocal ways to assuage their battered 
cultural psyche, northerners became intensely introspective. Without serious northern 
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opposition to the voluminous southern Lost Cause writers, the South effectively rewrote 
the history of the war. Even in modern America, many of the main beliefs of the Lost 
Cause still find ready acceptance.
48
 The Lost Cause effectively reduced the war to an 
incorrect caricature, depicting the North as a rapacious behemoth that ruthlessly 
suppressed a noble, justified, and prostrate South.
49
 Despite their military defeat, the 
South effectively dictated the nation’s memory of the Civil War. 
Before the Civil War, the white elite of the South dominated the economy, 
politics, and social system of the region. The honor culture that guided their actions 
rested on a series of belief structures deeply influenced by their own sense of superiority. 
Honor, pride, courage, and masculinity dominated the social interactions of white 
southerners, who were acutely aware of their place in the region’s social hierarchy. The 
white elite created a racist society that dominated and exploited its subservient black 
slave population for profit and power. When the Civil War broke out between the 
southern slave states and the free North, the South’s elite readily accepted their roles as 
the Confederacy’s military leadership. The honor culture’s violence, aggression, and 
militarism provided a strong basis for military participation throughout the South. The 
Confederacy fought for four years, but ultimately was defeated. The same culture that 
allowed southerners to fight so fiercely also allowed the region to lay down its arms in 
honorable defeat. However, white southerners remained deeply shamed by their defeat 
and almost immediately after the war turned to myth-making to explain their loss. 
Despite the devastation and destruction wrought by the Civil War, the South’s white elite 
stubbornly clung to their sense of superiority. Before, during, and after the war, the 
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southern honor culture defined the white elite, and helps explain their actions on and off 
the battlefield. 
The Confederate Lost Cause enabled the white South to recover emotionally after 
its defeat in the Civil War. More important, it provided a point of resistance for white 
southerners in their fight against Reconstruction and its proponents. The Lost Cause 
stiffened southern attachments to the honor culture and it created a way for white 
southerners to take pride in their region, even in defeat. Sadly, the Lost Cause effectively 
reinforced the violent, insular, and racist identifiers of the antebellum South during the 
postwar period. It substituted antebellum paternalism and hatred of abolitionists for 
postwar hatred of Republicans, northern businessmen, freemen, and southerners who 
cooperated with the northern-led state governments. After 1865, southern whites took 
renewed pride in their cultural values as they sought to regain political and economic 
control of their region from northern domination. By the end of Reconstruction, southern 
resistance largely erased the gains of free African Americans, the federal government, 
and northerners in the region. In 1877, after several years of increased anti-black 
violence, voter intimidation, and election fraud, white southerners gained control of the 
state governments of Louisiana, Florida, and South Carolina, effectively returning white 
control to the South.
50
 The northern public, weary of the sectional conflict, let the South 
return to its antebellum conservatism and racism. Southern elites, humbled by their 
military defeat, essentially rewrote the history of the war to restore a measure of pride to 
their battered honor. They paid a heavy price, however, as the Lost Cause guaranteed that 
the South remained chained to the racism and classism of the antebellum period. Over the 
next several decades the rest of the nation moved forward economically and culturally 
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while the South stagnated. But within a few years of the end of Reconstruction, white 
southerners could look back on the Civil War with pride, recalling the nobility of their 
defiance, the dignity of their defeat, and the immaculate condition of their honor. The 
South fabricated a new past from the ashes of their defeat, one about which they could 
proudly boast.
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